A student asked about this development in Indonesian constitutional law. I wondered about the precise legal basis of the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s decision. I soon discovered that it wasn’t perfectly clear to me what precisely the court had decided. My response:
This question intrigued me because I’ve never read anything about Indonesian law before. My immediate thoughts were:
- What is the precise basis for the Constitutional Court’s decision? What aspect of the electoral laws was unconstitutional, and precisely what part of the Constitution did it violate?
- If the Constitutional Court makes a decision on the constitutionality of a law, can the Legislature insist on reversing that decision? In some countries, the answer to a similar question is yes. For example, under section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Legislature can insist that a piece of legislation is to have force even if it violates certain rights in the Charter. (Section 33 is sometimes called the “notwithstanding” clause, because it allows a law to have force notwithstanding the fact that it is incompatible with certain rights). So if a Canadian court declares legislation as void because it violates one of those rights, the legislature can re-enact it anyway and give it force by invoking the “notwithstanding clause”.
- If the Legislature has no legal power to reverse the Constitutional Court’s decision, is there some reason why it can get away with doing so anyway?
So I started by looking at the law in question and the Constitutional Court’s decision. I don’t understand any Bahasa Indonesia (and even if I understood Bahasa Melayu — which I don’t — I wouldn’t rely on that when precision is required). So I downloaded a copy of the decision and used Google Translate to translate it into English. (All quotations below are from that machine-generated translation; the usual caveats apply, of course.) As I understand it, the main part of the decision starts at paragraph 3.8; previous paragraphs only summarise the history of the litigation, the parties’ arguments, and other miscellaneous matters.
I was unable to locate a transcript of legislative debates on the proposal to enact legislation to reverse the Constitutional Court’s decision. (Someone please let me know if you know where I may find one!)
So, in the rest of this note, I will consider only the Constitutional Court’s judgment. I found it worth doing this because I suggest that it is a useful example of the kind of problem of constitutional interpretation that we often see in constitutional democracies. We might well return to this example later in the course when we study the concept of a Constitution; but even if we don’t, we will certainly consider similar examples.
Relevant legislation
I saw that the debate centred around Articles 40 and 41 of PERPU 1 of 2014, as amended by UU 10 of 2016.
I got the sense the that the relevant laws were Articles 40 and 41 of PERPU 1 of 2014 (as amended). These, as I understand them (again from a Google translation), set out two ways in which a person may become a candidate in an election for governor, regent, or mayor.
First, under Article 40, a political party or coalition of parties can register candidates if the party/coalition of parties:
- controls at least 20% of the seats in the province’s Regional House of Representatives (DPRD); or
- gained at least 25% of the votes in the last DPRD election and controls at least one seat in the DPRD.
Second, under Article 41, an individual can register as a candidate if the individual has “support” from a certain percentage of the population of the province. This percentage ranges from 6.5% to 10%, depending on the population of the province. (I understand from this news story, linked to on this Wikipedia article, that candidates show “support” by getting people to sign support forms accompanied by photocopies of their identity cards.)
The applicants’ arguments
As I understand it, the applicants’ main argument was this: Under Article 40, why must the party have gained any seats in the DPRD at all to have candidates run for Governor/Vice Governor? Shouldn’t it be enough that they have gained a certain number of votes? After all, under Article 41, an individual candidate can run for election as Governor/Vice Governor as long as they have the support of a certain percentage of the population of the province – which is easier to get than to qualify under Article 40.
The applicants argued that the law violated the constitutional principles of “popular sovereignty” and the “rule of law”, as set out in Article 1(2)-(3) of the Constitution, as well as the constitutional right to engage in “collective struggle” for one’s rights (Art 28C(3)) and equality before the law (Art 28D(1)).
The majority of the court’s first point: the argument from democracy
The majority of the court court said that the law in question “clearly limits the fulfillment of constitutional rights of political parties participating in the election who have obtained valid votes in the election even though they do not have seats in the DPRD, thus reducing the value of democratic regional head elections…” This, said the court, ran contrary to Art 18(4) of the Constitution, which said that the Governor “shall be elected democratically”, for two reasons. First, even if a party did not control any seats in the DPRD, the fact the people voted for it had to count for something; there was a need to “respect the people’s voice in the election”. Second, if only parties that controlled seats in the DPRD could have candidates run for Governor, then there would be the risk of having only “a single candidate”, which could “threaten the democratic process”.
At first sight, I found this quite unconvincing. Yes, Article 40 limits the ability of political parties to participate in gubernatorial elections. But Article 41 also limits the ability of individuals to participate. And, for that matter, there are other laws limiting who can stand in elections: for example, there is a minimum education requirement. Surely the court didn’t mean to say that it’s wrong to have any limits on who can run for election at all?
On closer inspection, the court did not say that. It did (as I understand it) affirm that the Legislature has the power to regulate such details, but subject to the minimum requirements set out in the Constitution.
The key question is this: how are these minimum requirements – such as that the governor must be “elected democratically”, or that the principle of “popular sovereignty” is to be upheld – to be interpreted? The answer must depend on the interpreter’s ideas regarding democracy, what counts as a democratic system, etc. The answers to these questions may well be different in Indonesia in other systems. But even within Indonesia (or within any legal system), different people – and institutions – may have different answers. It is disagreements like these that explain the Indonesian legislature’s desire to reverse the Constitutional Court’s decision, as well as various other constitutional clashes.
Justice M Guntur Hamzah’s disagreement with the court’s first point
Indeed, there was a difference between different judges within the court. Justice M Guntur Hamzah, disagreeing with the majority, took the view that (as I understand it) while the Constitution states that the governor is to be “elected democratically”, it does not follow that there must be a certain model of democracy; the Legislature is free to choose one, as long as “the regional head [that] is elected is a representation of the people’s voice in the region”. This, he said, explains why it’s OK for the Governor of the Special Region of Yogyakarta to be chosen by a means other than direct election (I understand that it is an inherited position, similar to that of a hereditary monarch?) He added – and I see the force in this – that if the framers of the Indonesian Constitution intended for a particular method of electing the governor in a province, they would have spelled it out in the Constitution – as they had done in the case of the President and Vice-President (in Article 6A).
I see the force in this view, but I do note that I, by virtue of my limited legal education and training, am inclined toward a certain view of democracy and a certain view of how Constitutions (and laws generally) are to be interpreted. This is the point where I will play the ‘I am not an expert in Indonesian law’ card and stop talking about this point.
The court’s second point: the argument from rationality
Speaking for myself, I find the majority’s second point to be more convincing, but only a bit more convincing. The majority said that the law was irrational, given that it was harder for a pair of candidates to run for Governor/Vice Governor as party members (under Article 40), compared to running as individuals (under Article 41). The court essentially made the two sets of the requirements the same. The court lowered the requirements for running for Governor/Vice Governor as members of a party, down to the level of the requirements for running as individuals.
At first glance, this sounds compelling: why should it be harder for candidates to run as representatives of political parties, than in their own right? But if the two possibilities were perfect substitutes for each other, then, one may argue, the majority’s reasoning doesn’t make sense, because in practice no candidate would be disadvantaged – if their party didn’t get any seats in the DPRD, they could simply run as individuals.
Moreover, if the two possibilities aren’t perfect substitutes for each other, then the majority’s appeal to equality may be unconvincing. There may well be several possible reasons why the requirements to run as a member of a party should be different from the requirements to run as an individual. I can’t articulate them precisely without studying Indonesian constitutional law in more detail (which I’m not in a position to do now).
Justice M Guntur Hamzah’s last remark on the “motive and timing of the application”
Justice M Guntur Hamzah’s last point was that the application to the Constitutional Court had been made “after the vote counting and results acquisition stage” – as I understand him, he said that the applicants made the application because the DPRD election results had just been released, and the applicants realised that because of those results, they wouldn’t qualify under Article 40 to nominate candidates for the Jakarta gubernatorial election. (Did I mention that the Constitutional Court case had been initiated by the Labour Party (Partai Buruh) and Gelora Party (Partai Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia / Indonesian People’s Wave Party)?)
I have no comment whatsoever on either of these political parties, nor do I make any comment on their motives for bringing the case. Indeed, one may argue that whatever their motives were, they were entitled to attempt to persuade the Constitutional Court to correct what they thought was a violation of the Constitution. But I do note Justice Guntur Hamzah’s point that (as I understand it) electoral rules should not be changed, especially by the court, close to an election (for which he cited a US Supreme Court case called Purcell v Gonzalez). This links to a broader point: even if the Constitution demands that a law be declared void (or interpreted differently), what about the people who have planned their lives on the basis that the law was in force? Shouldn’t their expectations count for something?
One may also make a comment about the general phenomenon – and, again, I make no comment on the two Indonesian political parties in question – of politicians engaging in constitutional litigation, not so much because they believe in a certain understanding of constitutional principles, but simply because they want some advantage for themselves (e.g. a better shot at being elected). Then again, one may ask: why would anyone go to court – or, indeed, lift a finger to do anything – except if there is something in it for them?
Conclusion
In theory, the courts have the authority to interpret the Constitution. From the point of view of democratic theory, this is justified by the fact that the Constitution is a product of democracy; the court is merely upholding the will of the People. Put that way, the court is not acting un-democratically; to the contrary, it is upholding democracy. But the Legislature which wants to act contrary to the Constitution claims to be doing the exact same thing: after all, the Legislature consists of people who are also democratic representatives. Who is right?
It depends. One possible way forward is to ask: Which ‘People’ should take priority: the People who formed the 1945 Constitution, or the People today? Some argue that the very idea of allowing a court to strike down legislation made today based on a Constitution made long ago, means that the country is governed by the “dead hand of the past”.
Then again, the People who formed the Constitution were not doing the same thing as the People today. The former were creating a system of democracy, within which today’s legislature is one player; the former were creating the grand rules of a system (like Roblox?) that was built to last, while today’s legislature just creates rules under that system (like individual Roblox games) that come and go, even when the Constitution remains. Moreover, the People who formed the Constitution (the argument goes) meant to lay down hard limits (like Roblox’s community standards), which are meant to safeguard certain interests no matter what governments (or Roblox game-makers) come and go.*
So the really big question is: who should have the power to change the rules of the entire system itself?
* I don’t know anything about Roblox other than what I heard about from some YouTube video I watched some time ago. I think it was this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vTMF6xEiAaY
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