[I’m referring to Tan Eng Hong, Vellama, and Kenneth Jeyaretnam below.]
I think our best bet is that it could refer to a ‘right’ to have a licence, a ‘right’ to a hearing, a ‘right’ to not be dealt with on the basis of irrelevant considerations, a ‘right’ to have legitimate expectations duly considered, etc.
One reason why courts have not told us is that it rarely matters. In many cases involving administrative law, the decision being impugned will be one that targets the applicant in particular (e.g. a decision to not make a grant; a decision to revoke a licence; etc.) According to Vellama at [33], the law on standing aims to prevent a situation where “the courts will be inundated by a multiplicity of actions, some raised by mere busybodies and social gadflies, to the detriment of good public administration”; according to Tan Eng Hong at [82], “‘mere busybodies’ whose rights are not affected” cannot have standing. If only one person is affected, the purposes of the law on standing are met by simply granting standing to that one person and to nobody else, for there is no definition of “busybody” or “gadfl[y]” according to which that one person would be a busybody/gadfly.
Perhaps the courts ought to take a step back from formulaic references to “private right” etc., and simply ask themselves why the law on standing exists. If the purpose is simply to ensure that the person before the court has the best arguments and evidence to make the application, then clearly the one person affected by the decision would – and should – be the one to have standing. Consider the pragmatic approach in Comptroller of Income Tax v ACC [2010] 2 SLR 1189 (CA): the Comptroller had concluded that ACC was personally liable to pay withholding tax; therefore, “if [ACC] did not have locus standi to commence proceedings for a review of the Comptroller’s determination [that ACC had to pay withholding tax], we were unable to see who else would have locus standi to do so.”
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