Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

(Potentially) unconstitutional legislation: what does Tan Eng Hong say about Art 4 and Art 162 of the Constitution?

The passage in Tan Eng Hong beginning at [59], which discusses Articles 4 and 162 of the Constitution, is somewhat confusing. One of you expressed confusion as to what the following sentences from [59] mean: “Article 4 provides for the unconstitutional portion of the law to be severed while retaining the remaining part of the law in the statute books. In other words, the court’s power to void laws for inconsistency with the Constitution under Art 4 can be interpreted to include the power to void laws which pre-date the Constitution.” 

One possibility is that “[i]n other words” means that the court can (for example) use its power under Art 162 to “constru[e]” the entire Penal Code with the “modificatio[n], adaptatio[n], qualificatio[n] [or] exceptio[n]” that it does not include s 377A. But this would be stretching the meanings of the words “modificatio[n], adaptatio[n], qualificatio[n] [or] exceptio[n]”.

I think there is a simpler way of looking at the matter.

 The way I understand it, Art 4 says two things:

  1. “This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of Singapore”
  2. “any law enacted by the Legislature after the commencement of this Constitution which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void”

 All (b) does is to restate one of the consequences of (a), namely, that legislation contrary to the Constitution enacted after 9 August 1965 is void. But there are still other consequences of (a), e.g., that any legislation contrary to the Constitution can be void. If s 377A were unconstitutional, then striking it down would take place pursuant to (a), not (b). In fact, (b) would be irrelevant. So we wouldn’t be able to say that (b) is being contradicted or departed from.

I draw support for this view from the part of para [60] which says that “Article 4 provides for one of the most important features of the Constitution, viz, that it is the supreme law of Singapore” – the court focuses on point (a); there is no mention of point (b). Further, at [63], the court uses the Wee Commission report in order to make the point that “the supremacy of the Constitution is necessary for the purposes of the Constitution to be protected” – again, there is no reference to (b).

If we see things this way, then there’s really no need to refer to Art 162 at all. In short, we could simply say that, if a statutory provision is contrary to the Constitution, it is void simply because the Constitution is the “supreme law of the Republic of Singapore”, and “suprem[acy]” implies that anything contrary to that which is “supreme” is of no effect.

One might then ask: what is the point of (b), if what it says is already encapsulated in (a)? My answer would be that (b) serves to make the point that, while legislation contrary to the Constitution enacted after 9 August 1965 shall be void, other legislation contrary to the Constitution might be void but, because of Art 162, is not necessarily so.


Art 162 says that “all existing laws shall continue in force… but all such laws shall… be construed… with such modifications [etc.] as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with this Constitution”. To my mind, the Court of Appeal read this as meaning that all such laws must be brought into conformity with the Constitution (as opposed to merely meaning that the courts must try to bring all such laws into conformity with the Constitution). If this is correct, then Art 162 does not say that all such laws are constitutionally valid; it says that they are not, but they must be made so. This would leave a gap: what if they cannot be made so using the means set out in Art 162? The Court of Appeal’s answer was: they are void.

I think that a more problematic aspect of the Court’s reasoning was its reading of “construed”. Yes, there are limits to construction: for example, the orthodoxy is that construction cannot be rewriting. But Art 162 does not merely say that certain laws must be “construed”; it says that they must be “construed… with… modifications” etc. — so, one would think, Art 162 does authorise (in fact, require) the court to make changes to the statute to make it constitutionally valid. On the other hand, this view is not totally unproblematic: modification is not re-writing. (Can it be said that the statute has a ‘basic structure’ which cannot be changed by way of “modifications”?)

Perhaps the answer to this is similar to how the UK courts have, under s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, “read and given effect” to legislation “in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”. This includes ‘reading in’ words into the statute / ‘reading down’ the words in the statue: see Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza (which we will be examining in the last topic of the course). Chan Sek Keong, in his article on s 377A (2019) 31 SAcLJ 773, alludes (though very obliquely) to this. At [128], he says that, under Art 162, “the court cannot rewrite the text of the written law…”, but can “read the law or the words of the law in such a way that the law conforms to the Constitution”. His idea of how this may take place is set out at [132]: “the court must construe s 377A by reading it down, or up, as the case may be, to make it conform to Art 12(1)…”

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