Is a bad constitution a constitution?
In your Legal Theory and Philosophy course, you will consider the assertion, sometimes made, that “an unjust law is not a law”. Thomas Aquinas famously made that assertion (though I’m not sure whether hew as the first to do so.) Gustav Radbruch, a German legal philosopher, agreed: in his 1946 paper ‘Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law’ (translated and reprinted at (2006) 26 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1), he argued that certain laws passed by the Nazis were not truly laws, and, therefore, the evil acts purportedly allowed by these laws could not be said to have been justified by law.
The response of legal positivists is that the moral merits of a law do not determine its validity: they say that Nazi law is evil law, but is still law — see H L A Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 593.
Hart’s point, as I understand it, is this: we should confront the fact that an evil law is a law; it is better to confront the fact that something cloaked in the mantle of legality can be evil than to blind ourselves through a no-true-Scotsman argument. As he put it in The Concept of Law at 210,
“What surely is most needed in order to make men clear-sighted in confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience, and that, however great the aura of majesty or authority which the official system may have, its demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny.”
And at 211:
“to withhold legal recognition from iniquitous rules may grossly oversimplify the variety of moral issues to which they give rise”.
I, speaking for myself, have sympathy with Hart’s views; I think an unjust, bad, weak, or non-democratic constitution is still a constitution. After all…
… every legal system must, by definition, have a constitution
In The Concept of Law, Hart said:
“There are… two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials.”
In other words, a legal system exists only if people — both ordinary legal subjects and officials — generally follow the rules of that system; if people, en masse, cease to recognise a legal system as creating rules binding on them, then that legal system ceases to exist.
In fact, Hart’s two conditions imply a third, namely, that the rules of recognition, change, and adjudication exist in the first place. These rules are constitutional rules. As John Gardner, ‘Can There Be a Written Constitution?’, in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law: Volume 1 at 162 <https://johngardnerathome.info/pdfs/writtenconstitution.pdf> put it:
“A constitution is a conceptual l necessity of every legal system. In every legal system there are rules that specify the major institutions and officials of government, and determine which of them is to do what, and how they are to interact, and how their membership or succession is to be determined, and so forth. Without some such rules, as H.L.A. Hart explained in The Concept of Law, there is no legal system. These rules without which there would be no legal system (or some of them, invariably in combination with some other rules) make up the constitution of that system.”
So, when people speak of a ‘constitution without constitutionalism’, they do not necessarily deny that it is a constitution; what they are criticising is the content of the constitution — just as when one speaks of an ‘evil law’, one does not necessarily deny that it is a law; what one is criticising is the law’s content.
Most people who use the word “constitutionalism” use it to refer, not just to anything that limits power, but rather to the limitation of power to a substantial extent/in a meaningful sense. Merely saying that ‘the dictator is the only one who has tons of power’ doesn’t change the fact that the dictator has tons of power. It is cold comfort to say that there is only one dictator and not two.
The Constitution of Brunei
Consider the Constitution of Brunei. It states that the Sultan holds the “supreme executive authority of Brunei Darussalam” (Article 4(1)) and “the power to make laws for the peace, order, security and good government of Brunei Darussalam” (Article 39). Article 84B immunises the Sultan from any court proceedings. Moreover, according to the Preamble, the reason why the Constitution exists in the first place is because the Sultan intended to introduce it; the Preamble asserts that, independent of the Constitution, the Sultan had “the rights and powers of OUR Prerogatives as Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan…”, which was what gave him the power to enact the Constitution.
Yet, the Constitution of Brunei does contain constitutional rules. It tells us things like what the sources of law are, and who (else) exercises law-making power and executive power. It is not democratic; nor does it contain all the constitutional rules. But it contains constitutional rules.
The Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia
One of you cited a website which says that the Constitution of Saudi Arabia is not legally binding. I would, with respect, be cautious about such an assertion. I found the assertion on Wikipedia, which cited Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform (2003) at 60. That book does not cite any source for the proposition that “[t]here is no legally binding written constitution”, but page 56 does refer to a “Basic Law of Government” which has a “constitution-like form”. Now, it may be that there is a higher law than the Basic Law — say, a royal decree. But that does not mean that the Basic Law is not legally binding. After all, there can be a hierarchy of legal rule. It may be that a type A legal rule is capable of overriding a type B legal rule. But that does not mean that type B legal rules are not legal rules.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the Basic Law contains no legal rules at all. Even then, that would not mean that it is not constitutional in nature. Legal rules are not the only kind of rule; nor are they the only kind of constitutional rules — there are, as one of you pointed out, constitutional conventions.
In addition, it could be that the function of certain provisions in the Basic Law is to put into writing rules that already existed in unwritten form.
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