Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Author: admin

  • How ‘thick’ can a definition of the rule of law be before becoming so contested (/contestable) as to fail to be useful as a definition?

    In theory, it ought to be possible to derive from the core of the rule of law a series of necessary conditions for its protection, which, in theory, if they are necessary implications of the core, ought to be uncontentious as the core itself. 

    Perhaps a useful answer to the question of when the rule of law necessarily becomes too contested to be a useful concept lies in the distinction Barber draws in his article (on the reading list) between “legalistic conceptions of the rule of law” which “focus on questions of legal procedure, structure, and the formulation of laws”, and “non-legalist conceptions” which “include social and political rights at their core” (475). Barber argues that even legalistic conceptions of the rule of law might contain some substantive elements, e.g. a sufficient “level of material well-being” for people to be able to assert their legal rights (483).

    That said, ‘thin’ conceptions of the rule of law are not necessarily more vague than ‘thicker’ ones. It may well be as difficult to measure, say, the clarity of legislation as it is to define the boundaries of the freedom of legislation.

    Another point: The rule of law is, as you point out, a standard by which states (and their constituent parts) are judged; but it is more than that: it plays a role in the shaping of legal doctrines. We see this at work in Tan Seet Eng and Chng Suan Tze, where the rule of law was said to demand that certain rules of administrative law be the way they are. (To similar effect, see the statement of Dixon J in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth of Australia (1951) 83 CLR 1 that the “rule of law” is an “assumption” of the Australian Constitution, and leads to the principle that (to put it somewhat simplistically), if the legislature has power to legislate only regarding topic X, and somebody challenges legislation on the ground that it has nothing to do with topic X then it is for the court and not for the legislature to decide whether it really has anything to do with topic X.) So it might be that, even if a given conception of the rule of law is too vague/hard to measure to serve as a reliable yardstick by which the state (/any organ thereof) may be judged, it could still serve as a useful ideal to which the state (/any organ thereof) could aspire.

  • When the Legislature amends the Constitution, should this be described as an exercise of “legislative power” or “constituent power”?

    This is a hotly debatable question: see the summary of the debate in Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers (OUP, 2017) at 110-113. Roznai argues that the power to amend the constitution “should neither be regarded as another form of constituted power nor equated with the constituent power; it is a sui generis power” (113). He concludes at 133-134 that “the amendment power is a constitutional power delegated to a certain constitutional organ” (which, in Singapore, is the Legislature), and that this power is thereby limited by the scope of the grant of power by “the people”. At 121ff, he refers to this delegated power as “secondary constituent power”, which he distinguishes from the “primary constituent power” that vests in the people.

    Perhaps this account can explain the nature of Singapore’s Legislature’s power to amend the Constitution. The Legislature is exercising what may be described as constituent power, but it is not the only sort of constituent power: it remains open to the people of Singapore to decide to tear up the existing Constitution and replace it with a new one. The exercise of such primary constituent power would, by definition, not be mentioned in the Constitution, because the existence of this power is logically anterior to the Constitution.

    To my mind, the primary reason why amendments to the Constitution by the Legislature have legitimacy is that they are the product of a legal power created by the Constitution. On the other hand, a Constitution that is the result of the exercise of primary constituent power derives its legitimacy from the political fact of its acceptance by the People, rather than from a legal source.

  • Applying for judicial review: why is there a separate leave (/permission) stage before the application proper is heard? And why do courts ask the questions that they do at the leave stage?

    The classic explanation as to why there are requirements to obtain leave (or, even if the two stages are ‘rolled up’, there are threshold requirements) is to “prevent a wasteful use of judicial time and to protect public bodies from harassment”: Linda Lai [2001] 1 SLR(R) 133 (CA) at [23]. It appears that, in saying things like this, the courts have conflated two things: (a) the rationale for the threshold requirements; (b) the rationale for having a separate leave hearing during which these threshold requirements, and nothing else, are to be argued about.

    Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which the law can create a mechanism for a case to be summarily thrown out without having to go into all the details of the case. First, the law can require the plaintiff/applicant to show that certain threshold requirements are passed, failing which the application proper will not be allowed to proceed. Second, the law can allow the plaintiff/applicant to make the application proper first, but allow the defendant/respondent to apply to have the application struck out. The latter applies in civil proceedings generally, but the former applies in judicial review proceedings. In theory, the practical difference is as follows: in the former mechanism, an application for leave is to be made ex parte, i.e. the applicant asks the court for leave without the respondent having to be present – so the respondent need not trouble itself to appear in court at the leave stage.  But in practice, the respondent often (always?) appears at the leave stage anyway: Wong and Hong (2016) 28 SAcLJ 527 at [11]. This practical reality suggests that there need not be a separate leave stage.

    This, in turn, explains why the threshold to show a “prima facie case of reasonable suspicion” is in practice higher than what is claimed in Linda Lai. (Consider cases like Jeyaretnam and Vijaya Kumar, where the substance of the application was decided in full at the leave stage.) If all the parties will turn up in court for both hearings anyway, why have two hearings on two separate days? But I would disagree that raising the threshold for a “prima facie case of reasonable suspicion” says anything about the ‘green-light’ theory etc. This is because the threshold is being raised no higher than the threshold that the applicant would have to meet at the substantive stage anyway. It is, in effect, just a matter of administrative convenience: the arguments that would be heard and evaluated during the second hearing are now dealt with during the first hearing instead.

    That leaves us with the ‘susceptible to judicial review’ and ‘sufficient interest in the matter’ requirements. (For short, I will refer to the latter as the ‘standing’ requirement.)

    The ‘susceptible to judicial review’ requirement is not merely procedural; it is substantive. However, it makes sense for it to be dealt with as a threshold issue because it is logically prior to other substantive issues. If the subject-matter of the application is not susceptible to judicial review, then, by definition, all arguments about the grounds of review are irrelevant. By way of analogy, consider a suit in which the plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract. The defendant is entitled to apply to the court to strike the suit out on the ground that it is factually unsustainable, in that no contract existed at the first place. The effect of this is that the existence of a contract is a threshold requirement, and, if the plaintiff can be shown not to have met it, then the court (and defendant) need not trouble themselves with arguing about how to calculate the sum of damages etc. This has nothing to do with any particular theory of contract law; it is simply a matter of saving time. Similarly, the ‘susceptible to judicial review’ requirement is simply a matter of saving time – a matter of administrative convenience.

    As for the standing requirement, the reasons why it is relatively difficult to have standing are as set out in Vellama and Jeyaretnam. As I understand it, the cases make multiple points: that the aim is to prevent time being wasted by frivolous applications; that the aim is to prevent time being wasted by applications that are not based on the best possible arguments/evidence; that the aim is to prevent multiple applications; and that the aim is to prevent time being wasted by applications whose substance ought to be dealt with in the political arena.  Jeyaretnam explicitly linked the last of these points to the ‘green light’ theory. But I would hesitate to agree that that is correct. If the point is that the application is bound to fail because of the law of deference etc. – in other words, if the applicant is bound to fail for reasons of its substance – then I think the application ought to have been thrown out on that ground (viz. that there is no reasonable suspicion), and not on the ground that the applicant had no standing.

    I would add that, in Singapore, there has been no application for judicial review that would have succeeded on the merits but failed because the applicant had no standing.

  • Legislation that purports to oust judicial review on some grounds but not others

    I don’t think that the CA’s judgment in Nagaenthran only says that a statute that totally prevents the court from engaging in judicial review on any ground would be “constitutionally suspect”. At [43], the Court of Appeal noted that “the [PP’s] position is that aside from the grounds of bad faith, malice and unconstitutionality, the supervisory jurisdiction of the courts over the PP’s determination under s 33B(2)(b) of the MDA is excluded by s 33B(4)”. At [74], the Court of Appeal said that “[i]f the respondent’s submission on the effect of s 33B(4) were accepted, then to the extent that this ousted the court’s power of judicial review, s 33B(4) would be constitutionally suspect…” One could read this as saying that not only a complete ouster of judicial review, but even the notion that s 33B ousts judicial review on some grounds, would be “constitutionally suspect”.

  • Was GCHQ wrong to say that irrationality is a separate category from illegality, when Wednesbury itself said that the various grounds mentioned in Wednesbury all “overlap” and “run into each other”?

    I agree that it is arguable that GCHQ was wrong in inferring from Wednesbury that there is such a ground of review as irrationality. So would Prof Timothy Endicott, who says, in Administrative Law, 2nded (OUP, 2011) at 348-349, about the GCHQ taxonomy of ‘illegality’, ‘irrationality’, and ‘procedural impropriety’:

    This seemingly neat list is very popular, but it is incoherent. ‘Procedural impropriety’ makes sense—that means lack of due process. Lord Diplock meant ‘irrationality’ as a label for Wednesbury unreasonableness (410) – necessarybut it is a misleading label: see p 232. And if ‘illegality’ means unlawfulness, it covers all of the grounds of review.

    Lord Diplock tried to explain (410): ‘By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision- maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision- making power and must give effect to it.’ But all the grounds of judicial review are part of the ‘law that regulates’ a decision-making power […]

    There is no particular reason to use ‘illegality’ as a label for bad faith and irrelevant considerations if we don’t use it as a label for procedural impropriety and irrationality (whatever may be meant by that) as well. And classifying relevance as a matter of ‘illegality’ would be dangerously misleading. It would suggest that the standard for identifying the considerations on which a decision should be based is one of correctness (like the standard for determinations of law). But that is a mistake that generates excessive legalism in administrative decision making: judges ought to defer to public authorities, to some extent, on the question of what considerations are relevant to the public authority’s decision

    (see p 276).

    It is impossible – and unnecessary to encapsulate the grounds of review in three big words.

    [footnotes omitted]

    For more scepticism of the GCHQ taxonomy, see Swati Jhaveri, ‘Revisiting Taxonomies and Truisms in Administrative Law in Singapore’ [2019] SJLS 351, which will be on our reading list for the topic on theories of administrative law.

    That said, the courts have had occasion to apply irrationality (by whatever name called) as a ground of review, which suggests that the courts do see some value in it. Otherwise, the decision in Lines International (and perhaps Chee Siok Chin) would not have been so detailed; Bugdaycay would have been decided differently; etc. More generally, for all its problems, irrationality (as defined in GCHQ) was what paved the way for substantive review to take place, which has in turn had an influence on, among other things, the law on substantive legitimate expectations. Of course, one could retort that what I have just said is merely that I see the value in substantive review (by whatever name called), and that the courts do engage in substantive review under other names (such as what Chan J did in Fong Thin Choo). Seen in that light, the main contribution of GCHQ is to try to create doctrinal neatness where none existed before, even if GCHQ ultimately failed at this task.

  • Interpreting the Constitution of Singapore

    A student asked whether the Singapore courts, in interpreting the Constitution, apply a method of “originalism” rather than a “more creative” method. 

    I propose to respond in a manner that shies away from using terms like “originalism”, “textualism”, etc., given that these words can have various shades of meaning. Nor would I seek to draw direct comparisons with Justice Antonin Scalia’s method of interpretation, not only because I am not 100% familiar with his method, but also because he (like many others) has been said not to apply one method consistently anyway. 

    The starting point is that any interpretation of a text must have at least some link with the text. After all, it is an interpretation of the text. From there, several issues arise.

    First, the distinction between interpretation and addition. In general, while a word or phrase may be capable of a range of meanings, some of which may be described as “strained”, the Singapore courts will not, in the name of “interpretation”, ascribe to the text a meaning which it cannot possibly bear; that would amount in substance to addition and/or rewriting, not interpretation.

    Second, the distinction between giving effect to what the law-maker meant and what the law-maker wrote. This is easy: the Singapore courts’ task is to give effect to the intent of the law-maker as expressed in the text, not to give effect to the what the law-maker intended in his mind (/heart). After all, the latter would require a power of mind-reading. Moreover, the latter could yield an ‘interpretation’ which has no link at all with the text, which runs contrary to the principle that the court is interpreting the text.

    Third, the question of whether the courts are to consider the meaning that words had at the time the Constitution was written, or the meaning that those words have now. I suspect, Marcus, that this is the crux of what you were asking about. To answer this question, we would need an example of a case before the Singapore court involving a word whose meaning had changed over time; as far as I know, there is no such case. 

    Fourth, the distinction between the meaning of a word and its application. It is possible that the meaning of, say, “speech” or “expression” has never changed over time, yet different types of speech/expression have arisen. As the High Court of Australia put it in Re Wakim; Ex part McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 at [44]:

    “many words and phrases of the Constitution are expressed at such a level of generality that the most sensible conclusion to be drawn from their use in a Constitution is that the makers of the Constitution intended that they should apply to whatever facts and circumstances succeeding generations thought they covered.”

    Take, for example, the right to freedom of religion in Article 15 of the Constitution. I suspect that the Singapore courts might hold that the definition of the word “religion” has not changed over time, (e.g. it refers, and has always referred, to a belief system about the supernatural, etc.), but that that word would cover anything that falls within that definition even if it came into existence after the Constitution came into force (Pastafarianism?)

    Finally, I would like to draw your attention to section 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act, which provides:

    “In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or object.”

    So, if (and only if) the text is capable of bearing more than one meaning, the court will choose the one that would best promote the object of the provision in question. For more details, see Tan Cheng Bock v AG [2017] SGCA 50 at para [54].

    For further reading on originalism, consider:

    • Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation’ (2002) 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence 255
    • Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 677
  • The PCMR (and Bills that don’t need to be referred to the PCMR), and Presidential assent

    Article 78(8)

    All Bills require Presidential assent: see Article 58.

    It’s strange that Article 78(8) is part of Article 78 at all, given that it doesn’t have anything to do with the PCMR. What Article 78(8) says is that a Money Bill can only be presented to the President for assent if the Speaker of Parliament issues a certificate saying that it is a Money Bill. This raises an interesting question, the answer to which the Constitution does not make clear: can the President refuse assent if the Bill is in fact a Money Bill but the Speaker has failed to issue the certificate? 

    How the PCMR works

    The rest of Article 78 explains how the PCMR works:

    • Articles 78(1)-(4) state how, after Parliament passes a Bill, it must send the Bill to the PCMR, which is then to send its report to Parliament.
    • Article 78(5) states what happens if the PCMR does not render a report.
    • Article 78(6) states that a Bill can only be presented to the President for assent after the PCMR has rendered a favourable report; failed to render a report within the required time frame; or rendered an adverse report which is then overruled by 2/3 of the total number of MPs (except NMPs).

    Presidential assent — not a substitute for scrutiny by the PCMR

    What about Article 78(7), which sets out three exceptions to the PCMR procedure? Before going into more detail about those exceptions, I would like to point out that it is not enough to say that it’s OK for the PCMR not to scrutinise these types of Bills because the President is sufficient as a layer of scrutiny. That assumes that the President has the legal power to withhold assent. (After all, despite the President’s “moral authority”, it is law that governs the President’s powers.) Is she?

    The starting point is that the President is generally not free to withhold assent. We see this from:

    1. The fact that the President’s function in assenting to Bills is modelled after the Queen’s function. The Queen gives Royal Assent as a matter of course: she is not obliged to by law, but as a matter of constitutional convention she does.
    2. The fact that provisions like Article 22E, 22H, 144(2), and 148A exist. They state when the President may withhold assent to certain bills. If the President were generally free to withhold assent on any bill, then these provisions would be otiose.

    Now, about the three exceptions:

    Exceptions to the PCMR procedure

    Money Bills

    In the case of certain Money Bills, however, the President is entitled to withhold her assent in certain limited circumstances (subject to the caveats I mention right at the end of this post):

    • The President may, “acting in his discretion, withhold his assent to any Supply Bill, Supplementary Supply Bill or Final Supply Bill for any financial year if… [they] are likely to lead to a drawing on the reserves which were not accumulated by the Government during its current term of office”: Article 148A.
    • The President may also “withhold his assent to any Bill passed by Parliament providing, directly or indirectly, for the borrowing of money, the giving of any guarantee or the raising of any loan by the Government if, in the opinion of the President, the Bill is likely to draw on the reserves of the Government which were not accumulated by the Government during its current term of office”: Article 144(2).

    So the President is not free to withhold assent to Money Bills generally. Why, then, are such Bills exempt from scrutiny by the PCMR? Parliament did not say why when amending the Constitution to create the Presidential Council (as the PCMR was once known), Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, vol 29, col 63 (12 June 1969). But I believe the answer becomes evident when we consider what Money Bills normally do. See the definition in Article 68: if I may paraphrase it, a Money Bill authorises the state to raise funds or spend money. Merely raising funds or authorising the spending of money, without more, cannot possibly contain any differentiating measure. If anything, it is the specific things done with the money that is open to question.

    This is not to say that the exception for Money Bills is beyond criticism. Imagine a Bill that provides that people of race X shall pay income tax at a higher rate than that of other races. Wouldn’t this be a Money Bill, since it would deal with the “imposition… of taxation”? Why should such a Bill be beyond the remit of the PCMR? (That’s not to say that the Bill will go unchecked, since a court would most certainly rule that it is void for contravening Article 12.)

    Bills relating to “the defence or the security of Singapore” or “public safety, peace or good order in Singapore”

    Why are these exempt from scrutiny by the PCMR? Please see the explanation by the Minister for Law at Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, vol 30, col 195-197 (2 September 1970):

    “Recently the Presidential Council considered the Enlistment Bill (Bill No. 17/70). I understand that among other arguments against some of the provisions, there was one that Ministerial discretion was so wide as to be possible of discrimination. In this case, a majority of the Council upheld an interpretation of the legislation which did not cause the Bill to be referred back to the House.

    But it brought home to the Government the realisation that it could have been extremely difficult to explain, either to the Presidential Council, or in this House, sensitive issues as to why exemption or deferment of call-up for any person or group of persons would not be in the national interests. On matters of defence or security, there are times when a Minister cannot give his reasons. For example, a person aged 18, otherwise fit and eligible, might have to be left out of the armed forces because he is known to have pro-Communist or other extremist tendencies, or that he comes from such a family.”

    For the Presidential Council’s report on the Enlistment Bill, see https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/government_records/docs/c59e0463-b8fe-11e7-81c8-0050568939ad/Pres.Co.14of1970.pdf

    By the way, if you type presidential council enlistment bill into the search box on the website of the National Archives, you will see that the Prime Minister does not necessarily issue the certificate exempting bills about National Service from the PCMR’s scrutiny as a matter of course.

    Urgent Bills

    These are not exempt from scrutiny by the PCMR. The PCMR still has to examine them and issue a report — just that the report is issued after the President gives her assent: see Article 79. The report is then to be presented to Parliament.

    The President’s powers, and when they can be overruled

    For completeness, three more points about the President’s powers:

    1. Except in situations where the Constitution states otherwise, the President is bound to act, not in her own discretion, but rather in accordance with Cabinet’s/a Minister’s advice: see Article 21(1). (But that doesn’t come into play here, because Cabinet/a Minister has no role to play in the legislative process.)
    2. In general, the President must consult the Council of Presidential Advisers before exercising her discretion: Articles 37IA-37IB.
    3. On the powers of Parliament to overrule the President’s veto, see Article 37IF.

    For a summary of these matters, see https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/speech-dpm-teo-chee-hean-2nd-reading-constitutional-republic-singapore-amendment-bill (click on “03 – CPA.pdf”).

  • On the rule of law

    1. Speaking for myself, my understanding of the problem of defining the ‘rule of law’ is as follows: We would start with a core meaning in mind, namely, the idea that all relations, whether between private persons inter se, between state authorities inter se, or between private persons and state authorities, are governed by law and not by something else. The question is then: what is required to give effect to this core meaning? For example, it would be necessary for law to be clear and accessible, for nobody could conform to the law if it were not possible to know what the law is in the first place. 
    2. When asking what the rule of law requires, I think it may be useful to distinguish between what it requires of laws and what it requires of society. Nicholas Barber thinks that the rule of law requires that people have a certain educational legal and access to socio-economic resources. We might call this a ‘thick’ definition of the rule of law, but we should not lose sight of the fact that it is a different kind of definition from saying that (for example) the rule of law requires the people be able to vote. The latter can be said to be a ‘substantive’ definition of the rule of law, in that it demands that laws have a certain substance. Barber’s point is that a definition of the rule of law, even if not ‘substantive’ in this sense, can still demand more than merely that laws take a certain form.
    3. Why do we care whether a ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ definition of the rule of law ought to apply? I think it would be useful to begin by asking why we seek a definition of the rule of law at all. If we seek to use it as a metric to judge legal systems relative to each other in order to identify some legal systems for praise and others for criticism, then we should seek a definition of the rule of law that serves that purpose well, namely, one that:
      1. is relatively uncontroversial in terms of what it enshrines as ideals, so that its proponents cannot be accused of attempting to smuggle in some non-universally-accepted ideology;
      2. measures variables which, at the least, can be said to be comparable across systems (for example, ‘clarity’ should be one of the variables only if it is possible to say with certainty, for any two legal systems, which has better ‘clarity’).
    4. I do not agree that the distinction between thick and thin conceptions of the rule of law overlaps with the distinction between legal positivism and Radbruchian natural-law theory (according to which — to simplify somewhat — an ‘unjust’/’evil’ law is not a law). The latter distinction is a distinction between what criteria there are to tell whether something is law or not. The former distinction is a way of judging a legal system and/or a legal norm in that system. Moreover, the demands made of the law by a ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law are not necessarily coterminous with the moral criteria which a ‘natural law theorist’ would say that something must meet for it to count as law.
    5. Consider the following example of a ‘rule’: “Love all humans.” A natural-law theorist may say that that meets the requisite moral standard so it counts as ‘law’. Yet, that ‘rule’ would probably not comply with any conceivable definition of the ‘rule of law’, because it is so hopelessly unclear as to be totally incapable of guiding human conduct.
    6. In other words, none of the following statements is incoherent:
      1. X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria, but it is not compliant with a ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law.
      2. X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria, but it is not compliant with a ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law.
      3. X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria and is morally just, but it is not compliant with a ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law.
      4. X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria and is morally just, but it is not compliant with a ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law.
    7. I disagree that ‘thin’ conceptions of the rule of law focus on quantitative indicators while ‘thick’ conceptions of the rule of law focus on qualitative ones. The same challenges arise with quantifying, say, ‘stability’ and ‘promoting the freedom of expression’. Of course, quantification is not impossible. We can say that country A has a more stable legal system than country B, even if we can’t assign a number to each. (In other words, we can rank countries’ compliance with some indicator on an ordinal scale, even if we can’t do so on an interval or ratio scale.) 
    8. In general, how can we quantify something like the clarity of laws? We could:
      1. Ask people to rate the clarity of laws on a scale of, say, 1 to 10. This can be a useful way to measure changes over time provided it is the same people being polled every time. By way of comparison, consider how, if you seek medical treatment for pain, you may be asked to rate the pain on a scale of 1 to 10: because (the theory goes) you will have the same scale in mind each time, your rating will be an accurate way to measure whether the pain has worsened or improved over time.
      2. Use something objectively measurable as a proxy — for example, we could use the average length of words or sentences in laws as a proxy for clarity.
    9. I’d say that the following requirements are in increasing order of ‘thickness’:
      1. Laws must be passed in accordance with a certain procedure
      2. Laws must be passed in accordance with a certain procedure that is democratic in nature
      3. Laws must have content that advances the freedom of expression

    Someone asked whether the rule of law can act as a “yardstick to judge societies and legal systems” given that every legal system (or, more precisely, the officials within each legal system) might have a different idea of what the rule of law should mean. Will this create unfairness? What if there are disagreements between officials in the same legal system? My response:

    When anything is being evaluated, the evaluator must apply consistent standards. If the evaluator applies the same standards consistently, there can be no unfairness in the sense of inconsistent treatment. The evaluator must also apply standards that are fit for purpose – for example, it must be possible to say with certainty which of two things measures up better according to those standards; the standards must be a useful , etc. those make use of the evaluator’s findings agree that the evaluator has applied standards that are fit to form a basis for evaluation. That is a different question from the question of whether everyone who is being evaluated agrees with the standards which they should aspire to.

    Indeed, it is precisely because everyone has different goals and priorities that it is worth attempting to create a single yardstick by which to judge them all. People may protest at being judged by that yardstick because they say it is not a suitable one for the task of judging them. The yardstick may or may not, in fact, be a suitable one for the task of judging them. But there is no unfairness in the sense of inconsistency, provided that the judger is applying the same yardstick to all of them.

    Now, suppose officials within a legal system — say, different judges — have different views on the rule of law. You asked whether the difference in views as to what the rule of law requires of the law may lead to different outcomes in terms of what the case law requires. The answer is yes. If judge A and judge B start with the idea that the rule of law is important, but judge A thinks that the rule of law requires X while judge B thinks that the rule of law requires Y, then it may be that judge A may develop the common law down path 1 while judge B takes the common law down path 2. (This is not necessarily the outcome. It may be, for example, that both X and Y would imply that the law should follow path 1.)

    That would simply be an instance of the general phenomenon that decision-makers faced with the same question can make different decisions because they have different background ideas in mind. That is not necessarily a bad thing: people, in general, value diversity in thought, and seek to embrace it by having decision-making organs consist of multiple people. One might think that this phenomenon may be minimised through rigid legislation that leaves little room for the courts to develop the common law in tandem. But, putting aside the problems that rigidity brings, that would simply mean that the aforementioned phenomenon will take place to an even greater extent in the Legislature.

  • The litigation strategy in Wham v PP [2020] SGCA 111

    The problem in Wham’s case was that he had applied for judicial review of the wrong thing. He had attempted to argue that the Public Order Act is unconstitutional insofar as it requires one to have a permit for certain types of assembly. The court said that it was not. In other words, the permit system per se was not unconstitutional.  If anything is unconstitutional, it might be, not the system, but rather the application of that system in a given case. In other words, even though the permit system is constitutionally valid, a person may seek to argue that a particular decision by the police not to grant a permit is unconstitutional (or unlawful for some other reason).

    But Wham couldn’t argue that, because the police had not taken a decision not to grant a permit, because Wham had never applied for a permit in the first place.

    What he should have done was to apply for a permit. If his application was rejected, he could then do 3 things:

    1. Apply for judicial review of the Public Order Act, saying that it is unconstitutional
    2. Apply for judicial review of the police’s decision not to grant a permit, saying that that decision was unconstitutional/illegal/irrational/procedurally improper (/in breach of substantive legitimate expectations?)
    3. Apply for judicial review of the Public Prosecutor’s decision to prosecute him, saying that that decision was a breach of his constitutional rights / in bad faith / for an extraneous purpose (see Gary Chan’s article for details about the grounds on which an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be judicially reviewed)

    But because he had not applied for a permit, option (2) was out. And he had not tried option (3). 

  • Congressional hearings in the US – what’s the equivalent in Singapore? And why are there fewer/less active select committees in Singapore compared to, say, the UK?

    Why are there so many congressional hearings in the US, and why are select committees in Singapore, by contrast, not so active?

    It’s not just because the US has a Presidential rather than Parliamentary system of governance. There are Westminster-style systems (like the UK itself) where we see more and more active parliamentary select committees than in Singapore; and because it is (usually) Congress itself that decides what hearings to hold, Congress could in theory hold far fewer hearings than it does. (Are there are many congressional hearings in, say, the Philippines – or other presidential systems – as in the US? Or fewer, or maybe even more?)

    One determinant might be the size of the US, and hence the number of matters that Congress sees fit to deal with; I don’t feel qualified to comment further. That said, I have a hunch that the most important feature is the ruling party’s preferred style of governance. 

    In Singapore, because it is Parliament that gets to decide by motion whether to appoint a select committee (Standing Orders of Parliament, SO 101), the ruling party has the power to block any opposition party’s attempt to convene a select committee. In theory, backbenchers from the ruling party could do this, but the fact that they have not may indicate that they either do not have the inclination or that they are whipped into not doing so. Yet, I believe that the position is similar in the US, which would mean that the differences don’t relate to differences in the systems of governance, but rather the culture of governance. I also understand that party whips are less strict in political parties in the US than in Singapore; this too could be relevant.

    What is the closest functional equivalent of congressional hearings in Singapore? We know that the government holds closed-door consultation sessions on bills (my colleagues and I have been to a few of these) as well as on other issues. There are also public consultations on various general issues (including proposed bills) as well as more specific matters; these generally do not take place orally, but they are consultations nonetheless. These may well be Singapore’s equivalent of congressional hearings. They do not necessarily take place orally, but there is nothing magic about an oral hearing; indeed, certain pieces of information may well be easier to communicate in writing, and besides, some closed-door hearings do take place orally, while there are witnesses who give written but not oral evidence to Parliamentary select committees (and perhaps to Congressional hearings too?) They are not necessarily open to the public, but then again, in the US, there is nothing to stop senators/representatives from meeting people and getting their views behind closed doors too. Perhaps the differences are more apparent than real; perhaps it is a question of labelling and the degree of publicity.

    It may also be worth noting that MPs who are not members of the ruling party are at liberty to conduct consultations in the loose sense of getting people’s views. This could take the form of a petition to Parliament, which will then be considered by the Public Petitions Committee (a standing select committee of Parliament).

  • When MPs get expelled from their political party

    Article 46(2)(b) of the Constitution states that if an MP who was elected as a member of a political party is (among other things) expelled from that party, then that MP also loses their seat in Parliament. Some students asked: when does an MP get expelled from their political party?

    The answer is: it’s up to that party; it depends on that party’s internal rules. For examples, see:

    Each party’s constitution is, in law, a contract between the party and members. The law is that, in such contracts (as well as similar contracts in the case of social clubs, sporting associations, etc.), there is an implied term that disciplinary powers are to be exercised in line with certain rules of procedural fairness, including that the person facing disciplinary proceedings has a right to a fair hearing. See, for example, Chiam See Tong v Singapore Democratic Party [1993] 3 SLR(R) 774. In that case, the SDP had expelled Chiam; the High Court held that the purported expulsion was void because the party did not give him a fair hearing — for example, it was not made clear to him what rule he was accused of breaking. 

  • A little primer on international law and Singapore

    International law is a system of law whose subjects are states. Therefore, it governs the rights and obligations which states have vis-a-vis one another.  (Here, “international” doesn’t mean all over the world; it means between (nation-)states. Hence, we would call the Singapore-Malaysia water agreements “international treaties” even though they are only between two countries.) 



    The two most common sources of international law are customary international law and treaties. A state is only bound by an international treaty which it has signed and ratified. Rules of customary international law are formed when nearly all states act in a certain way because they believe that they are bound by law to do so. Examples include the rule that visiting heads of state are immune from criminal prosecution. (Some rules of international law are both rules of customary international law and rules found in treaties. For example, the prohibition against torture is both a rule of customary international law and a rule set out in the Convention Against Torture.


    Even as each state is a subject of international law, each state also has its system(s) of what is termed domestic law or municipal law. Hence, we would speak of the domestic law of Singapore, the domestic law of the UK, etc.

    A rule of international law does not necessarily automatically become a rule which the state must follow in domestic law. Therefore, it is in principle possible for a state authority to do something that it is entitled to do under that state’s domestic law, even if doing it would put the state in breach of its international-law obligations.

    A (somewhat simplified) example: Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are prohibited from instituting a blanket policy banning all prisoners from voting. The UK is a party to the ECHR. However, under UK domestic law, for a long time, there was a blanket ban prohibiting (most) prisoners from voting. This put the UK in breach of the ECHR. However, that did not mean that prisoners had the right to vote. The UK was in breach of its international-law obligations, but the prisoners’ rights and obligations were governed by UK domestic law, under which the UK, through its legislature, was entitled to ban prisoners from voting. After all, there is no rule of UK domestic law saying that rules under the ECHR automatically become rules of UK domestic law. (As to whether the UK is still in breach of its ECHR obligations, see https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/01/30/elizabeth-adams-prisoners-voting-rights-case-closed/) 

    It is true that international law often exists for the sake of individuals – consider, for example, human rights treaties. But, nonetheless, international law is primarily about how states relate to each other. For example, suppose Singapore were to breach its obligation under CEDAW to “repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women” (CEDAW, Article 2(g)). It is not an individual woman who would have the right to take action in response. Rather, the consequences take place at the level of states – for example, public criticism by the CEDAW Committee (Article 17). In other words, Singapore has obligations to take certain steps to eliminate discrimination against women, but those obligations are owed to other states – not to individuals.

    Sometimes individuals do have access to remedies under international law, but this is generally only when a treaty says so. For example, if someone claims to be the victim of a violation of CEDAW by the Philippines, they can send a complaint (known as a “communication”) to the CEDAW Committee; the Committee can then form “views” and “recommendations”, which it can then send to the Philippines, which in turn must submit a “response”. All this – which is essentially a way for individuals to complain of a violation of CEDAW – is only possible because the Philippines has agreed to it, by signing and ratifying the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.


    Some of you have asked about how international law is enforced. Sometimes, states agree to enforcement mechanisms – such as the Philippines’ signing the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, or Singapore and Malaysia agreeing to refer the Pedra Branca dispute to the International Court of Justice. But these are up to state consent; even the International Court of Justice only has the jurisdiction to hear cases which parties have agreed to refer to it (see Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ).

    Rather, a key means of enforcement is diplomacy. A state which violates international law can expect to be criticised on the world stage – for example, at UN General Assembly meetings. It can also expect that other states will approach it with greater suspicion – if you were a state, would you really want to enter into a free trade agreement with another state that has a track record of ignoring its international agreements?

    In some cases, a violation of international law by one state can cause other states to impose sanctions unilaterally, as when Singapore imposed sanctions on Russia following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Singapore took the view that “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contravenes the UN Charter and is a clear and gross violation of international law”. There could also be sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, which UN member states are obliged by the UN Charter to obey.

    There is a body of literature about why states enter into treaties. It could be a matter of maintaining a certain image on the global stage, and/or sending a certain signal domestically. As for Singapore’s approach to international treaties, see my draft paper on international law (click “Content” above), paragraphs 27-45.


    Singapore’s law on treaties is as follows:

    When Singapore enters into an international treaty, that does not mean that it becomes part of the domestic law of Singapore. This is known as the “dualist” approach to international law, which is adopted by most (if not all) common-law systems, including the UK.

    • Take, for example, the Genocide Convention, Article III of which says that genocide “shall be punishable”. But that is not the reason why genocide is a crime in Singapore. Rather, the reason why genocide is a crime in Singapore is sections 130D-130E of the Penal Code.
    • Or consider UN Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), which is binding on Singapore because Singapore has agreed to the United Nations Charter (Article 25 states: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”) That Security Council resolution requires that UN member states shall, among other things, “prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK… all crude oil”. That does not itself make it unlawful for someone in Singapore to export crude oil to the DPRK. What makes it unlawful is the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010, made under s 2 of the United Nations Act.

    The courts will strive to interpret domestic legislation and the Constitution in a manner that better gives effect to Singapore’s international law obligations. Take, for example, the customary international law rule that torture is prohibited. (The word “torture” has a certain technical meaning in international law: for examples, see Yong Vui Kong v PP [2015] 2 SLR 1129 (CA) [84].) Hence, prison authorities have the discretion as to what imprisoned people eat (see generally the Prisons Act 1933), but the courts would probably say that it would be unlawful for them to exercise this discretion in a way that amounts to torture – for example, by giving prisoners “rotten food and insufficient drinking water” (Miroslav Kvocka, cited in Yong Vui Kong (2015) [84(d)]).

    But there are limits to interpretation; the courts’ remit is only to interpret legislation, not to rewrite it. If, for example, legislation explicitly stated that imprisoned people get only 1 litre of drinking water a day and are to be given only rotten food, then doing so would be lawful (and in fact mandatory).1 Singapore would be in breach of its international law obligation not to torture people – but that would be a matter for international fora, not the Singapore courts.

    If not embodied in a statute, rules of customary international law and treaty law can, at most, be accepted by the courts as rules of common law. Other countries’ courts have said something similar. For example, the High Court of Australia has held that though “[t]he common law does not necessarily conform with international law, … international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights”: [Optional] Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at [42].

    But common law can be overridden by legislation. Hence, for example, even if the death penalty violated customary international law, that would at most mean that the common law of Singapore prohibits international law; but that common law rule, in turn, would be overridden by legislation explicitly providing for the death penalty, such as the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973. (See Yong Vui Kong (2010).)

    Rules of international law do not themselves have the status of constitutional rules. Therefore, the courts will not strike down a domestic statute merely because it (allegedly) contravenes international law.


    1. If subsidiary legislation said that, it would be at least arguable that such subsidiary legislation violated the Prisons Act 1933, in that any intention by Parliament to give the Minister the power to make such subsidiary legislation would have to be shown by clear and explicit words. As for the law in Singapore now, see r 110 of the Prisons Regulations. ↩︎

  • The separation of powers

    1. The separation of powers is not just about ensuring that powers are not concentrated in the same hands. If that were all there is to it, then why not simply distribute power randomly among people? (See Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers’, ch 11 in David Dyzenhaus and Malcolm Thorburn (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (OUP, 2016) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/ak_separation_of_powers_philfounds_book.pdf> at 229-230. Kavanagh argues: “Not only do we want to ensure that the right decisions are made by the institutions which govern us, we also care about whether the right decisions have been made by the right body.”  What matters, she says, is that functions are allocated to the institutions that are best equipped to perform them.
    2. One could draw a distinction between a separation of powers and a separation of power-holders. The mere fact that Ministers are also MPs doesn’t mean that there is no separation between the legislative and executive powers. The Ministers do know which of the two hats they are wearing at any given point. There is, of course, a conversation to be had about whether the two should be doing the same job — but that is a conversation about the separation of power-holders, not the separation of powers. If you’re interested in more detail, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?’ (2013) 54 British Columbia Law Review 433.
    3. In Westminster systems, one tends (whether rightly or wrongly) to see the separation between the legislature and the executive as being less important than the separation between the judiciary on the one hand and everyone else on the other. 
    4. One may question how useful a label like “the executive” is. Not every institution within “the executive” performs the same function. There are executive bodies which check each other; there are situations where a person dissatisfied by the decision of one executive officer may appeal to another; and there are executive bodies which perform completely different functions from one another. It may well be that the main reason for labelling them all “the executive” is simply the broad idea — which relates to the previous point I made — that executive action generally is subject to control by the courts through judicial review. (More on that in the seminar next week.)
    5. The Legislature is not the only law-maker. Courts make law too — if you have forgotten this, think back to what you learned during the Business Law course about the Offer and Acceptance Act and the Duties of Care Act (hint: they don’t exist). But that doesn’t mean that courts legislate. It is not that “to legislate” simply means “to make law”. Rather, it is clearer to say that legislating is one kind of law-making, which is different from the kind of law-making that courts do. For an analysis of the differences between the types of laws and law-making processes, see John Gardner, ‘Some Types of Law’, ch 3 in Law as a Leap of Faith (OUP, 2012) <https://johngardnerathome.info/pdfs/typesoflaw.pdf>; and Paul Yowell, ‘Legislation, Common Law and the Virtue of Clarity’, ch 6 in Richard Ekins (ed), Modern Challenges to the Rule of Law (LexisNexis, 2011) especially at 123-128. 
    6. For further reading on the Auditor-General of Singapore, see Preston Wong, ‘Watchman, Watchdog, Warden and What More? The Constitutional Role and Autochthony of the Singapore Auditor-General’ (2016) 28 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 552 <https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive/ctl/eFirstSALPDFJournalView/mid/495/ArticleId/1161/Citation/JournalsOnlinePDF>.
    7. For an example of an argument that we should consider that there is a fourth branches of the state and not just three, see Mark Tushnet, The New Fourth Branch: Institutions for Protecting Constitutional Democracy (CUP, 2021), or simply listen to the 15th Kwa Geok Choo Distinguished Visitors Lecture that he delivered at NUS in 2018: https://nus.edu.sg/thought-leadership/the-future-of-the-separation-of-powers. Note that Tushnet’s conception of the ‘fourth branch’ of the state is by no means the only one.
    8. Consider how the separation of powers advances the rule of law. If a law-maker were also in charge of applying the law, there may be the danger that what he applies may be the law that he thought he was making rather than the law that he actually made. Worse, there may be the danger that he deliberately applies something other than the law he made. All this would run contrary to the rule-of-law values of certainty and predictability. Indeed, it would run contrary to the enterprise of law itself. Quaere: why, then, do we tolerate the existence of case law as a source of law?
  • “We flew a kite in a public place”; “[h]andling fish in suspicious circumstances”

    I am generally a fan of Tom Scott and Matt Gray, but I am constrained to point out that their video “Ten Illegal Things To Do In London” omits several key details. They assert, for instance, that “[f]lying a kite in a public place” is an offence under s 54 of the Metropolitan Police Act 1839. But that provision states:

    “Every person shall be liable to a penalty not more than level 2 on the standard scale, who, within the limits of the metropolitan police district, shall in any thoroughfare or public place, commit any of the following offences; (that is to say,) […]

    17. Every person who shall fly any kite or play at any game to the annoyance of the inhabitants or passengers, or who shall make or use any slide upon ice or snow in any street or other thoroughfare, to the common danger of the passengers.”

    Clearly, this law only criminalises kite-flying in public which is “to the annoyance of the inhabitants or passengers”.

    Similarly, it appears to me that s 13(1)(e) of Singapore’s Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 only criminalises flying a kite in a manner that “obstructs or interferes with the traffic in any public road”.

    Note that in Singapore, under the Air Navigation Order, you need a permit to fly a kite in certain places near aerodromes (including airports and air bases), and anywhere more than 500 feet over sea level.

    Note that s 28 of the UK’s Town Police Clauses Act 1847, which criminalised “wilfully and wantonly disturb[ing] any inhabitant, by pulling or ringing any door bell, or knocking at any door”, “in any street, to the obstruction, annoyance, or danger of the residents or passengers”, is no longer part of the law of England and Wales because of s 115(3)(r) of the Deregulation Act 2015 read with para 45(l) of Part 9 of Schedule 23 of that Act. (Making sense of UK legislation is sometimes tricky because you have to pay careful attention to which provisions of the Act apply to which countries of the UK.)  

    The same can be said of the offence of “beat[ing] or shak[ing] any carpet, rug or mat (except door mats, beaten or shaken before the hour of eight in the morning)”; but even when that was an offence, it was only when it was done “in any street, to the obstruction, annoyance, or danger of the residents or passengers”.

    As for the offence of “handling salmon in suspicious circumstances” (which, by the way, has been broadened to cover certain other types of fish such as “trout, eels, lampreys, smelt and freshwater fish”): The video depicts physically handling salmon in a suspicious manner, but what s 32 of the UK’s Salmon Act 1986 really says is (emphasis added):

    “… a person shall be guilty of an offence if… at a time when he believes or it would be reasonable for him to suspect that a relevant offence has at any time been committed in relation to any fish to which that section applies, he receives that fish, or undertakes or assists in its retention, removal or disposal…”

    The phrase “relevant offence” is defined in s 32(2) as “taking, killing or landing, or selling” in circumstances when it is an offence, or where the fish is “taken, killed or landed, or sold… in the course of the commission of the offence”. The former would include fishing for salmon without a licence; the latter would include selling fish so caught, as well as knowingly reselling stolen fish.

  • Presumptions under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973

    The following is, of course, not legal advice.

    1. It is a criminal offence to possess “controlled drugs” for the “purpose of trafficking”: s 5(2). Here, to “traffic” means:
      1. “to sell, give, administer, transport, send, deliver or distribute” (s 2(1));
      2. while knowing the “specific nature of the drug” (e.g., that it is heroin): Adili Chibuike Ejike v PP [2019] SGCA 38, [35].
    1. If you have “possession”, “custody”, or “control” of “anything containing a controlled drug” (e.g. a box), “the keys of anything containing a controlled drug”, or “the keys of any place or premises or any part thereof in which a controlled drug is found”, you are presumed to have possession of the drug: s 18(1). Therefore, you can rebut this presumption by showing that, for example:
      1. You did not know that the thing containing the drug (e.g. the box) contained something (e.g. you thought that it was an empty box).
      2. You did not know that the thing/premises contained drugs; you thought it contained something else: Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed v AG [2022] SGHC 291, [32], citing Obeng Comfort at [35].
    1. Note also that as a matter of law, you don’t “possess” something if you don’t even know that you have it. Hence, if you are found to have drugs in your bag, you are presumed to have possession of those drugs; but you can rebut this by showing, for example, “that the drug was slipped into [your] bag… without [your] knowledge”: Obeng Comfort at [35]. Another way to put this point is that you can rebut the presumption by showing that you thought the bag contained only (say) clothes, and not clothes plus drugs.
    1. However, you are considered to know something if you are wilfully blind to it – in other words, if you had a “clear, grounded and targeted suspicion”, and you had a reasonable means to check, yet you did not check: Adili at [94]. So for example, if you see someone slipping something into your bag and say “Here are some drugs”, the onus is on you to check what that thing was. Better yet, go straight to the police, tell them what happened, and let them check, so that your fingerprints don’t end up on that thing.
    1. If you are proved to possess a certain amount of drugs or above, you are presumed to have possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking: s 17.
      1. You can rebut this presumption by showing that, for example, you possessed the drugs for your own consumption. (It doesn’t count as trafficking if you are “administer[ing]” the drugs to yourself.) For this, you will need to show evidence of things such as your rate of drug consumption and ability to afford to buy drugs in such a large quantity just for your own consumption. This is sometimes called the “consumption defence”.
      2. You can also rebut this presumption by showing that you were holding the drugs on behalf of someone else, and the only purpose of holding the drugs was to return them to that person, and “the act of returning the drugs is not part of the process of supply or distribution of drugs”: Ramesh a/l Perumal v PP [2019] 1 SLR 1003 (CA) [114] (emphasis removed). This is sometimes called the “bailment defence”.
    1. If you are proven or presumed to possess a controlled drug, you are presumed to know the “nature of that drug”: s 18(2).
      1. You can rebut this presumption by showing that you “genuinely believed” that what you were carrying was “something innocuous” or that it was some other drug: Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed v AG [2022] SGHC 291, [32], citing Masoud Rahimi bin Mehrzad v PP [2017] 1 SLR 257 (CA) [55].
        1. But it’s not enough merely to claim that you knew you were carrying something but you didn’t know what it was: Obeng Comfort v PP [2017] SGCA 12, [39].
        2. The court will also, of course, not necessarily accept your claim at face value. In Saravanan Chandaram v PP [2020] 2 SLR 95, the offender (who was carrying cannabis) claimed to have thought that he was carrying tobacco for a man named Aya. But the court rejected this claim, as he knew that Aya was a “drug syndicate leader”; “he had previously done jobs for Aya in connection with Aya’s drug deals; and he had been promised substantial monetary rewards for bringing the bundles in question into Singapore. In these circumstances, [the court] held that it was simply incredible that the appellant would have accepted at face value Aya’s alleged statement that the bundles only contained contraband tobacco”: Adili at [63].
  • The ‘marital rape’ exception

    Section 375 of the Penal Code used to, in effect, make it lawful for a man to rape his wife: “Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 13 years of age, is not rape.” In 2007, this was amended such that it was lawful for a man to rape his wife except in certain circumstances, such as that they were separated or a protection order had been made under the husband. There were calls for further change, including a campaign called “No To Rape”. It was only in early 2020 that the ‘marital rape’ exception was finally abolished in Singapore, just as it had been abolished in English law in 1991 by a judgment of the House of Lords (which is certainly worth reading in full).

    And, finally, I can’t resist giving you links to this exchange of views that took place about a decade ago:

    https://www.aware.org.sg/2013/01/saying-no-to-seemingly-harmless-sexist-views/

    https://web.archive.org/web/20130115141145/http://www.straitstimes.com/premium/forum-letters/story/address-issue-marital-rape-20130115

    https://web.archive.org/web/20130115140358/http://www.straitstimes.com/premium/forum-letters/story/fabricated-rape-claims-exact-heavy-toll-men-20130115

    https://dj-factiva-com.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/article?id=drn:archive.newsarticle.STIMES0020130117e91i0002r

    https://web.archive.org/web/20130122022145/http://www.straitstimes.com/premium/forum-letters/story/marital-rape-existing-law-not-ideal-20130122

  • The courts’ powers to deal with frivolous/vexatious proceedings

    A student asked about this matter — specifically, whether the HSA could have done anything to prevent future applications that amounted to an abuse of the court’s process. My response:

    The courts have the following powers in any court proceedings, including but not limited to judicial review proceedings:

    • Costs orders: The unsuccessful party generally has to pay a sum of money to the successful party. This sum of money is called “costs”, because in theory it is meant to cover the successful party’s lawyers’ fees. However, the amount of costs is decided (“fixed”) by the court — it is a matter of discretion, and not simply looking at how much the successful party’s lawyers charged. (By the way, that means that even if you succeed in civil litigation, you might end up paying your lawyers more than what you get from the other side in costs!) When proceedings are frivolous or vexatious, or conducted in a frivolous or vexatious manner, that could cause the court to order a greater sum of costs to be paid (see Order 21 rule 2(2) of the Rules of Court). Indeed, even if you succeed, you might be disentitled to costs, entitled to less in costs, or even ordered to pay the losing party’s costs if you have, among other things, acted “unreasonably” (O 21 r 4(b)).
    • Power to exert control over the manner in which proceedings are conducted: see sections 73A(2)-(3) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1969 (SCJA). Note that “stayed” can either mean “paused” or “not allowed to continue”; in the latter case, one speaks of a “permanent stay”.
    • Extended civil restraint orders and general civil restraint orders, restricting a party’s ability to commence legal proceedings if that party has made applications that are “totally without merit”: see sections 73C-73D of the SCJA. The Attorney-General can also apply for a similar order under s 74 of the SCJA. If such an order is made against you, you cannot commence certain civil proceedings without the court’s permission; and when you ask the court for permission, the court will decide not based on a full trial, but by a summary procedure based on the evidence you present (I’m not sure precisely what the law is, but, in short, this is a relatively short principle in which you have to convince the judge that there is some potential merit in your case). 

    In your hypothetical situation, the HSA might well ask the court to make such an order — but of course that’s up to the court’s discretion.

  • Judges in the PCMR

    Someone [in a previous class] mentioned the fact that the Chief Justice is a member of the PCMR, and asked: does this compromise his ability to perform his judicial tasks impartially?

    This issue was debated when the PCMR was first created. Then, it was called the Presidential Council, and one of its tasks was to scrutinise legislation, not only for whether it contained differentiating measures, but also for whether it violated the fundamental liberties in the Constitution generally.  One might have asked, as did Francis Khoo Kah Siang’s paper at (1969) 1 Singapore Law Review 14 at 16:

    “Might it not indeed be futile for private litigants to challenge Acts of Parliament as being discriminatory when the Council has endorsed them? If a Judge of the Court, sitting in the Presidential Council, considers a Bill consistent [with the fundamental liberties provisions in the Constitution], little reason exists to compel him to a different view when that Bill finally becomes an Act and is brought before a Court of law. Furthermore, that Judge will be a Judge in his own cause.”

    or, as Thio Su Mien put it in her paper in the same volume, (1969) 1 Singapore Law Review 2 at 6:

    “Suppose the Council advises against the enactment of a Bill on the basis that it is unconstitutional but the Government thinks otherwise and goes ahead with its enactment or where the Council makes no report within the prescribed time and the presumption arises that the Council has no adverse comments to make, or suppose the Council advises the Government that a Bill is not inconsistent with the fundamental rights of individuals, hat is the position of these Council-Judges when subsequently faced with litigation challenging the constitutionality of that same piece of legislation? Would they not be judges in their own cause?”

    I see the force in this argument, but I respectfully disagree that the judge would be a judge in his/her “own cause”. That phrase is usually used to refer to a situation in which a decision-maker has a stake in the decision one way or another – say, if a judge hearing a dispute between two competing companies owns a huge stake in one of them, or if a judge is personally related to one party.

    My preliminary view is this: In the case of the PCMR, all that can be said is that the judge, having once expressed a certain view, will be called upon to change his/her mind. But it is neither unusual nor objectionable for a judge who has once expressed a certain view in one case to depart from that view in another case. One example is Wee Chong Jin CJ’s being part of the court in Chng Suan Tze,which overruled the same Wee CJ’s decision in Lee Mau Seng. More generally, the PCMR, in rendering its report, will not have had the benefit of hearing counsel’s arguments in the case. Besides, in the judgment, the judge will have to explain his/her decision. 

  • The history of the PCMR

    On the history of the PCMR

    The PCMR began as the Presidential Council. Article 81J of the Constitution, which came into force on 9 January 1970, provided: 

    “It shall be the particular function of the Council to draw attention to any Bill or to any subsidiary legislation if that Bill or subsidiary legislation is in the opinion of the Council a differentiating measure or otherwise inconsistent with the fundamental liberties of the subject” (emphasis added)

    (See the Select Committee report referred to below for the text of the Bill that eventually created the Presidential Council; Parliament passed the Bill, as amended by the Select Committee, on 23 December 1969 without further amendments.)

    For more details, see the debates on the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1969 which took place on 12 June 1969 <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=003_19690612_S0002_T0002>; the Select Committee report dated 9 December 1969 <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/selectcommittee/selectcommittee/download?id=188&type=report>; and the further debates on 23 December 1969 <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=023_19691223_S0002_T0004>. 

    For comments on the Presidential Council, see the various articles in volume 1 of the Singapore Law Review.

    As for the reason why the Constitution was amended on 2 September 1970 to provide that Bills that “affec[t] the defence or the security of Singapore or which relat[e] to public safety, peace or good order in Singapore” need not be scrutinised by the Presidential Council (and, nowadays, the PCMR: see Art 78(7)(b) of the Constitution), see the debates in Parliament on 2 September 1970 <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=025_19700902_S0003_T0004>.

    It was in 1973 that the Presidential Council became the PCMR, following a recommendation by the Presidential Council itself in its annual report dated 30 April 1971: see <https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/government_records/Flipviewer/grid_publish/c/c4f96fbc-d3b6-11e7-bbf1-0050568939ad-Cmd.23of1971/web/html5/index.html?launchlogo=tablet/GovernmentRecords_brandingLogo_.png&pn=3> at para 8-9. At paragraph 9, the Presidential Council said:

    “… we recommend that this Council’s principal function should be to examine legislation with a view to ‘preventing’ Parliament inadvertently passing laws which discriminate against racial or religious minorities in Singapore”.

    So, on 16 February 1973 <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=019_19730216_S0003_T0004>, the Constitution was amended to rename the Presidential Council to the Presidential Council for Minority Rights, and to change its remit as follows:

    “the Presidential Council for Minority Rights will be concerned only with drawing attention to ‘differentiating measures’ in any legislation, principal or subsidiary, that is, measures which are disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community. Upon the coming into operation of the Act, therefore, it will not be part of the Council’s functions to draw attention to inconsistencies with the fundamental liberties of the subject as set out in Part II of the Constitution of Malaysia which applies to Singapore.” 

    Why is the “defence or security of Singapore” exception there? See https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/#/topic?reportid=025_19700902_S0003_T0004.

  • “Textualism” and “originalism”

    Textualism is a method of interpretation that takes into account primarily/only the text being interpreted. Originalism is the idea that the text being interpreted has the same meaning as from when it was originally written, i.e. its meaning cannot be said to change over time. The two are not the same. For example, one can take a non-textualist originalist approach, seeking to give intention to the original intentions of the drafters of a text, but ascertaining those intentions through the use of materials other than the text itself.

  • Being told of your right to counsel: Rajeevan Edakalavan v PP and Miranda v Arizona

    In class, referred to Rajeevan Edakalavan v PP [1998] 1 SLR(R) 10 (HC), which held that “nowhere in Art 9(3) does it provide that there is a further right to be informed of one’s right to counsel… there is no obligation imposed on the relevant authority to inform and advise the person under custody of his right to counsel.” (at [19]) One of you asked how this compares to the position in Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/384/436/case.html, in which the Supreme Court of the US held, by a 5-4 majority, that there must be “fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it”.

    I have not had time to read Miranda in full, but skimming it suggests to me that the majority reasoned as follows:

    1. The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution provides that “No person shall be… compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…” (emphasis added)
    2. If an accused person is not given a ‘Miranda warning”, etc., then there is a risk that he is pressured into incriminating himself, in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. (at 467)

    For those of you who would like to learn more about the Miranda case and its applicability to Singapore, I invite you to look at Rajeevan at [16] and how it distinguished Miranda.

    Note that Miranda lays down a rule of evidence (only), i.e. breach of the duty to give a ‘Miranda’ warning has the result only that some evidence is excluded.  It does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that the accused must be acquitted.  In Rajeevan, the accused was going further and claiming that the breach of the duty ought to vitiate his plea of guilt.   

    Also, note that in Miranda the majority spoke of “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will”, i.e. its view is premised on the assumption of fact that the failure to give a ‘Miranda warning’ would necessarily amount to a violation of the Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled.  By contrast, in Singapore, it is not as clear to me that the failure to tell someone of his right to a lawyer would amount to a violation of the right to be represented by a lawyer.  Might it amount to compulsion? Perhaps, although, as I understand the law of evidence, that is a question of fact to be determined in each case.

    That having been said, even as Rajeevan says that there is no constitutional right to be informed of your constitutional right to be represented by counsel, it suggests that there is a constitutional right not to be misinformed about your right to counsel. At [19]: “The officer under whose custody [the accused] is in cannot be heard to say, ‘you have no right to be defended by a counsel of your choice’. That will be contrary to Art 9(3) and a breach of the arrested person’s constitutional rights.” I say “suggests” because this line can, as I understand it, be read in at least 2 different ways: (a) it is unconstitutional because it has the practical effect of denying you a lawyer, contrary to Art 9(3) which says you have a right to a lawyer; (b) it is unconstitutional because you have a right not to be misled regarding your rights.  Which of the two do you think Yong CJ meant to say?

    I also think Miranda may be distinguished as follows.  In Miranda, the majority held that, in order to safeguard your right not to be compelled (right A), you have to be given a certain warning (right B).  But that warning is not just a restatement of right A: the content of that warning is not “You have a right not to be compelled to be a witness against yourself”.  I do not think Miranda goes so far as to say that if you have right A then you have a right to be informed of right A.

    Finally, note that some of the dissenting judgments in Miranda argue along similar lines as the court in Rajeevan.

    1. Saying “good morning” in court

      Our discussion of the problem of how to ensure that justice is not only done but also seen to be done reminded me of judicial criticism in Australia of the practice of lawyers saying “good morning” in court, particularly when the opposing party is a litigant in person: such greetings are said to risk giving an impression of familiarity between the lawyer and the judge. If you are interested in reading more, see this paper: C F Wall, ‘Good Morning, Your Honour’ <http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/QldJSchol/2012/82.pdf>

      Here’s a note I sent to students in a previous class:

      I can’t remember the context in which I did so, but I promised some of you that I would give you some links to case law on the phrase “good morning”. The case I had in mind is Wilson v Department of Human Services – Re Anna [2010] NSWSC 1489 at [102]-[113].

      The Chief Justice of New South Wales mentioned that case in a recent speech: T F Bathurst, ‘Don’t be Court Out: The Basics of Court Etiquette’, speech at the Toongabbie Legal Centre Seminar, 28 March 2020 at [16]-[17].

      For a more nuanced consideration of the issue, see Lindsay Ellison, ‘Litigants in Person – the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Counsel’s Perspective’, speech at the New South Wales Bar Association Bar Practice Course 1/2022, 23 September 2021 at [36]ff. That speech reproduces the relevant extract from the case, and also quotes the opposing view of Bao-Er (the full text of whose article I am unable to find online).

    2. The Eng Foong Ho case and common-law principles of judicial review

      Question: Could the Eng Foong Ho case have been argued on the basis of common-law principles of judicial review, in addition to/instead of Article 12 of the Constitution?

      Yes, I agree that the applicants could have raised one of the common-law grounds of review in administrative law, and that the ground of irrationality may overlap with how Art 12 works in administrative law. See the High Court’s judgment in Eng Foong Ho [2008] 3 SLR(R) 437 (HC) where the court recorded the applicants’ argument as follows (at [20]): “They contended that if the temple property was accorded different treatment as compared to the mission and the church, the differentiation must be founded on rational reasons. In their view, there were no rational reasons for the differentiation.”

      I say that it is an overlap, rather than that the two are identical, for the following reasons. As we have seen, when we talk about irrationality, we need to frame what exactly is the thing we are alleging is irrational. Are we saying that acquiring the temple is irrational? Or that acquiring the temple but not the nearby religious buildings is irrational? By contrast, by using the language of Art 12, it is clear that we are talking about the latter. It becomes clearer that the argument is not that taking the temple is irrational, but rather that taking the temple but not the other two is irrational.  That may, I suspect, by why the applicants framed their application as one under Art 12 rather than one based on irrationality simpliciter.

    3. Procedural impropriety and legitimate expectations

      Question: Are procedural impropriety; frustration of procedural legitimate expectations; and frustration of substantive legitimate expectations conceptually separate grounds of review?

      I think it is clear that frustration of substantive legitimate expectations is certainly a separate ground of judicial review from the other two. First, the Court of Appeal in SGB Starkstrom has proceeded on the basis that the two types of legitimate expectation are to be treated separately. Second, as I have stated in a previous message, so did the High Court in Chiu Teng, albeit less clearly. Third, conceptually speaking, it is evident from the cases involving alleged frustration of alleged substantive legitimate expectations that such expectations or such frustration can take place in a manner that has nothing to do with the procedure adopted by the decision-maker.

      As for the question of whether procedural impropriety and frustration of procedural legitimate expectations are separate: You are certainly right to note that they overlap in the sense that both are about decision-making procedures; as you noted, this is evident from the approach taken in various textbooks, as well as some jurisdictions’ case law (see, e.g., Chiu Teng at [87] and [91]).  You are also right to consider that procedural legitimate expectations can be said to be a subset of rules of procedural fairness, in the sense that the former help to determine whether a hearing should be held, while the latter tell us both whether a hearing should be held as well as about how that hearing is to take place.

      Nonetheless, I think a conceptual difference is as follows. Procedural legitimate expectations are grounded in some kind of expectation that the applicant had. The cases on procedural impropriety, on the other hand, tend to say that a hearing should have been held/it should have been held in a certain manner/bias should have been avoided/better reasons for the final decision have been given, for reasons of principle that one would think must apply regardless of what the applicant actually expected or did not expect.

      It is true that sometimes there is an overlap, particularly when the reasons of principle why a hearing need not be held are the same as the reasons why it would have not have been legitimate for the applicant to expect that one be held. Nonetheless, I think the conceptual difference referred to above still stands.

      For these reasons, I think it would be clearest to treat the three as separate grounds of review, although noting the interaction between procedural legitimate expectations and rules of procedural fairness as described above.

    4. The freedom of expression as a guard against the risk of abuse of state power

      In response to a student’s question, I set out the following remarks:

      I agree that preventing the abuse of state power can be a justification for the freedom of speech.

      The more challenging question is where we are to go from there. First, we could say that, if the rationale for the freedom of speech is the prevention of the abuse of state power, then protecting the freedom of speech is only justified to the extent to that the speech in question is capable of countering the abuse of state power. Second, we could say that the speaker should not have to prove that the speech is capable of countering the abuse of state power, because, so long as the state is called upon to answer that question, the state may abuse its power in answering that very question.

      This reminds me of the debate in New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/39> over whether false speech engages the freedom of expression. The US Supreme Court did not say that there should be a constitutional right to engage in false speech. Yet, it said that the freedom of expression is violated by rules targeted at false speech. Hence, according to the US Supreme Court, the rule that the defendant (not the plaintiff) bears the burden of proving the truth of a statement that is defamatory of a political figure is unconstitutional, because (at 279; internal citations omitted):

      “A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions — and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount — leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’ Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred… Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’… The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.”

      Hence (at 279-280):

      “The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”

      So US defamation law tolerates false speech, not because false speech is worthy of protection, but rather because rules that preventing false speech may end up discouraging non-false speech.

      While the Singapore courts have not explicitly said so, it may be that a similar idea drove the Court of Appeal in TOC/SDP to say that, while speech that has been “judicially determined to be indeed a false statement of fact” (at [62]; emphasis in original) does not fall within the ambit of Art 14(1)(a), speech that might be false does.

    5. The “CMIO model”

      A student asked about an op-ed by my colleague, Eugene Tan. I responded with the following thoughts:

      I would respectfully disagree with Prof Tan if his view is that “sustain[ing]” the “multiple identities of Singaporeans” is, in and of itself, a reason to keep the CMIO model. This is because the state is not the only one who constitutes people’s identities. I will be of my race, and you will be of yours, regardless of whether the state has those facts recorded somewhere. 

      But, as I understand it, that is not Prof Tan’s view. I can’t disagree with his pointing out that the promise in Article 152 of protecting minorities can only possibly be fulfilled if there is a way to define who is a minority. 

      My issue, rather, is not with classification by the state, but rather with the significance attached to the classification. If I may use a rather personal example: am half Chinese and half Indian. Before I had the race on my NRIC amended to reflect both of these facts, my NRIC simply described me as being “Chinese”. Yet, at this point, I would have taken umbrage at being described as only “Chinese”. This is because, more generally, I would have taken umbrage as being treated as a person constituted only by the state. It may make sense to treat me as “Chinese” for the purposes of some state policies (such as… patrilineality as a facet of patriarchy?), but that does not make me “Chinese” for all intents and purposes.

      One could, of course, go further. Is society entitled to treat as single a person who is married in the eyes of a religious authority, but not married in the eyes of the state? What role, exactly, does the state play in saying who we are? I would like to think that every instance on which the state attempts to attach labels to us is something that calls out for justification. In the case of race, I can’t disagree, on the whole, with Prof Tan’s justifications.

      Coming back to your point, one may ask: why must the state bother determining what kind of racial/religious minority one is, so long as it has determined that one is a racial/religious minority? There are several possible responses I can think of, but one is that the phrase “interests of the racial and religious minorities” in Article 152 of the Constitution prompts us to consider that different minorities may have different interests which have to be “care[d] for” in different ways. 

      Come to think of it, what is a “minority”? That word can mean a group of people which is smaller than the “majority” group: for instance, Malays, Indians, Eurasians, and “others” are minorities because there are fewer of them than there are Chinese. But what if we see “minority” more broadly as a group which is at especial risk of facing certain disadvantages? After all, isn’t the significance of one’s being part of a numerically small group simply that one, qua member of that group, will be be underrepresented in processes which represent groups of people in proportion to how many people there are — such as elections? Isn’t that just a special instance of disadvantage-facing?

    6. Parliamentary privilege and the courts

      On the role of the courts in matters involving Parliamentary privilege, there is one decided case in Singapore: Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v Attorney-General. There, the Committee of Privileges had found Jeyaretnam guilty of abuse of Parliamentary privilege and contempt of Parliament, and fined him. The High Court, referring to Article 63 of the Constitution and the Parliament (Privileges, Immunities & Powers) Act, refused to entertain a challenge to the substance of the decision ([1987] SLR(R) 472 at [12]):

      “Our Parliament has the right to control its own proceedings and to regulate its internal affairs without interference by the courts. Whatever matter arises concerning Parliament ought to be examined, discussed or adjudicated in Parliament and not elsewhere.”

      The Court of Appeal agreed ([1988] 2 SLR(R) 571 at [13]):

      ” Parliament at its sitting on 27 January 1987 had resolved that the appellant was guilty of abuse of the privileges and contempt of the Committee and of Parliament and imposed the fines on the appellant. In our opinion, these resolutions of Parliament are conclusive, and it is not open to the court to go behind these resolutions and determine the same issues. Parliament has the right of judging for itself what constitutes abuse of privilege and contempt…”

      This would appear, then, to be a limited exception to the general rule that the courts have the final authority to interpret statutes.

      That said, neither court denied that the Committee of Privileges was bound to give Jeyaretnam a fair hearing. They were not unwilling to consider Jeyaretnam’s argument that he had not been given a fair opportunity to be heard. However, they found that he had been.

    7. Interpreting allegedly defamatory statements

      When determining whether a statement is defamatory, the statement is to be interpreted from the point of view of the “‘ordinary reasonable person’ who is not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal”: see Gary Chan, The Law of Torts in Singapore (1st ed, 2011) at [12.026]. (And the intention of the speaker is irrelevant: Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th ed) at [3.15].)

      In essence, you have asked: Are there not multiple types of person in society, each of whom may ascribe a different meaning to a statement? Traditionally, Anglo-Singaporean law has ignored this concern, applying a “single meaning rule” — see Goh Chok Tong v Tang Liang Hong [1997] 1 SLR(R) 811 (HC) [59]:

      “although the alleged libellous publication or the alleged slanderous words may convey different meanings to different readers or listeners, a judge in Singapore, as a finder of facts, is required by the common law to determine the single and the right meaning which the publication or words conveyed to the notional reasonable reader or reasonable listener and, having identified it, the judge is then to proceed to consider if it is defamatory of the plaintiff and, if so, he is to base the damages on that meaning and that meaning alone”

      The “single meaning rule” has been subject to heavy criticism: for an outline of such criticisms, see The Online Citizen Pte Ltd v AG [2021] SGCA 96 at [145]-[147] and Alastair Mullis and Richard Parkes QC, eds, Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th ed) at [3.16]. The Singapore courts may revisit this rule — which the authors of Gatley on Libel and Slander describe (at [3.16]) as “ripe for challenge” — in future.

    8. Making the law more accessible

      In response to a question from a student, I was reminded of Lord Renton QC’s 1995 Statute Law Society Lecture, titled ‘The Evolution of Modern Statute Law and its Future’ <http://www.statutelawsociety.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Lord_Renton_lecture.pdf>, where, referencing the Ten Commandments from the Torah, he wrote:

      “I am not being entirely frivolous when I remind you that Moses was an excellent draftsman. When he said, ‘Thou shall not steal’, everyone knew what he meant. But we have the Theft Act, 1978, with 36 sections, which have given rise to many problems of interpretation, which have had to be considered many times by the Court of Appeal.”

      (The irony is that Renton had mistakenly referred to the Theft Act 1978 when, in fact, he meant to refer to the Theft Act 1968. Both are UK Acts of Parliament which are presently in force.)

      If Renton was not being “entire frivolous”, he was not being entirely serious either. It is by no means clear that “everyone knew what [Moses] meant”; even if the word translated as “steal” had a settled meaning, one wonders how far that meaning could be extended beyond the central case of dishonestly taking movable property. Would “Thou shall not steal” criminalise obtaining services from someone else without paying for them (Theft Act 1978, s 3)? What about obtaining Bitcoin or an NFT by fraud? Or personal information? Or electricity (Theft Act 1968, s 13)? Or land (Theft Act 1968, s 4)? Is a distinction to be drawn between taking possession of another’s property and fraudulently inducing a transfer of ownership? Moreover, “Thou shall not steal” fails to distinguish between various varieties of theft which most people would agree should not be treated the same way, from pickpocketing to burglary to armed robbery. Designing rules on the basis that “everyone kn[ows]” what one means is a recipe for disaster.

      So, while I see the value in efforts to make the law easier to access (why couldn’t the UK Parliament have combined the Theft Act 1968, the Theft Act 1978, and the Fraud Act 2006 into one?) and to understand (see the AGC’s PLUS project), I am skeptical of calls for the substance of the law to be simplified merely for the sake of being understandable by the average person without assistance. Understandability is not an unqualified good, and is sometimes in tension with other values such as rigour. Moreover, what level of understandability is to be achieved? Surely, if laws (or road signs, or websites with instructions on how to apply for a dog licence, or COVID-19 vaccination instructions) are designed to be understandable by literally everyone, something has to be sacrificed. There comes a point where one ought to consider, not whether the law is understandable without assistance, but rather whether the required assistance is easily accessible.

      As for socioeconomic causes of inaccessibility, one matter that particularly irks me is the amount of fees that one has to pay in order to enforce a judgment against someone who will not pay generally — I don’t think charging fees is wrong in and of itself, but charging hundreds can be particularly problematic when the judgment debtor is not particularly wealthy to begin with. For an example, see this blog post from TWC2: https://twc2.org.sg/2018/06/17/when-court-orders-are-worthless-the-zach-engineering-case/. One solution I can think of is to identify certain socioeconomically disadvantaged groups and create a fund to fund the costs of enforcement.

      The creation of the ECT as a means to resolve labour disputes only gets one so far, because orders of the ECT are enforceable in the same manner as orders of the District Courts (see the Employment Claims Act 2016, s 22(11)), which are in turn expensive to enforce (see https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/cws/ECT/Pages/Enforcing-a-Tribunal-Order.aspxon enforcement generally, and https://www.statecourts.gov.sg/cws/CivilCase/Pages/EnforcementofJudgmentsorOrdersbyWritofSeizureandSale.aspx on Writs of Seizure and Sale in particular.)

    9. The criminal justice system and diplomacy

      A student asked about the Michael Fay case — specifically, the fact that following a request by the US President, he received fewer strokes of the cane than what he was sentenced to receive. (Specifically, this took place by means of Singapore’s Cabinet advising the President to grant partial clemency.) The student asked about the court’s role. This was my response:

      As far as the courts are concerned, they are not entitled to be influenced by foreign pressure or pressure in the form of assurances given by the Government. Both are irrelevant to sentencing.

      A case in point is that of David James Roach, whom the UK had extradited to Singapore on condition that he not be caned. Yet, the Singapore courts sentenced him to caning — as they had to, given that robbery carries a mandatory sentence of caning (see section 392 of the Penal Code).

      The Singapore government’s promise was instead fulfilled through the President, on the advice of Cabinet, exercising her power under Article 22P(1)(c) of the Constitution to remit part of the sentence. 

      For more information, see Olivine Lin, ‘Roachgate – No Constitutional Crisis’, Singapore Public Law (27 February 2018), archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20200427070219/https://singaporepubliclaw.com/2018/02/27/roachgate/ (the Singapore Public Law blog is now defunct); and this press release from the MHA: https://www.mha.gov.sg/mediaroom/press-releases/singapore-government-fulfills-assurance-given-to-uk-government-for-extradition-of-david-james-roach/

      So the question is: what are the legal limits to Cabinet’s power to advise the President to remit part of a sentence? Specifically, would it be unlawful to exercise this power on the basis of an demand by a foreign state before extradition? I believe a court would say that the answer is no. If the answer were yes, then it would have been unlawful for the Singapore government to fulfil its promise to the UK government, which would mean that the Singapore government would make no such promise, which would mean that Roach would not be extradited to Singapore, which would mean more generally that a person can commit a crime in Singapore and get away with it simply by going to a country which refuses to extradite people to Singapore except if certain promises are made by the Singapore government. That would be a highly undesirable state of affairs. 

      But, even assuming that I am correct, that doesn’t mean that diplomatic concerns can never be irrelevant to the exercise of the clemency power, such that taking them into account can never be unlawful. A court could, for instance, hold that Cabinet is entitled to advise the President to remit the sentence on the basis of the need to secure the extradition of a person who has evidently committed an offence in Singapore, but not on the basis of a mere desire to please a foreign state. But I am now venturing into speculative territory. I do wonder what the courts would have made of a challenge to Cabinet’s decision to advise the President to partially remit Fay’s sentence of caning.

      But then we would run into a practical problem: Who would bring the challenge? Not Fay himself, of course. The only person who would would be the Attorney-General, as guardian of the public interest. But the Attorney-General would ordinarily also have to be represent Cabinet as the respondent, and the President/Cabinet can certainly require him to (Constitution, Art 35(7)). So, in practice, we may never see a case in which the courts have occasion to pronounce on when diplomatic concerns may lawfully be taken into account in a decision to remit a sentence.

      One can imagine a complete stranger to the action gaining standing to bring such a challenge by invoking the “grave and serious breaches of legality” limb in Jeyaretnam [2014] 1 SLR 345 at [62]. I wonder who would do so. I might if such a thing happens after retirement and I can afford the time. But in the absence of such a public-spirited individual, it may well be that the limits to the power to remit a sentence will be tested in the political rather than the judicial arena.

    10. The Shared Values White Paper

      Whenever we judge anything, we should judge it not only according to what it is, but also according to how well it achieves what it purports to achieve. For example, it would be unfair to say that the ‘Shared Values’ fail to provide prescriptive guidance to state authorities if they were not meant to do so in the first place.

      If I may share a note I wrote to a previous class about the ‘Shared Values’ and the purported ‘jun zi’ model:

      I agree with [a student who argued that the Shared Values White Paper is of limited prescriptive utility, and is more descriptive]. The article which [another student] cited [namely, Thio Li-ann, ‘Constitutional “Soft” Law and the Management of Religious Liberty and Order’ [2004] SJLS 414] cites another article by Benedict Sheehy (2004) HKLJ 67, which argues that the decisions in Colin Chan and Ong Ah Chuan make sense in the light of the Shared Values (notwithstanding that Ong Ah Chuan predates the Shared Values White Paper) — for example, he refers to the first of the Shared Values, and then explains Colin Chan as a case in which “[t]he individual’s interest in eternal life does not override the state’s or community’s interest in self-defence” (76). However, Sheehy does not (and cannot) say that the courts relied on the Shared Values.

      Sheehy suggests that the judiciary was “not always so strongly pro-communitarian” (79) until the Constitution and ISA were amended to reverse Chng Suan Tze and appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1993 (80). I have a number of points in response.

      First, correlation is not causation. It is not clear how Sheehy moves from his statement that the Shared Values are a statement of “values and principles by which the Government of Singapore intends to run the country” (81, emphasis added) to the conclusion that the courts are to be understood as having deliberately decided on the basis of the Shared Values.

      Second, it would appear that Sheehy’s thesis has proven no longer to be accurate: his characterisation of constitutional interpretation in Singapore as “pro-communitarian” (79) and failing to “adher[e]” to the “Westminster modelled Constitution… in the strict ‘Rule of Law’ sense” (81), even if once accurate, must now be reconsidered in the light of more recent case law. (Sheehy’s paper was published in 2004.)

      Third, I wonder whether Sheehy and others are making more of the White Paper than the White Paper itself did. To elaborate:

      • The White Paper’s professed aim is to present “a set of Shared Values which Singaporeans… can subscribe to and live by” (at [1]) which are nonetheless “ideals” (at [54]) which are, further, not “prescribe[d] and fr[ozen] for all time” (at [53]), and which are meant as an “influence” on “future generations of Singaporeans” rather than an attempt to “completely determine” their “values” (at [57]).
      • The passage in the White Paper about junzi is a passing remark that was merely meant to illustrate the point that “[m]any Confucian ideals are relevant to Singapore” ([41]), and does not necessarily relate directly to any particular proposed “shared value”.
      • The White Paper purported to be a discussion of values that ought to shape society, and not a discussion of how the government should act. Even the discussion of “[p]olitical values” at [47]-[51] purported to discuss the importance of “[p]olitical values” and “political culture” to “all Singaporeans” (as opposed to, say, the government only), and, more importantly, ultimately concluded that “[t]he Shared Values focus on the relationship between the individual and society… Extending them to cover the relationship between the voter and the government will bring in an altogether different set of issues, and risk diffusing their primary focus… It is better for the political culture not to be included in the Shared Values, but to be inculcated separately among the population.” ([50]-[51]; emphasis added)

      That is not to say that the Shared Values White Paper is useless. I agree with [the first student’s] account of possible uses to which the White Paper could be put. I would, however, add the caveat that, for the Shared Values (or anything) to be more than merely someone’s opinion, it would need to have a degree of legitimacy among people — otherwise, the courts would have no business imposing them on people. Thio makes this point in ‘Soft constitutional law in nonliberal Asian constitutional democracies’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 766, albeit in the context of another document (the Declaration on Religious Harmony). At 769, she observes that “the function and effect of [soft constitutional law], created and interpreted primarily by nonjudicial actors, raise[s] questions of legitimacy…”; for example (at 796): “The legitimacy of a document is more likely to be bolstered where it is a product of consultation, not diktat…”

      Finally, if you do not know what a White Paper is, please go and find out, and please do not think that a White Paper necessarily contains unshakeable truth.

    11. On the Legislature and Parliament

      Is the PCMR similar to a second chamber / a council of state?

      Kind of. It may play a similar function. But there are important differences between the PCMR and second chambers/councils of state in many other legal systems: (a) The PCMR debates in secret, not publicly. (b) There are only limited grounds on which the PCMR can object to a Bill/subsidiary legislation: see Article 77.

      Note that a second chamber doesn’t necessarily have to have the power to override the first chamber, nor does it necessarily have to be elected: consider the UK’s House of Lords.

      How  can Parliament ‘fire’ the Cabinet?

      Parliament could pass a vote of no confidence in the Government, which would signal to the President that the PM no longer commands the confidence of the majority of Parliament. In that case, under Art 26(1)(b) of the Constitution, the President must either declare the office of PM vacant or (if the PM requests) dissolve Parliament. 

      Parliament can also pass a resolution to dissolve itself: Art 65(3A)(d).

      If Parliament is dissolved, then elections must be called. If Parliament isn’t dissolved, but the PM’s office is declared vacant, then the President must appoint a new PM in accordance with Art 25(1).

      How many MPs does it take to pass a Bill?

      You may say “simple majority for normal Bills; 2/3 majority for Bills that would amend the Constitution”. That is not precise enough.

      Bills seeking to amend the Constitution / Bills passed despite an adverse report by the PCMR 

      “A Bill seeking to amend any provision in [the] Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament(excluding nominated Members)“: Article 5(2) (emphasis added).

      The President can only assent to a Bill on which the PCMR has issued an adverse report if “a motion for the presentation of the Bill to the President for assent has been passed by not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament (excluding nominated Members)“: Article 78(6) (emphasis added).

      At present, there are 108 MPs, 9 of whom are NMPs. So the minimum number of MPs needed to pass a Bill seeking to amend the Constitution = ceil(2/3 * (108 – 9)) = 66.

      Other Bills (sometimes known as ‘ordinary Bills’)

      As for a question whether an ordinary Bill should be passed, see Article 57(1): “Subject to this Constitution, all questions proposed for decision in Parliament shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting; and if, upon any question before Parliament, the votes of the Members are equally divided, the motion shall be lost.” 

      Then see Article 56: “If objection is taken by any Member present that there are present (besides the Speaker or other Member presiding) fewer than one-quarter of the total number of Members and, after such interval as may be prescribed in the Standing Orders of Parliament, the Speaker or other Member presiding ascertains that the number of Members present is still less than one-quarter of the total number of Members, he shall thereupon adjourn Parliament.”

      So, if we assume that some MP will object if Parliament has fewer than 1/4 of the total number of members present, then the minimum number of MPs needed to pass a Bill other than a Bill seeking to amend the Constitution = ceil(1/2 * 1/4 * 108) = 14.

      But if the number of MPs who turn up is fewer than 1/4 of the total number of MPs and yet no MP objects — in the extreme case, if just one MP turns up and he doesn’t object — then it would appear to me that the minimum number of MPs needed would be 1. (Of course, this is a very unrealistic scenario. As long as there is one opposition MP, I suppose that in practice that MP would turn up to object.)

      We must note two special cases.

      First, NMPs cannot vote on Supply Bills, Supplementary Supply Bills, Final Supply Bills, and Money Bills: Article 39(2). So in the case of such Bills, for the purpose of Article 57(1), they don’t count as “present and voting”.

      Second, as noted above, if the PCMR has issued an adverse report on any provision of the Bill, then the Bill can only be passed if “not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament (excluding nominated Members)” vote in favour. That currently means at least 66 MPs.

      Finally, you may be wondering: does an MP who chooses to abstain from a vote count as “present and voting”? I would think the answer is no; I would think that “voting” refers to having the right to vote, not necessarily exercising that right.

      Whips, etc.

      Because of the party whip system, a party that controls at least 2/3 of the non-NMP seats in Parliament can pass any Bill seeking to amend the Constitution, and a party that controls more than half of the non-NMP seats in Parliament can pass any other Bill. One may ask: does this mean that, once that party’s leadership has decided that it wants a Bill to be passed, it will be done? Couple that with the fact that Ministers tend to take the lead in setting the legislative agenda (the vast majority of Bills are Government Bills), and you may ask: can we say that, in reality, it is the Government that legislates?

      Sometimes, we see Ministers using language loosely: ‘we will introduce laws’; ‘the Government will change the law’. This is, of course, terminologically inaccurate: the Legislature, no matter who dominates it, is the legislative body. But there is a more important problem with thinking that the Government legislates: even if the Government dominates the legislative agenda, debates and questions — including questions asked by members of the ruling party — are no less an important part of the legislative process.

      Indeed, given section 9A of the Interpretation Act, such debates can come into play when it is time for a court to interpret the legislation. It is possible that some part of a Bill is unclear; an MP asks for a clarification; the Minister who introduced the Bill responds; and a court then draws on that response in interpreting the Bill.

      In an extreme case, it is possible for an MP to defy his/her party’s Whip. That may be a career-ending move in practice, but it remains possible.

      ‘The PAP’

      While nobody, including the PAP, is beyond criticism, it is useful to distinguish between criticisms of what the PAP does qua PAP and what the PAP can do qua ruling party. For instance, I wouldn’t say that ‘the PAP’ can use its party whip to get Parliament to pass any Bill that it likes. To the extent that it can (which is itself an imprecise thing to say: it is Parliament, not any party, that passes Bills), that’s not because it’s the PAP; it’s because it’s the party that occupies more than 50% of the non-NMP seats in Parliament.

    12. On ‘sovereign citizens’

      For a gloriously thorough description of/analysis of/rant on those who attempt to make “Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument[s]” in court (and fail spectacularly), see Rooke ACJ’s judgment in Meads v Meads 2012 ABQB 571 (Court of Queen’s Bench, Alberta, Canada) <https://www.canlii.org/en/ab/abqb/doc/2012/2012abqb571/2012abqb571.html>.

      For a recent academic follow-up, see Donald J Netolitzky, ‘After the Hammer: Six Years of Meads v Meads‘ (2019) 56 Alberta Law Review 1167 <https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2019CanLIIDocs2094#!fragment//BQCwhgziBcwMYgK4DsDWszIQewE4BUBTADwBdoByCgSgBpltTCIBFRQ3AT0otokLC4EbDtyp8BQkAGU8pAELcASgFEAMioBqAQQByAYRW1SYAEbRS2ONWpA>.

      Finally, consider that, according to Hart (The Concept of Law at 115-116), a legal system (with the secondary rules that he says a legal system must have) only exists if two criteria are true: (a) “those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system’s ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed” (by ordinary legal subjects); (b) the system’s “rules of recognition specifying the criteria or legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards o official behaviour by its officials”. Clearly, according to these criteria, the legal system which a ‘sovereign citizen’ claims exists does not in fact exist.

    13. Successful applications for judicial review of executive action

      (Note: I say “judicial review of executive action” in order to avoid confusion with judicial review of legislation.)

      For a (somewhat dated) list of cases in which the applicant succeeded in arguing that some executive action was unlawful, see Chan Sek Keong: ‘Judicial Review — From Angst to Empathy’ (2010) 22 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 469 at Annex A. Some that stand out to me:

      Aziz bin Abdul Rahman [1979-1980] SLR(R) 55; Phang Moh Shin [1965-1967] SLR(R) 666: In each of these cases, a police officer’s dismissal was void because he was not given a fair hearing.

      Chng Suan Tze [1988] 2 SLR(R) 525: See the video.

      Tan Gek Neo Jessie [1991] 1 SLR(R) 1: The Registrar of Businesses ordered someone to change the name of her business, “JC Penney Collections”, on the ground that it was very similar to that of another business called JC Penney Company Inc. The Registrar’s decision was unlawful because she had not taken into account various relevant matters, e.g. that JC Penney Company Inc had not used the name “Penneys” as a trade mark in Singapore.

      Fong Thin Choo [1991] 1 SLR(R) 774: A company imported cigarettes into Singapore, claiming that it would export them again soon (i.e. Singpaore was just being used as a transit point) so it did not have to pay duty on the cigarettes. The Director-General of Customs ordered the company to pay duty because he concluded that the company had failed to export the cigarettes. The court held that the Director-General had acted unlawfully because his inspectors’ “investigation was neither fair nor sufficient”: the inspector “failed to investigate fully the evidence produced by the [company and its directors]” and “did not give a fair hearing to the applicants”, instead “hear[ing] one side of the story without hearing the other side” (at [54]).

      Pang Chen Suan [2008] 3 SLR(R) 648: The Commissioner for Labour had acted unlawfully in dismissing a worker’s claim for compensation under what was then known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act (now, see the Work Injury Compensation Act). The Act said that the worker had to make his claim within a certain time limit, but could make his claim past that limit if he had “reasonable cause”. The Commissioner for Labour had proceeded on a misunderstanding of what the phrase “reasonable cause” meant.

      Stansfield Business International Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR(R) 866: The Minister for Labour, in deciding that a worker had been “dismissed without just cause or excuse”, had failed to give a fair hearing to the employer.

      Tan Seet Eng [2016] 1 SLR 779: You’re probably tired of hearing about this case by now.

      Note also that, even though the majority of applications for judicial review of executive action don’t succeed, that could well be because (a) executive bodies tend not to act unlawfully; (b) other mechanisms, such as informal negotiations or statutory appeals, are a sufficient safeguard against unlawfulness; and/or (c) applicants sometimes don’t run the best legal arguments possible.

      In addition, note that there can be cases where the applicant does not succeed, yet the court makes important statements that keep the respondent on its toes. For example, in Gobi a/l Avedian [2020] SGCA 77, the applicants’ argument that their imminent execution would be unlawful failed, but the Court of Appeal did point out that it was unlawful for the Singapore Prison Service to send copies of prisoners’ documents to the AGC. This is not limited to judicial review proceedings. For example, Parti Liyani’s application for compensation ([2021] SGHC 146) failed, but the court did state: “If cross-examination at trial reveals severe weaknesses in the testimony of the witnesses or new evidence is discovered that destroys the very crux of the Prosecution’s case, the onus is on the Prosecution to re-evaluate its case and decide if the prosecution should continue. If it is appropriate, the Prosecution should, as ministers of justice, exercise its discretion to discontinue the proceedings.”

    14. Non-citizens and the freedom of expression in Singapore

      Article 14 of the Constitution says that citizens of Singapore have certain constitutional rights. The effect of those constitutional rights is to restrict the state’s powers to restrict the ability of citizens to express themselves, assemble, and associate. Therefore, because non-citizens do not have those constitutional rights, the state is freer, not less free, to restrict non-citizens’ ability to express themselves, assemble, and associate.

      I say “freer”, and not “totally free”, for the following reason. While non-citizens do not enjoy rights under Article 14 of the Constitution, it does not follow that non-citizens have no right at all to express themselves (etc.). They still enjoy a limited right to express themselves (etc.) in two senses.

      First, non-citizens enjoy the residual liberty to speak, which is a specific instance of the general proposition that whatever is not expressly forbidden by law is permitted. Hence, non-citizens have a liberty to speak in the sense that they are free to speak save to the extent that the law prevents them from doing so. (There is, in a similar sense, a liberty to engage in cannibalism. While there is no constitutional right to cannibalism, we are free to engage in cannibalism because there is no law forbidding it. If such a law is passed, then our liberty to engage in cannibalism will be correspondingly restricted, and we have no ground to say that that law would be invalid; but, so long as such a law does not exist, eat away.)

      Second, there are certain rights recognised at common law, with the effect that a statute, if capable of being interpreted in more than one way, will be interpreted in the way that better gives effect to those rights. The freedom of speech is one such right. A case in point is PP v Yue Mun Yew Gary [2013] 1 SLR 39, which involved section 267C of the Penal Code. Section 267C states that it is an offence to, among other things, make a communication “containing any incitement to violence or counselling disobedience to the law or to any lawful order of a public servant or likely to lead to any breach of the peace”. The High Court could have read this literally, which would make the offence a “strict liability” offence (i.e. one where the offender need not have any particular state of mind in order to be convicted). Or the High Court could have held that there is an implied mental element (“mens rea“), namely, that a person must have had an intention to incite violence (etc.) to be convicted under s 267C. The High Court chose the latter. Why? Because of the

        “need to give sufficient weight to the value of free expression. A free and open discourse is indispensable to the proper functioning of any democracy, and provisions like s 267C may potentially have an adverse chilling effect on this vital civic conversation. That is not what s 267C was meant to achieve. Hence in my judgment s 267C cannot be a strict liability offence.” (at [38)

        Neither of these is the same as the constitutional right enjoyed by citizens under Article 14. The difference is perhaps best summed up by the Court of Appeal’s approach to the Reynolds privilege in Review Publishing. The Court of Appeal said that, if anything would provide the Singapore courts to adopt the concept of Reynolds privilege from English law into Singapore law, it would have to be a constitutional right. Hence, if the defendant had been a Singapore citizen, then the Court of Appeal would, prompted by Article 14, have considered adopting Reynolds privilege into Singapore law. By contrast, because the defendant was not a Singapore citizen (and did not consist of Singapore citizens), it did not enjoy the constitutional rights in Article 14, and so the Court of Appeal did not consider adopting Reynolds privilege at all. So Article 14 is not “merely symbolic”; whether or not someone enjoys the rights in Article 14 can make a real difference to the outcome of a court case.

      1. On a question about “detention without trial”

        1. “Detention without trial” is not a term of art. It refers simply to detention other than imprisonment following criminal proceedings involving a trial (although, in practice, I have not heard of anyone using the term to refer to imprisonment following criminal proceedings in which the accused person has pleaded guilty — there is no trial, but the accused person could have claimed trial).
        2. That said, implicit in the term “detention without trial” is an assertion that detention following a trial (or an opportunity to stand trial) is the norm, and other types of detention the exception; and that the exception merits especial comment. In this sense, “detention without trial” is something of a loaded term, not unlike “termination without notice”.
        3. Why is a trial in open court (or an opportunity to claim trial) considered the norm? Consider what a trial entails. It entails the testing of evidence against/in favour of someone, but that is not all: a trial (as traditionally conceived of) involves publicity. Read about the principle of “open justice” for more on why importance is often ascribed to such publicity.
        4. Various legal systems have struggled with the problem of how to balance the impulse to stick to the norm of a trial with reasons for a trial not to be held. It is not true that the system Singapore has under the CLTPA/ISA is the only possible one. Consider, for example, “closed material procedures” in the UK. These are court proceedings involving the hearing of evidence that, in the state’s view, should not be disclosed to the public. Such proceedings are held behind closed doors: typically, only the judge and lawyers who have been security-cleared are in attendance. This means that even the accused person (or person on whom the state proposes to impose restrictions) himself/herself will not have access to that evidence; only his/her lawyer (known as a “special advocate”) will. Of course, this system is not beyond criticism.
      2. Of judicial activism and (allegedly) deficient political processes

        Some time ago in class, I made a remark that the Indian courts tend to read rights provisions in a more expansive manner (that is, in favour of the person and against the state) than Singapore courts do. I would now like to expand on that. Before doing so, however, it may be useful to have a look at the rights provisions in the Indian Constitution, and observe that they are different from Singapore’s. India’s Constitution <https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/COI.pdf> recognises more constitutional rights than Singapore’s, and the rights provisions are themselves worded differently. For example, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution provides that legislation can impose on the “freedom of speech and expression” only “reasonable” restrictions in the interests of various matters; by contrast, Article 14 of Singapore’s Constitution does not contain the word “reasonable”.

        Now, consider Article 21 of India’s Constitution, which states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” This is nearly identical to Singapore’s Article 9(1); the only difference is that the Indian provision says “according to procedure established by law”, not just “according to law”. In Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 SLR 489, the Court of Appeal had to consider the argument that the mandatory death penalty violates Article 9(1) of Singapore’s Constitution. As we have seen, according to the Singapore courts, “in accordance with law” means in accordance with laws that observe certain “fundamental rules of natural justice”. By contrast, in India, “in accordance with law” means in accordance with laws that are “fair, just and reasonable” (see Yong Vui Kong at [80] citing Mithu v State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC 473 at [34]). According to the Supreme Court of India in Mithu, the mandatory death penalty violates their Article 21.

        Why the difference? The Singapore court in Yong Vui Kong at [83] said: “The decision in Mithu is entirely understandable, having regard to the economic, social and political conditions prevailing in India and the pro-active approach of the Indian Supreme Court in matters relating to the social and economic conditions of the people of India.” What precisely does this mean? How can the “economic, social and political conditions” in a country influence what the law means? 

        It may be that the Singapore court was, somewhat euphemistically, referring to a phenomenon, actual or perceived, of inaction on the part of the Indian legislature and/or executive which have caused the court to take on a more active role than it otherwise would. There is at least one case in which the Supreme Court of India has reeferred to such a phenomenon. The case of Vishaka v State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1031794> concerned a social worker who had allegedly been brutally raped. The Supreme Court said (emphasis added): 

        “… The incident reveals the hazards to which a working woman may be exposed and the depravity to which sexual harassment can degenerate; and the urgency for safeguards by an alternative mechanism in the absence of legislative measures. In the absence of legislative measures, the need is to find an effective alternative mechanism to fulfil this felt and urgent social need.

        Each such incident results in violation of the fundamental rights of ‘Gender Equality’ and the ‘Right of Life and Liberty’. It is clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of Constitution. One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) ‘to practice any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or business’. Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy under Article 32 for the enforcement of these fundamental rights of women. […] The fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession depends on the availability of a ‘safe’ working environment. Right to life means life with dignity. The primary responsibility fro [sic] ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable legislation, and the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and the executive. When, however, instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation of fundamental rights of women workers under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are brought before us for redress under Article 32, an effective redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down for the protection of these rights to fill the legislative vacuum.”

        The court, noting the “absence of enacted law to provide fro [sic] the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse”, laid down several very detailed “guidelines and norms” which would stand “until a legislation [sic] is enacted for the purpose”. In Singapore, as in several other jurisdictions, a court which made such rules would be considered to have grossly overstepped its boundaries by (in effect) legislating. But in Indian law, the courts consider that “it is the duty of the executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders because its field is coterminous with that of the legislature, and where there is inaction even by the executive, for whatever reason, the judiciary must step in, in exercise of its constitutional obligations under the aforesaid provisions to provide a solution till such time as the legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper legislation to cover the field” (Vineet Narain v Union of India AIR 1998 SC 889 <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1203995/>, discussing Vishaka).

        Some pejoratively call this “judicial activism”. Others call this “judicial activism”, but not pejoratively. 

        The Vishaka case, and the gloss in Vineet Narain, are evidence for the hypothesis that the courts take on a more active role in lawmaking, sometimes interpreting the Constitution more expansively in order to justify doing so (by saying that the Constitution requires them to), when they perceive that the political branches of the state are not adequately performing their function.

        Another piece of evidence for this hypothesis is what is sometimes known as the most famous footnote in [US] constitutional law, namely, footnote 4 of United States v Carolene Products 304 US 144 (1938). The main text of Stone J’s judgment, at [11], speaks of a presumption that legislation is constitutionally valid. But footnote 4 suggests that “legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” might stand to be “subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny”. Again, the court sees itself taking on a more active role when it needs to make up for deficiencies in political processes.

      3. Finality in judicial decision-making

        In class, I said something about the value in people’s being able to ascertain the content of the law with a sense of certainty, and to have disputes resolved with finality. I meant to mention the following quotation by Robert H Jackson, a US Supreme Court judge: “We [i.e. the court] are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”

        Jackson’s famous words may be found in his judgment in Brown v Allen 344 US 443 (1953). We need not concern ourselves with the facts of that case. What matters is this passage:

        Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.

        Do you find this disturbing? If so, ask yourself: If the Supreme Court of Newgarth [in Lon L Fuller, ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explorers‘ (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 616] was unable to deliver a clear majority ruling (and only reached the conclusion it did because of the rule that, if there was no majority, then the lower court’s decision would stand), then why would an even higher court lead to a clearer decision? If not, ask yourself: Why have appeals — or, for that matter, any check and balance — at all?

        The Kho Jabing saga

        For a Singapore case about the issue of finality, consider the case of Kho Jabing. Kho had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Then the Penal Code was amended to allow for a sentence of life imprisonment and caning instead of death in certain cases of murder; and to provide for a procedure by which those who had been sentenced to death but not yet executed could apply to the court for a review of their sentences. Kho made such an application. The High Court ruled that he should be sentenced to life imprisonment and caning. The Prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ruled (by a 3-2 majority) that he should be sentenced to death. (In the Court of Appeal, all the judges agreed that, when the court has a choice between a sentence of death and a sentence of life imprisonment and caning for murder, “the death penalty would be the appropriate sentence when the offender has acted in a way which exhibits viciousness or a blatant disregard for human life”: see [2015] 2 SLR 112 at para [45]. What the judges differed on was whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to show that Kho had indeed acted in such a manner.)

        Next, Kho asked the Court of Appeal to re-open the appeal (see [2016] 3 SLR 135). The Court of Appeal agreed that it had the power to re-open a previously concluded case. But this power, said the Court, is to be exercised sparingly. The Court laid down stringent criteria for when this power would be exercised, and found that those criteria had not been made out. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision would stand. Note that, while the Court of Appeal’s initial decision to sentence Kho to death was by a majority of 3 judges to 2, the Court of Appeal’s next decision not to re-open its earlier decision was a unanimous decision of the same 5 judges. So was the Court of Appeal’s next decision (reported at [2016] 3 SLR 1259), in which Kho made a second application to the Court of Appeal asking it to re-open its decision. 

        As of 2 January 2021, the power of an appellate court to re-open a previously concluded case is governed by sections 394F to 394K of the Criminal Procedure Code. Focus on section 394J, which specifies when the case may be re-opened (or, to use the language of the Criminal Procedure Code, when a “review application” is to be allowed.) The criteria are more or less the same as those laid down by the court in Kho Jabing. They are very stringent indeed. For example, one must be able to produce new material which had not been, and could not have been, canvassed in court before which is “capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice”; and it is not a “miscarriage of justice” merely because “there is a real possibility that the earlier decision is wrong” (rather, the decision must have been “demonstrably wrong” or “tainted by fraud or a breach of the rules of [procedural fairness], such that the integrity of the judicial process is compromised”.)

        For statements from the Court of Appeal about the importance of finality, see the following passages from [2016] 3 SLR 135 (Kho’s first application to re-open the case):

        1        In our recent decision in The Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT International Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1104 (“TT International”) at [185] and [215], we explained that the principle of finality is an integral part of justice. Judicial decisions, if they are to mean anything at all, must confer certainty and stability. People must be able to order their affairs according to the settled conviction that the last word of the court is the last word, and that the last full stop in a written judgment is not liable to be turned into an open-ended and uncertain ellipsis. As Harlan J said in Mackey v United States 401 US 667 (1971) at 690–691:

        … It is, I believe, a matter of fundamental import that there be a visible end to the litigable aspect of the criminal process. Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain view. … If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to the questions litigants present or else it never provides an answer at all. Surely it is an unpleasant task to strip a man of his freedom and subject him to institutional restraints. But this does not mean that in so doing, we should always be halting or tentative. No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing [that] a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.

        2       However, the cost of error in the criminal process is measured not in monetary terms, but in terms of the liberty and, sometimes, even the life of an individual. For this reason, where criminal cases are concerned, the principle of finality cannot be applied in as unyielding a manner as in the civil context, and it seems that the court should, in exceptional cases, be able to review its previous decisions where it is necessary to correct a miscarriage of injustice. The question would then be this: when do these conditions obtain? In the present criminal motion (“the Present Application”), we confront this very issue.

        […]

        8       Applications to reopen concluded criminal appeals have burgeoned. In 2015, 11 criminal motions of this nature were filed by accused persons in the Court of Appeal alone: six seeking leave to appeal against the outcome of Magistrate’s Appeals and five seeking to move this court to re-examine its own decisions in concluded criminal appeals arising from decisions made by the High Court at first instance. Of these 11 criminal motions, eight were dismissed summarily for being wholly without merit (oftentimes without the respondent in the application concerned being called on to respond); one was withdrawn; one has yet to be heard; while the last (the Present Application, which was also the last criminal motion of this nature filed in this court in 2015), we reserved to consider more carefully. This figure does not include the innumerable criminal motions filed in the High Court, some of which, we have no doubt, also sought to have the High Court reopen its previous decisions in concluded Magistrate’s Appeals, there being no avenue for a further appeal against a decision made by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate criminal jurisdiction.

        9       We do not think the present state of affairs conduces to justice. As Jackson J candidly remarked in Brown v Allen 344 US 443 (1953) at 537, “[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones”. We are still paradigmatically a one-appeal jurisdiction. The filing of unmeritorious applications to reopen concluded criminal appeals takes up valuable resources which can and should go towards the disposal of cases which are coming up on appeal for the first time. For this reason, we propose to lay down some guidelines to explain when, and in what circumstances, this court should reopen a concluded criminal appeal. First, we will examine the way in which this issue has developed in our jurisprudence. Second, we will consider the position in other jurisdictions in search of guiding principles which may be used to develop a coherent system in Singapore. Finally, we will gather up the threads of our analysis and distil certain guidelines for application in future cases.

        And from [2016] 3 SLR 1259 (Kho’s second application to re-open the case):

        […]

        3       When the applicant first applied to set aside the sentence of death on 4 November last year, he made the exact same argument. However, he withdrew his argument on 20 November 2015 when he amended his notice of motion. He did not give any reasons for doing so, but it is plainly his prerogative to amend his motion as he sees fit in order that he might put forward the best case he possibly can. We then considered his application on the basis of his amended motion and we dismissed it. It is an abuse of the process of the court for a person to file an application containing a particular argument, withdraw the argument sometime before the hearing, and then – after his first application is dismissed – file a fresh application premised on the argument which had been withdrawn. If this were allowed, applicants would prolong matters ad infinitum by drip-feeding their arguments one by one through the filing of multiple applications. We cannot allow this. No court would ever allow this. The English courts set their face against this in the 1800s in a case called Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 and we have affirmed that principle many times before this. For this reason, we would dismiss this motion.

        […]

        9       For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this application. In conclusion, we only wish to say this. The applicant was arrested in 2008. Eight years and an innumerable number of legal applications later, he still stands before this court. When we delivered judgment on 5 April 2016, we stressed the importance of finality (see Kho Jabing at [50]). We said that there comes a point, after the appeals have been heard and the applications for reviews have been decided, when the legal process must recede into the background and give way to the search for repose. We think that time has come.

        By the way, the reason why Holmes had first come to my mind is his description of law as “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact” — which would mean that, if the law says A on paper but the courts do B, then the law is, for all intents and purposes, B and not A. If you’re interested, read about the ‘legal realism’ movement.

      4. Procedural innovations by the Court of Appeal in criminal cases in order to prevent a “miscarriage of justice”

        Some time ago, I mentioned instances where the Singapore courts have adopted procedures that no piece of legislation (such as the Supreme Court of Judicature Act or the Rules of Court) says they can take, in the name of preventing a “miscarriage of justice”. Please allow me to illustrate this using two examples.

        The first is Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 2 SLR 192. The background is as follows: Yong had been convicted of drug trafficking; he appealed; he then withdrew the appeal, as the court put it at [17], “on the ground that he had become a Buddhist and was at peace with himself”. Yong then changed lawyers. The new lawyer argued that the withdrawal of the appeal was a “nullity” as it had been, among other things, been “based on a misapprehension that… in order to maintain an appeal against conviction on points of law, it was necessary to lie” (at [18(a)(i)]). 

        But there was no statute referring to the idea that a decision to withdraw an appeal could be a “nullity”. To the contrary, r 18(2) of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Rules stated clearly that, once an appeal was withdrawn, it “shall be deemed to have been dismissed”; and the Prosecution argued that, the appeal having been deemed to have been dismissed, the court had no more role in the matter.

        Yet, the court held that Yong’s decision to withdraw his appeal was motivated by a mistake, and hence a “nullity”. Hence, his appeal was still before the court, and the court could proceed to hear arguments and rule on it. This, said the court, would prevent the ocurt from “circumscrib[ing] its own jurisdiction to render itself incapable of correcting a miscarriage of justice” (at [16]).

        This, to my mind, is an example of a procedural innovation by the courts in the interests of preventing a “miscarriage of justice”. The courts, in effect, created the idea that a withdrawal of an appeal could be a “nullity”, with the effect that the case was still before the court. There was no clash with r 18(2) of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Rules, because the purported withdrawal was a “nullity” and so no withdrawal had actually taken place.

        Note that, at this stage, the court had not ruled on the merits of Yong’s appeal. So when it spoke of preventing a “miscarriage of justice”, this referred to a procedural injustice in the sense of a situation that would prevent Yong from running potentially meritorious arguments; the court did not yet rule on whether those arguments were in fact meritorious.

        Another innovation is the idea that the court has the power to re-open a concluded criminal appeal: Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 (at [2]: “the court should, in exceptional cases, be able to review its previous decisions where it is necessary to correct a miscarriage of injustice”). Please see my other forum post titled “Finality in judicial decision-making” for more details.

      5. The military courts

        The subordinate military courts have jurisdiction over various offences allegedly committed by “any person subject to military law”: Singapore Armed Forces Act 1972, section 81(9). Section 3 states who is “subject to military law”.

        A person who commits an offence set out in the Act, known as a “military offence”, may be tried by a subordinate military court. See Part 3 of the Act for such offences.

        A subordinate military court may also try a person for a “civil offence”, which means “an offence punishable under any written law in force other than a military offence” (s 2(1)), except for certain cases of alleged culpable homicide or murder: section 112(1). However, the Attorney-General or the Director, Legal Services of the Singapore Armed Forces may order that the person not be tried by a subordinate military court, in which case, the person may be tried by an ordinary (“civil”) court.

        According to section 3 of the Act, a person who is charged with any of the offences listed in the First Schedule to the Act may be tried by a disciplinary officer under Part 4 of the Act. If the disciplinary officer finds the accused person guilty, and sentences the person to anything other than a “reprimand” or “minor punishment”, the accused person may choose to be tried by a subordinate military court: section 77. (“Minor punishments” are as set out in the Singapore Armed Forces (Summary Trial) Regulations.)

        A person convicted by a subordinate military court may appeal to the Military Court of Appeal: s 127(5).

        The Director, Legal Services of MINDEF is also the Chief Military Prosecutor: s 82(6).

        You can find some reported decisions of the Military Court of Appeal on LawNet.

        A person cannot be tried both by the military courts and the ordinary courts. Even if section 108 of the Act did not say that, that would be the effect of Article 11(2) of the Constitution.

      6. You don’t possess your body parts…

        … at least, while they’re attached to you: R v Bentham [2005] 1 WLR 1057. This is because: “One cannot possess something which is not separate and distinct from oneself. An unsevered hand or finger is part of oneself. Therefore, one cannot possess it.”

        The case note which the House of Lords cited at [8] is a delightful read.

        The law on dead bodies (and parts thereof) is fascinating: see e.g. https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6969&context=lalrev

      7. An English case about cutting someone’s hair

        In class, I mentioned a case involving someone who cut a woman’s hair without her consent. That case is Director of Public Prosecutions v Smith (Michael Ross)[2006] EWHC 94. Sir Igor Judge P (P stands for “President of the Queen’s Bench Division”; “Judge” here is not a title, but a surname) held that that counts as “assault occasioning actual bodily harm”, which is an offence in English criminal law. The reasoning was simple: hair is a part of the human body. (Judge P added that “an individual’s hair is relevant to his or her autonomy. Some regard it as their crowning glory.”, but that was just obiter.)

        I take issue with the following statement by Cresswell J: “… to a woman her hair is a vitally important part of her body. Where a significant portion of a woman’s hair is cut off without her consent, this is a serious matter amounting to actual… bodily harm”.

        What is the ratio of this case? Is it that cutting anyone’s hair counts as “assault occasioning actual bodily harm”? Or is it only that cutting a woman’s hair counts as such? I would like to think that it is the former, and I believe that is the generally accepted view in English law. But one can see why Cresswell J’s remark may have caused confusion. So this is a case study in being careful when writing.

        (By the way, Cresswell J was wrong to state that Judge P had “said” that “to a woman her hair is a vitally important part of her body”. Judge P had said that about any individual — he used phrases including “the hair is an attribute and part of the human body”; “an individual’s hair”; “his or her” — and not just a woman.) 

      8. On limiting the scope of your essay because otherwise the essay would be too long

        If a reasonable reader would think that a complete answer to the question must address A, B, and C, and if you only address A and B, then you should explain why you are not addressing C. Otherwise, one might get the impression that the paper does not completely answer the question because it doesn’t address C.

        This is, by the way, similar to other general skills such as explaining one’s methodology and stating one’s assumptions.

        What could be a valid reason for omitting C? Possibilities include the following (all of which, of course, would need to be substantiated):

        • At first glance C is relevant to the question, but actually it is not.
        • C is actually a subset of A and/or B.
        • The paper illustrates a broad principle. It is trite that that principle applies to C. What is less clear is whether the principle also applies to A and B. Therefore, the bulk of the discussion will focus on A and B.
        • C is theoretically relevant, but it hardly arises in practice.

        Note that all of these require an explanation of why it is justifiable not to discuss C. It is not enough to say that you are not discussing C because of time/space constraints. This is because one might retort: if you want to save time and space, why not omit A or B instead of omitting C? Even if your aim is to save space, something needs to say about why C is the thing that is omitted in order to achieve this aim.

      9. How judges communicate

        A few case studies I mentioned in class:

        1. On judicial portraits, see the work of Leslie Moran: https://www.portrait.gov.au/magazines/24/judicial-portraits ; https://www.jstor.org/stable/43862420
        2. Judgments written in the form of letters: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2017/48.html ; https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWFC/HCJ/2022/164.html (scroll to the end)
        3. Documentary about the UKSC: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PZtYENfNa7k — the whole thing is worth watching;. See 16:41, and, if you are inclined to take a life partner, let it be someone who will cook you something even if they don’t like it. And would we see footage like that from 23:55 in Singapore? 
        4. Justice Yvonne Mokgoro, formerly of the Constitutional Court of South Africa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_1nAjL4EkA
        5. Quotable passage in a judgment: https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2023_SGHC_166 para 61 — it’s not strictly necessary, so why is that paragraph there?
        6. The court addressing an offender directly: https://www.elitigation.sg/gd/s/2023_SGHC_265
        7. “This is a court of law, not a court of sympathy”: https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive/ctl/eFirstSALPDFJournalView/mid/495/ArticleId/521/Citation/JournalsOnlinePDF, para 33-34 (and indeed the whole lecture)
        8. The UK Judiciary’s YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCi3XytDJY8a3I9_vL7A_5SQ – consider how the judiciary presents itself to the public.
        9. On emotion:
      10. Could a Minister come from a party other than the ruling party?

        The answer is yes, if there isn’t a ruling party in the sense of a party that controls the majority of seats in Parliament. In such a situation, we say there is a “hung Parliament”. This has never happened in Singapore before, but it has in the UK. For an overview of the position in the UK, see:

      11. Is sentencing an exercise in populism? (No)

        Some time ago, we discussed the case of Venables, in which one of the issues before the House of Lords was whether the public’s opinions could be a consideration which the Minister tasked with determining the duration of a sentence of detention was entitled to take into account. Some of you noted that the local case of Kho Jabing appears to have addressed a similar issue.

        In response, I would like to share with you a passage from Singapore Medical Council v Lim Lian Arn [2019] 5 SLR 739 (HC). In this case, a doctor had pleaded guilty to a charge of professional misconduct; the Disciplinary Tribunal sentenced him to a fine of $100,000. As the court observed at [2]: “There followed a major outcry from the medical profession, many of whom thought the penalty was unreasonably high. Those protesting appeared to be concerned that the decision would set an unacceptable benchmark for other cases…” The Ministry of Health then asked the Singapore Medical Council to appeal to the High Court (see the MOH’s press statement here: https://www.moh.gov.sg/news-highlights/details/moh-statement-on-smc-dt-inquiry-for-dr-lim-lian-arn). 

        The High Court ultimately set aside the conviction. The reasons for its doing so are interesting, but will not be my focus here. Rather, I would like to focus on the court’s response to the fact that there was, in the court’s words, an “‘outcry’ from the medical profession after the [Disciplinary Tribunal’s] decision was handed down”, which was a “protest at the perceived harshness of the penalties and warnings of the spectre of defensive medicine” (at [51]). In response, the court had this to say (at [52]):

        “… fidelity to the rule of law demands that courts remain independent and not succumb to external pressures: see also Chan Sek Keong, ‘Securing and Maintaining the Independence of the Court in Judicial Proceedings’ (2010) 22 SAcLJ 229 at para 36. Decisions are made within the confines of the case at hand and not under the sway of public opinion. Hence, we bluntly told [counsel for the Singapore Medical Council] that the ‘outcry’ from the medical profession is irrelevant to us because our concern is solely with the merits of the present case.”

         What, then, of the case of PP v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA), which some of you raised in/after class? In that case, the Court of Appeal held that, when a court has the discretion to sentence an offender to death, the court is to do so in the event that (at [44]):

        “… the actions of the offender would outrage the feelings of the community.  Undoubtedly, capital punishment is an expression of society’s indignation towards particularly offensive conduct, and the fact that the death penalty continues to be part of our sentencing regime is an expression of society’s belief that certain actions are so grievous an affront to humanity and so abhorrent that the death penalty may, in the face of such circumstances, be the appropriate, if not the only, adequate sentence. It would therefore, in our judgment, be correct to consider the strong feelings of the community in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty.”

        At first glance, this flies in the face of the idea articulated in Lim Lian Arn that the courts are not to decide cases “under the sway of public opinion”. How can we reconcile the two cases? The easy answer is that public opinion is relevant to the passing of one kind of sentence (death) but not to another (a fine) or to conviction. But even that would not accurately reflect what the Court of Appeal said in Kho Jabing. The real answer is this: As the Court of Appeal later said in Kho Jabing v PP [2016] 3 SLR 135 (CA) at [89], the “outrage the feelings of the community” test

        “does not entail that the court is to sentence by public opinion, with the sentence of death being imposed for the offence of murder whenever a preponderance of the members of the public express sufficient distaste for the accused’s actions. We completely abjure such a suggestion. That is not the way this court or, for that matter, any court elsewhere would administer justice. The test that this court adopted in CA (Re-sentencing) sets out, instead, a reasoned normative standard which future courts are to apply when deciding whether to impose the death penalty for the offence of murder…”

        and was, in fact, an objective test that took into account factors such as the offender’s “motive and intention”, etc. (See [2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA) at [45]-[50] for a discussion of the factors to be taken into account.)

        In other words, it appears that, despite the reference to the “feelings of the community”, the true test is not whether the public was in fact outraged, but, rather, whether, in the court’s view, the offender’s acts were objectively outrageous. While the Court of Appeal did refer to “society’s belief that certain actions are so grievous an affront to humanity and so abhorrent that the death penalty may, in the face of such circumstances” ([2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA) at [44]), the court did not for one moment seek to formulate a hypothetical ‘reasonable member of the public’ and ask what that person thought. Instead, public opinion was relevant only to the extent that it was the inspiration for what was ultimately an objective test which the court formulated.

        I suspect that this approach explains what is going on in cases of apparent bias. In class, I suggested that the “fair-minded observer” is a hypothetical figure that does not exist in practice. But is this a problem? According to the House of Lords in R v Gough [1993] AC 646 at 670, the answer is no: “I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to require that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man”. This line of thinking has been subject to criticism in various jurisdictions, and ultimately our Court of Appeal rejected it in BOI v BOJ (see, e.g., [91]). Nonetheless, I would like to suggest that one key element of that line of thinking remains: namely, that it is not the court’s function to decide cases based purely on what the public would think. Rather, the point of the BOI v BOJ test, and tests like it, is to remind the court simply that the mind of the public is not like the mind of the court — in other words, to temper the court’s tendency to focus on substance to the exclusion of appearance. 


        I would like to add the following about the “outrage the feelings of the community” test in Kho Jabing: I am fortified in my statement that that test is an objective one that, in substance, amounts to asking whether the offender’s acts were outrageous by the following cases:

        • In PP v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA) [45] itself, the Court of Appeal said that the court should “consider the strong feelings of the community in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty” (at [44]). However, it went on to define “outrage the feelings of the community” as follows: “In determining whether the actions of the offender would outrage the feelings of the community, we find that the death penalty would be the appropriate sentence when the offender has acted in a way which exhibits viciousness or a blatant disregard for human life. Viewed in this light, it is the manner in which the offender acted which takes centre stage. For example, in the case of a violent act leading to death, the savagery of the attack would be indicative of the offender’s regard for human life. The number of stabs or blows, the area of the injury, the duration of the attack and the force used would all be pertinent factors to be considered.” (at [45]) These are all objective factors which make no reference to the actual feelings of “the community”. While the court stated that “capital punishment is an expression of society’s indignation towards particularly offensive conduct” (at [44]), the only role that “society” or “the community” played in the court’s reasoning was this: the court recognised that “society”, through the Legislature, had decided to enact laws providing for the death penalty. That is all.
        • Similarly, in the following cases, the court had to apply the “outrage the feelings of the community” test, but made reference only to objective factors relating to how the offence had been carried out, and not to any actual or inferred feelings of any members of the community: PP v Daryati [2021] SGHC 135, [68]; PP v Toh Sia Guan [2020] SGHC 92, [122]ff; PP v Khoo Kwee Hock Leslie [2019] SGHC 215, [163]ff; Chan Lie Sian v PP [2019] 2 SLR 439 (CA) [84]ff; PP v Chia Kee Chen [2018] 2 SLR 249 (CA) [110], [113], [1135]ff; Micheal Anak Garing v PP [2017] 1 SLR 748 (CA) [54]ff; Panya Martmontree v PP [1995] 2 SLR(R) 806 (CA) [66].
        • In Sia Ah Kew v PP [1974-1976] SLR(R) 54 (CCA) [7] — a case involving kidnapping, which appears to be the first case in Singapore to use the phrase “outrage the feelings of the community” — the Court of Criminal Appeal (which has since been absorbed into the single Court of Appeal that we have today) held that the trial judges, in deciding to impose the death penalty instead of life imprisonment, had laboured under the mistaken impression that kidnapping was “on the increase in Singapore”. This, and other reasons, led the Court of Criminal Appeal to set aside the death sentences and replace them with sentences of imprisonment and caning. This is interesting, because it suggests that a possible reason to impose a more severe sentence is that the crime in question is “on the increase in Singapore”. This does not have to do with the feelings of the community, but it does suggest that, in sentencing, the court is entitled to take into account the needs of the community (in that, if a crime is rampant, then a stiffer sentence is needed to provide the requisite degree of general deterrence).
        • The same can be said of PP v Wang Wenfeng [2014] 2 SLR 636 (HC), another case involving kidnapping. In that case, the High Court had to apply the “outrage the feelings of the community” test in Sia Ah Kew. Again, in deciding to impose imprisonment and caning instead of the death penalty, the High Court said: “For the court to justify imposition of capital punishment on the ground of deterrence, the Prosecution must produce much more evidence to show the inadequacy of life imprisonment (plus caning) as against the death sentence. The only evidence of this produced by the Prosecution was a single incident of murder of a taxi driver in the past five years, which was this present case. There have been a number of cases of serious hurt against taxi drivers, but there is no upward trend nor are the numbers high – the range of such offences vary from two a year to seven a year in the last five years.” (at [31]) 
        • At the most, we have the following remark in para 4 the oral remarks of Tay Yong Kwang JC (as he then was) in PP v Zhou Jian Guang [2000] SGHC 68 (reproduced at [14] of the written judgment): “This offence has certainly not been rampant for the past decade – in fact it was practically non-existent – but I am confident that our society does not feel nostalgic about it.” Read in context, however, this is merely a (somewhat poetic) statement that, though the offences in the case did not warrant the death penalty, they were still serious ones. 
      12. When will a candidate for President lose their deposit? A few (very unlikely) hypotheticals

        Suppose Candidate A gets 1 vote, Candidate B gets 1 vote, Candidate C gets 2 votes, and every other vote is spoiled. Candidate C is duly elected President. Who will lose their deposit?

        Section 10(1) of the Presidential Elections Act 1991 says that a candidate must put up the required deposit “between the date of the issue of the writ under section 6 and 12 noon of nomination day”.

        Section 10(5) of the Presidential Elections Act 1991 says: “If a candidate who has made the required deposit is not elected and the number of votes polled by the candidate does not exceed one-eighth of the total number of votes polled, the amount deposited is forfeited and must be paid into the Consolidated Fund.” (Section 10(6) says that otherwise, the deposit is to be refunded to the candidate.)

        In my view, Candidates A and B will not forfeit their deposits because they each received more than “one-eighth of the total number of votes polled”. In my view, a spoiled ballot paper does not count as one of the “votes polled”. This is because sections 32(6) and 33 describe such a ballot paper as “invalid” and “rejected”. I do acknowledge, however, that my view is open to debate: the Act is not entirely clear on the meaning of “votes polled”. (It is, however, very clear that Candidate C wins. According to s 32(8D), the winner is determined according to the “number of votes given to the candidates”. It is clear that a spoiled vote is not a vote “given to” any candidate.)

        Candidate C will not forfeit his deposit. In my view, he received more than “one-eighth of the total number of votes polled”. But even if I am wrong in this view, it is clear that he will not lose his deposit because he was “elected”. 

        Now, suppose there are ten candidates. 11% of voters vote for Candidate X. 9.88% of voters vote for each of the other candidates. 0.08% of voters spoil their votes. Here, although Candidate X has not received more than “one-eighth of the total number of votes polled”, he will still not forfeit his deposit, because he was “elected”. All the other candidates will lose their deposits, because each of them has not received more than “one-eighth of the total number of votes polled”.

      13. On a question about the “threshold to succeed” in a judicial review application

        The words “threshold to succeed” could refer, not only in succeeding in clearing the preliminary issues like standing (which, if satisfied, get you into the courtroom so to speak), but also ultimately succeeding in showing that a ground of review is made out, and hence getting the results that you want. Examples of decisions by the courts that could raise/lower the ‘threshold’ to win are:

        • Deciding whether there is a right to be heard, and if so, what fairness would require
        • Deciding what the threshold for irrationality is
        • Deciding whether to say that certain considerations are mandatory, as opposed to just potentially relevant

      14. On a question about the “right to vote”

        Rights can be positive or negative. The phrase “right to vote” could mean: (a) a right not to be stopped from voting; (b) a right to be provided with a means to vote.

        The right to vote is not the only right. In the US, many cases involving voting are argued on the basis of the right to equality before the law, not a right to vote per se.

        Non-constitutional rights are still rights. The phrase “right to vote” could well refer simply, for example, to the rights set out in the Parliamentary/Presidential Elections Act.

        One could also argue that the right to vote includes ancillary rights like an implied right to receive information about candidates, etc. (If you’re interested, consider Australian case law on the implied freedom of political communication?)

        What is the content of the implied right to vote? Consider, first, the test for when something can be said to be implied in the Constitution (or an ordinary statute, or indeed any document). Then consider what precisely is to be implied. The precise content of the right can make a difference. 

        For example, if the constitutional right to vote is merely a right that there be some way to vote, then it would follow that it would not be unconstitutional, say, for Singapore to have just one polling station that is not easily accessible by public transport, etc. Or consider the situation if the constitutional right extended only to people without a criminal record, people with work experience, etc. (Of course, there could easily be an express right with such limited content, but at least it would be clear that that is all there is to the right.)

        If you agree that the “implied right to vote can be easily negated”, consider why it can be. Is it that all implied rights “can be easily negated”? Or is there something specific about voting? etc. 

        One could ask: why not amend the Constitution to make the right to vote express? One possible reason I can think of is: to avoid giving the impression that something is being added that didn’t exist before. Consider also the difficulties with coming up with a comprehensive statement, not only of the right, but also of the limits to the right.

        On whether deepfakes undermine the right to vote

        A useful starting point might be: what’s so special about deepfakes, that is different from other forms of false/misleading statements? One might ask: there are already regulations relating to false statements; why should deepfakes be treated as being in a separate category? And even if we agree that deepfakes are harmful, why should we conceive of that harm as being a threat to the right to vote?

        (By the way, this kind of thinking — about how to characterise a problem — is useful to bear in mind when tackling all sorts of legal questions, if not all sorts of questions generally.)

        Note also that the question focuses on whether deepfakes need to be regulated; it does not ask only about whether, if the answer is yes, existing law is enough to do so. You could, of course, discuss what you say is the best means (if any is needed) to regulate deepfakes, but don’t forget other issues – for example, whether deepfakes threaten to “undermin[e]” the “right to vote”, or, indeed, whether the threat posed by deepfakes is best understood as a threat against the right to vote.

      15. Income-based fines

        Some students asked for my views about income-based fines, which were discussed in the StraitsTimes Forum some time ago.

        To my mind, Ms Sim Joo Geok’s argument against income-based fines misses the mark. Sim appeals to the idea of equality. But that idea calls to mind a fundamental question (which one would learn about if one studies discrimination law): does equality demand that people face the same treatment, or that people face the same impact? She assumes it is the former. But the law appears to contemplate the latter: see M Raveendran v PP [2021] SGHC 254 at [15]; see also Syed Suhail bin Syed Zin v AG [2021] SGHC 274 at [61].

        Now, it is true that the court in M Raveendran argued that this reasoning should not apply to circumstances “extrinsic” to the offender, such as income. But the reasons for the court’s view were ones of pragmatism, not principle: see [32]-[35].

        I also cannot agree with Ms Sim’s analogy with incarceration. A $10 hits the person who earns $100 harder than the person who earns $1,000. But a 1-year jail sentence arguably hits both equally, insofar as we can assume that the two persons have roughly the same lifespan.

        To my mind, the best arguments against income-based fines are indeed pragmatic ones. There could be problems defining ‘income’ fairly: do we consider employment income only, or only investment income? There may, after all, be super-rich people who earn income only from investment. But – unlike with employment income (as regards which, the court could simply ask to see the offender’s tax returns, or even get them directly from IRAS) – there is no official national database of people’s investments. One may ask whether it would be fairer to use wealth rather than income as a measure. But, again, it would be difficult to measure the amount of wealth that people have.

        I cannot disagree with Mr Rahul Patwardhan’s other suggestions, nor with Mr Edward Eng’s more considered views, particularly that “[w]e cannot let perfection[ism] get in the way of improvement”.

        See also the debates in Parliament on 8 July 2019. Mr Walter Theseira discussed income- and wealth-based fines. Ms Sun Xueling said the government would not rule that out.

        If two persons who are otherwise similarly situated are to be sentenced to caning, should the one with less sensitive nerve endings on his buttocks be sentenced to more strokes of the cane?

      16. Prizes in arcades

        (For the avoidance of doubt, the following isn’t legal advice.)

        What is the legal basis for the new rule [introduced in 2024] that prizes at arcades can be worth only $100 or less?

        The starting point is s 18 of the Gambling Control Act 2022 states that one needs a licence to “conduct gaming”. That includes “mak[ing] available to others, any gaming machine for the purpose of gambling”. It would appear, from the definitions in s 3, that any arcade gaming machine would count as a “gaming machine” if it is a “game of chance” and there are prizes to be won – that is, unless it is an “amusement machine”. To be an “amusement machine”, the machine must, among other things, give no prize, or provide a prize (per game) which is “less than $100”.

        So the starting point is that one needs a licence to operate arcade machines that allow players to play a game of chance and win a prize that is worth $100 or more.

        The Gambling Control (High-Value Amusement Machines – Exemption) Order 2023, however, created an exception to this. It stated that if one has (among other things) a public entertainment licence, one does not need a gambling licence to operate a “high-value amusement machine”, which is basically an arcade machine where one can win a prize that is worth $100 or more.

        The Order was revoked with effect from 1 March 2024.

        In theory, an arcade operator could still apply for a licence to “conduct gaming”, which would encompass providing machines allowing players to play a “game of chance” and win a prize worth more than $100. So we can see MHA’s announcement as a statement that, as a matter of policy, no such licences will be granted to arcades.

        Some of you also asked whether players who had earned coupons etc. before 1 March 2024 could exchange the coupons after 1 March 2024 for prizes worth more than $100. I believe the law does not forbid this. What the Act states is that one requires a licence to “conduct gaming”, which includes making available arcade machines from which one can win a prize. I would say that if someone won $200 worth of coupons on (say) 1 February 2024, the prize would be won then – the prize would simply be a contractual right to exchange the coupons for $200 worth of prizes. Accordingly, no offence would be committed if this contractual right were exercised after 1 March 2024, because the right would already have accrued – “won” – before that.

        If I am right, it would follow that arcade operators were not legally obliged to require that tickets won before 1 March 2024 can only be redeemed for prizes worth less than $100. They were of course at liberty to do this, subject to the terms of the contracts they had with the players. Perhaps the potential practical problem was that tickets didn’t have dates on them.

        Come to think of it, this would be an interesting contract law exam question.

      17. The word “crackpot”

        In response to a student’s question:

        I’ll respond substantively shortly. For now, I just checked the Oxford English Dictionary, and learned that the word “crackpot” doesn’t have to do with the drug known as “crack”. The OED says that the word “pot” here refers to the “pot of the head”, which is a now-defunct term for the skull, and someone with a cracked pot is (the reasoning goes) incapable of perfectly rational thought. Interestingly, there is another word, “crack-brain”, with a similar meaning. So I suppose we (including me) shouldn’t refer to our ideas as crackpot ideas, in that we should focus our skepticism on the ideas rather than on ourselves.

      18. The UK’s attempt to send asylum seekers to Rwanda: error of precedent fact

        The UK Supreme Court held that a proposed (in the court’s words) “policy that certain people claiming asylum in the United Kingdom should not have their claims considered here, but should instead be sent to Rwanda in order to claim asylum there” was unlawful: R (AAA (Syria) and others) v SSHD [2023] UKSC 42, [1]. Someone asked what precisely the role of the court is. I think we will be in a better position to understand once we have learned about the law on questions of precedent fact.

        The law is that, in the UK, public bodies must not “act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right” (Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1); here, “Convention” refers to the European Convention on Human Rights). The ECHR requires that the UK (in the Supreme Court’s words) “not… remove persons to other states where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be at real risk of” “torture or… inhuman or degrading treatment” (at [23]). Also, the UK’s legislation states that immigration policies cannot be “contrary to the Convention” (referring to the Refugee Convention), and the Refugee Convention says: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (reproduced at [20] and [27])

        This being so, “The test to be applied by the court in relation to the issue of refoulement is… whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda would expose them to a real risk of ill treatment, as a consequence of refoulement to another country.” (at [38]) It is not merely whether the Minister reasonably thinks that there is no such risk; the question is whether there is such a risk (at [39]).

        The government sought to rely on assurance given by the Rwandan government. The court acknowledged that it should “attach weight to the government’s view as to the value of assurances given by another country, particularly where its view reflects the advice of officials with relevant experience and expertise” (at [52]). However, the government’s fact-finding process was flawed (at [54]). Moreover, “the government is not necessarily the only or the most reliable source of evidence about matters which may affect the risk of refoulement” ([55]). There could be other sources of evidence, which the court would have to weigh up ([57]).

        Moreover, “even if the court is not institutionally as well equipped as the government to carry out an evaluation of a diplomatic assurance, the position is different ‘where the assessment of future conduct engages practical considerations which arise from past conduct’” ([58]). In other words, the government does not have “special institutional expertise” on the track record of how the asylum system has worked in Rwanda; that is simply a matter of historical fact which the court is no less well-placed to consider.

        The court’s conclusion was that, indeed, “there were substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers would face a real risk of ill-treatment by reason of refoulement in the event that they were removed to Rwanda” ([73], [104]-[105]).

      19. The Fulham Corp case – who was Yapp? (More generally, who can apply for judicial review?)

        Not everybody can apply for judicial review of just about anything. One must have standing (or locus standi, which literally means a “place to stand”) to apply for judicial review. Different legal systems have different tests for standing. In the UK, one must have “sufficient interest” in the matter complained of. In Singapore, the law is a bit more (over)complicated, but, in short, you must have been personally affected, or you must be in a category of people affected more than and/or differently from others. For example, only a man who had sex with men could apply for judicial review of s 377A of the Penal Code; similarly, “if there is a law which provides that it is an offence for any person of a particular race to take public buses”, only persons of that race will have standing to challenge that law (Tan Eng Hong v AG [2012] 4 SLR 476 (CA) [93]).

        There is an exception: the Attorney-General has standing to apply for judicial review, which stems from the UK Attorney General’s “ancient power to make legal claims in the name of the Crown as an aspect of his role as guardian of the public interest” (De Smith’s Judicial Review, 8th ed, at [2-016]). (This power is not as illusory as it may appear. One would think that, in the UK, the AG would sometimes have a reason to apply for judicial review by something done by a local government authority.)

        If you don’t have standing, what can you do? You can try to persuade the AG to apply for judicial review. Or you can ask the AG for permission – his fiat – to apply for judicial review in the AG’s name. The latter is called a “relator action” – we say that (as in the Fulham case) the action is brought by “the Attorney-General at the relation of Yapp”, and the case might be titled “AG ex rel Yapp v Fulham Corporation” (“ex rel” stands for “ex relatione”).

      20. The constitutionality of sentences for enhanced public protection (SEPPs)

        I have just read what was said in Parliament about the Criminal Procedure (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill – in particular, about sentences for enhanced public protection (SEPPs) – so that I can better answer your questions.

        Having done so, I stand by my view that SEPPs are probably not unconstitutional if we see them as a form of life imprisonment imposed by the court followed by executive discretion to release the convicted person early.

        As for whether SEPPs are a good thing: I have learned that a useful case study is “imprisonment for public protection” in the UK, which was introduced in 2005 and abolished in 2012.

        I would also like to point out that one can apply for judicial review of a decision not to release someone who is serving an SEPP after the minimum period. There isn’t even a purported ouster clause.

        I also found out about the English case of James, Wells, and Lee. I gathered the following points from the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales ([2008] 1 All ER 138):

        1. There is no presumption in favour of not releasing someone serving an IPP sentence after the minimum period has lapsed: [47]-[48].
        2. The purpose of the minimum period is “retribution and deterrence”, while the purpose of continued detention after that is prevention: [44]. Therefore, what is relevant to the Minister’s deciding whether to release someone is a something to be assessed, not at the time of the sentence, but rather from the time the minimum period expires, “on a continuing basis, by periodic assessment”: [46]-[47].
        3. Indeed, it is a mandatory relevant consideration for the Minister whether there is “up-to-date… information” that justifies continued detention. This means that the Minister must have a “current and effective assessment of the danger he does or does not pose”: [47].
        4. The legislation providing for IPP sentences was on the basis of a “settled understanding” that the UK Government would put in place “procedures… to ensure that initiatives, in particular courses in the prison, would be available to maximise the opportunity for lifers to demonstrate they were no longer a danger to the public by the time their tariff expired or as soon as possible thereafter, so as to allow the lifer’s release once that was shown”: [26].  (I make no comment yet about whether a similar “understanding” can be said to exist in Singapore.)

        The Court of Appeal agreed with these propositions: [2008] 1 WLR 1977. So did the House of Lords ([2010] 1 AC 553), which remarked that the “Secretary of State failed deplorably” in not performing his duty to “provide the systems and resources that prisoners serving [IPP] sentences needed to demonstrate to the Parole Board… that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that they should remain in detention”: [3]. The European Court of Human Rights held that this gave rise to a violation of certain prisoners’ rights under Art 5 of the ECHR (see [209] onwards).

      21. Teaching

        [These are extracts from a message I sent to my students in response to some mid-term feedback.]

        I should also make clear: Class participation is not “restricted to” anybody. I will call on someone to speak in class when they raise their hand, whether in response to a direct question from me, or otherwise; if multiple people raise their hands, I will call on all of them, except if the question was a simple (e.g. a yes/no) one and the first answer is enough to address it. Even in this latter case, please feel free to alert me if you would like to add a further comment or question.

        There was a comment about class participation records. As you know, there is a distinction between recording something (i.e. maintaining evidence) and what is done with the evidence (i.e. making findings of fact and other decisions): not every piece of evidence is relevant; not every piece of evidence has the same (or any) weight. The teaching assistants help me by keeping notes of what people say in class, which helps me to refresh my memory. But please be reminded that that, by itself, says nothing about the weight (if any) that I will attach to each note. As you know, the basis for assessing class participation is quality, not quantity. (That said, those who provide a high quantity of high-quality contributions – including those which are not correct but which are thought-out and can therefore contribute to everyone’s learning – will of course be duly credited.)

      22. “I know it when I see it”

        In Jacobellis v Ohio, Justice Potter Stewart said that, under the US Constitution, speech can only be banned on the ground that it is “obscene” if it is as devoid of social value as “hard core pornography”. Justice Stewart’s definition of “hard core pornography” was: “I know it when I see it”. I Googled the latter phrase and was sent down an interesting rabbit-hole. Then I found this paper by Paul Gewirtz. He notes the criticism that that phrase “seems to be based on a nonrational, intuitive gut reaction, instead of reasoned analysis” (1025). But he disagrees. He says that even if you can’t put into words what one ‘sees’, a legal test that relies on an emotional judgment is no less valid than a legal test phrased in the form of a checklist. In fact, he says, the “I know it when I see it” test is probably better than, say, a test that considers specifically “body parts shown, arousal, numbers of people, positions of bodies, and so forth” (at 1031).

        I found what Gewirtz says about emotion an interesting foil to what Lord Carnwath says about words like “anxious”.

        Is the phrase “I know it when I see it” similar to “so unreasonable that no reasonable person…”? (Thanks to a previous student for asking that question.) My initial response was that there is a difference. The phrase, “… that no reasonable person…”, tells us to what extent there is something, but it doesn’t tell us what that ‘something’ is: what does “unreasonable” mean? By contrast, the word “obscene” at least tells us what the ‘something’ is – namely, prurience. That said, I agree that if “I know it when I see it” can be a workable reasonable test, then so can “ew”, “ick”, or “so unreasonable that no reasonable person…”

        Speaking of emotion: if you’re interested, check out this paper by Gary Low.

      23. Asking judges to recuse themselves

        [I sent this to students from a previous run of the course.]

        Some of you asked why an application to disqualify a judge from hearing a case is heard by that very judge. I did a bit of digging around, and found a paper [link] by the Australian Law Reform Commission that sums up various arguments for and against this (at [34]-[47]). See also this speech [link] by Justice John Sackar, Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales at page 35 onwards. That speech cites the El Faragy case [link]; see para 32 of that case, and also see this blog post by Mr Jason Hadden [link] for criticism. For a more radical view, see this article by Professor Dmitry Bam [link] which argues that the practice in the USA of having judges hear applications to recuse themselves violates the parties’ constitutional right to “due process of law” under the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution.

      24. Hearings by licensing bodies, etc.: inherently biased?

        (In what follows, references to various textbooks are references to the latest editions available in the Course Reserves section of SMU’s law library, as of [if I remember correctly] 2024.)

        There are many situations in which you asks a public body for something — say, a licence. The public body has a duty to hear you. But, some of you asked, wouldn’t that make the public body a judge in its own cause? Shouldn’t there be three persons — the applicant, someone to present arguments against the granting of the licence, and a judge to hear both and decide? Why are there so many situations in which there are only two persons involved — the applicant and the public body? I will call these two possible models of decision-making system, for short, the ‘three-body’ and ‘two-body’ model respectively.

        I have borrowed this language from Endicott (at 175). He notes: “Many public authorities, unlike courts and tribunals, do not hear a dispute between parties, but hear responses to their own (tentative, or even concluded) decisions or policies or plans. So they are already involved in the issues, rather than serving as a neutral third party resolving a dispute between two sides.” 

        The easiest answer is: even if the public body is a judge in its own cause, the necessity principle demands that that be tolerated. But we can go deeper.

        Endicott, like other authors of textbooks, does not take the view that the ‘two-body’ model is intrinsically unfair. After all, the role of the public body is not to oppose the applicant, but rather to decide impartially in the public interest. Therefore, for example, a licensing authority should be thought of more like a judge than like state counsel. (The analogy is not perfect, but the main point still stands: the public body should not be thought of as playing an adversarial role vis-a-vis the applicant”.) For more on this, please see B Johnson & Co (Builders) Ltd v Minister of Health [1947] 2 All ER 395 at 399 (cited in Alconbury at [47]).

         ne may draw a further analogy with a judge’s power to summarily punish for contempt committed in the face of the court. In Wilkinson v Lord Chancellor’s Department [2003] EWCA Civ 95 (cited by Endicott at 183), Wilkinson used “foul and abusive language” and committed acts of physical violence in court; the judge assigned counsel to him, then tried him for contempt in the face of the court and sentenced him to imprisonment. (In Singapore, the court can do this under section 25 of the Administration of Justice (Protection) Act 2016.) On appeal, Wilkinson argued that she should have been tried for the contempt by another judge, not the same judge. The Court of Appeal pointed out that “the power to impose summary punishment for actions which one has oneself witnessed and is oneself the victim does appear to place the judge in the position of being witness, prosecutor and judge” (at [24]). However, the Court of Appeal disagreed that the matter had to have been heard by another judge: “strictly speaking the procedure does not offend against the rule of natural justice, nemo iudex in sua causa (no-one shall be judge in his own case), since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the judge personally but protecting the administration of justice” (at [25], citing Borrie and Lowe’s The Law of Contempt, 3rd ed (1996) at 522). Therefore, the mere fact that the same judge conducted the summary trial for contempt did not mean that there was apparent bias. (Nor did it render the judge other than “impartial” within the meaning of Art 6(1) of the ECHR.)

        There is another case that agrees, though it makes the point slightly differently. In R (Alconbury Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295 (UKHL), various businesses applied to certain local authorities for planning permission to build certain facilities. The local authorities dismissed the applications. The law was that they had the right to appeal to the Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions. The businesses argued that this system was incompatible with Article 6(1) of the ECHR, which provides: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” They argued that the Secretary of State was not “independent and impartial”, because he “lays down policy and directs what he or the department considers to be the most efficient and effective use of land in what he sees to be the public interest”, and would make decisions, not impartially, but instead in line with these views (at [24]).

        The House of Lords unanimously rejected this argument. For present purposes, I would call your attention to [48], where Lord Slynn said: “it is not right to say that a policy maker cannot be a decision maker or that the final decision maker cannot be a democratically elected person or body”. Lord Hoffmann agreed for reasons that I will not set out here because they repay reading in full: see [69]-[76], and, if you’re interested, the rest of his judgment. 

        The conclusion was that there was no violation of Article 6(1) because, to the extent that the Minister was not “independent and impartial”, the system as a whole was because one could apply for judicial review of the Minister’s decision. 

        That is not to say that, under the ‘two-body’ model, the rules of procedural fairness cease to exist, even as regards first-instance decision-makers. Cooper v Wandsworth has clearly put paid to that idea; and in Wilkinson, the court did apply the test for apparent bias. Rather, the point is this: the principles from the cases on procedural fairness — most of which arise in the context of a ‘three-party’ decision-making system, such as a court — must be applied with certain modifications to suit them to the ‘two-party’ model. What a fair hearing requires under one model may be different from what a fair hearing requires under the other. 

        Besides Endicott, others make this point. Cane, for example, says (at 75) of the task of fact-finding: “the rules of procedure… will be different according to whether an adversarial or a non-adversarial mode of discovering the truth is adopted”; for example, “under an inquisitorial system, the decision-maker’s input is much greater”. The relevance to administrative law is this: “in many administrative contexts, there are only two parties: an applicant (for a benefit or a licence, for instance) and a decision-maker. In that context, certain procedural steps (such as cross-examination of witnesses) might simply be inapplicable. More generally, investigation by the decision-maker may seem more appropriate and less problematic in two-party than in three-party situations…” 

        Craig agrees (at 382), and adds: “We should…. be prepared to think more broadly about what procedural protection connotes. Procedures developed against a backdrop of adjudication may well be the most appropriate in certain areas. They may not, however, be equally suited to all the institutions that comprise administrative law.”

        Sorry, I don’t have a conclusion, just as the authors of the textbooks appear not to have one.

      25. The right to be told the gist of the case against you

        I said that the law is not exactly that a fair hearing requires that you know the case against you; rather, it requires that you know the gist of the case against you. The case I had in mind was AF (No 3), which involved the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. That Act allowed a “control order” to be made against a suspected terrorist – not unlike a restriction imposed under s 8(1)(b) of our Internal Security Act 1960. The person could appeal against the control order to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). Some hearings before the SIAC would be open to the public. Others would be “closed hearings”, at which not even the controlee could attend. Instead, the controlee would be represented by a “special advocate”, who was a security-cleared lawyer who would be shown certain “closed” security-sensitive details of the case against the controlee. The special advocate could then make submissions to SIAC. But the controllee themselves would not get to see the “closed” evidence. And the special advocate would not get to meet the controlee to take instructions about the “closed” materials.

        Would this be a fair hearing? One could argue that, given national security constraints, yes: the ‘special advocate’ system was a way to balance the need for a fair hearing against the needs for national security. But the House of Lords, by a majority, said that this wasn’t always good enough. The controlee need not be shown every piece of evidence against them, but “the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations” (Lord Hope at [59]). That’s what I meant when I said that the person affected has to be given at least the “gist” of the case against him. (See [85]. English lawyers use the word “gisting” to mean telling someone the gist of the case against them.)

        Otherwise, Article 6(1) of the ECHR would be violated. And, Lord Scott said, the same conclusion would have been reached under the common law rules of procedural fairness (at [96]).

        How is all this relevant in Singapore? Suppose someone is detained under the ISA. That person has the right to be “informed of the grounds of his detention” and “the allegations of fact on which the order is based”, but this “does not require any authority to disclose facts the disclosure of which would, in its opinion, be against the national interest”: Constitution, Art 151; ISA, s 9. Or suppose someone is detained under the CLTPA; that person has the right to be told the “grounds for the making of the detention order” (Criminal Law (Advisory Committee) Rules, Schedule, Form 2, read with r 6), but the Minister need not “disclose facts which he considers it to be against the public interest to disclose” (CLTPA, s 41). One could argue that, despite the “national interest”/“public interest” provisos, it would be unlawful to disclose the grounds of detention in such scanty detail that the applicant doesn’t even know the gist of why they have been detained. And I think the English case law might be useful for making such an argument.

        For more, see this case note by Aileen Kavanagh.

      26. Adam and Eve and the right to a fair hearing

        In class, I said something about the story of Adam and Eve. I express no opinion here on the theological significance, if any, of that story. I was instead referring from the following statement from R v Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge (Dr Bentley’s Case) (1723) 1 Stra 557 at 567; 93 ER 698 at 704. The University of Cambridge had stripped Dr Bentley of his degrees, but in a procedurally flawed manner. Among other things, he had not been given a fair hearing. Fortescue J said:

        “The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. Adam (says God) where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? And the same question was put to Eve also.”

        There are at least two interesting glosses on this view. First, as Lord Hoffmann pointed out in SSHD v AF (No 3) [2010] 2 AC 269 at [72], here there was no cost to the public interest of granting a fair hearing: “God suffered no disadvantage by revealing to Adam what he knew.”; fairness may require something different if, for example, disclosing to someone certain details of the case against them would be contrary to the public interest.

        Second, as Lord Reed pointed out in R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2014] AC 1115 at [69], “Adam was allowed a hearing notwithstanding that God, being omniscient, did not require to hear him in order to improve the quality of His decision-making”. Lord Reed was emphasising a quite different point from Lord Hoffmann: his point was that a fair hearing is not just a means to the end of a substantively sound decision; a fair hearing has an intrinsic dignitarian value (see also [70] of his judgment).

      27. If you are applying for judicial review of a decision to prosecute, do you first have to — as an alternative remedy — plead not guilty and go through the trial?

        If your argument is that the act of prosecuting you is Wednesbury unreasonable because (for example) the evidence against you is so scanty that no reasonable prosecutor would prosecute you, the court will probably expect you to go through the trial first. In Patnaik, the court said just that at para 37.

        But it’s interesting to me that the court said that only at para 37 (at the start of the part of the judgment dealing with the alleged irrationality), and not anywhere in the part of the judgment dealing with the alleged breach of Art 12.

        So my sense is that the position is this:

        1. If your argument is that the very act of prosecuting you will be a breach of your constitutional rights, and you have enough evidence to show that it will be such a breach, I think you won’t be expected to go through the trial as an alternative remedy.
        1. If your argument isn’t about constitutional rights, but some other ground (such as illegality/irrationality):
          • If your argument is fundamentally based on the PP’s evidence (for example, alleged error of fact by the PP, or allegedly no reasonable prosecutor would prosecute based on the evidence that you think the PP has), then you will be expected to go through the trial as an alternative remedy – for the reasons set out in Patnaik at [37]-[39].
          • If not, good question – we don’t know yet. I would be inclined to think that you shouldn’t be expected to go through the trial. If, for example, you are being prosecuted in bad faith, there should be no reason to drag you through the process. This is unlike when you are alleging that the prosecution is Wednesbury unreasonable given the evidence, because the very point of the trial is that it’s a process to gather evidence, and a feature of criminal proceedings is that the Prosecution doesn’t have to tell you what evidence it has before it goes to trial.
          • That leaves us with a difficult question: what if your argument is that the prosecution is bound to fail because, even assuming the facts alleged in the charge are true, they can’t possibly amount to the offence you’re charged with? I don’t know off the top of my head, and you don’t need to know this for the exam – a criminal procedure textbook will tell you the answer.
      28. The World Development Movement case

        A student asked why commentators say that the court in the World Development Movement (known as the “Pergau Dam case”) had mis-applied s 1(1) of the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980. After all, the student asked, surely s 1(1) suggests that grants must be made for the sake of the “welfare” of the people of another country, and the auditors had found that the proposed dam project would raise electricity costs for the people.

        I noted that s 1(1) does not say that the only permissible purpose of a grant is to promote the “welfare” of people.

        My reply:

        I see the force in your view. The argument I see to the contrary was put by Timothy Endicott, in Administrative Law (5th ed, OUP, 2021) at p 297 as follows: 

        “The Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980 s 1(1) gave the Secretary of State power to make grants ‘for the purpose of promoting the development or maintaining the economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or the welfare of its people’ (Pergau Dam, 390). He was certainly maintaining the economy of Malaysia by giving the government £400 million from the overseas development fund. It is not implausible to argue that the Act authorized the action.” 

        (Note that Endicott ultimately disagreed with this view.)

        I am prepared to agree with you, and with Endicott’s point that the legislation had a “development purpose”. But I do note the counter-argument at 402C that, ultimately, the money was going toward providing electricity.

        What I don’t like is that the court did not explain this. What I don’t like is that the court said: “if Parliament had intended to confer a power to disburse money for unsound development purposes, it could have been expected to say so expressly.” Why? We are not told. We are not pointed to Parliamentary debates showing that the Legislature intended that the power in s 1(1) be used only for the purpose of economically viable projects, and not for projects that were not economically viable but were diplomatically fruitful. (I don’t see how the sources referred to at 402A-B can be of use in statutory interpretation: they are not evidence of the legislative intention at the time the Act was passed.) What I was looking for, and I did not find, was an explanation — or at least a statement — of why your interpretation of s 1(1), and not the alternative, is correct. 

        Is it that I’m missing something? Perhaps the word “development”, like the word “wash-house”, has a certain meaning in English law that I’m not picking up on. But even then, I find it difficult to see how the distinction between “sound” and “unsound development purposes” (402A) has any basis in s 1(1). 

        For what it’s worth, all this may not have made a difference. On the account of Ivan Hare, ‘Judicial Review and the Pergau Dam’ (1995) 54 Cambridge Law Journal 227, 228, the UK Government eventually did fund the Pergau Dam — just under a different law.

      29. Are arbitration clauses unconstitutional attempts to oust the court’s jurisdiction? / Judicial review of subordinate courts’ decisions

        I believe the argument the person who asked this question was referring to is as follows. Suppose you and I have a contractual dispute (in other words, a “controversy”). Suppose that there is an arbitration agreement between us. The effect of the arbitration agreement is that it will be an arbitral tribunal, and not the court, which has the power to resolve the “controversy”. But Article 93 of the Constitution effectively provides that only courts have the power to resolve “controversies”. That must mean that the arbitration agreement, and all arbitration agreements, are unconstitutional.

        Before evaluating this argument, a preliminary point about it must be made. An analysis based on a ‘right of trial by jury’, or, for that matter, some (common-law?) right of ‘access to court’, must be irrelevant. This is because Article 93 of the Constitution has nothing to do with rights; it is about powers. A right is something that exists to benefit the rights-holder. But Article 93 does not exist in order to benefit anybody; it exists simply to define and delimit the powers of certain institutions. If, in doing so, people happen to gain a benefit as a side result, “so be it”;* but that does not change the fact that Article 93 has nothing to do with rights.

        Do arbitration agreements require an arbitral tribunal to exercise judicial power? I believe the answer is the same as the question of whether executive bodies who exercise statutory decision-making powers exercise judicial power. The answer, for the reasons referred to in a previous post as well as those I have set out in my note on Nagaenthran (‘The constitutionality of ouster clauses’), is no, both because of the limits of the powers of the tribunal as well as the role of the court as an independent reviewer.

        In AJU v AJT [2011] 4 SLR 739 (CA) [62], the Court of Appeal said that “the court cannot abrogate its judicial power to the Tribunal to decide what the public policy of Singapore is”, and hence the Court of Appeal could set aside an arbitral award on the ground that it had the effect of enforcing a contract that was contrary to public policy.** This suggests that arbitration is not an exercise of judicial power because the court retains its supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings, which it may exercise through powers such as the power to set aside the award; and because the court retains the final say over the boundaries of what is permissible in a contract, as well as the final power to enforce those boundaries. (Besides public policy, the doctrine of arbitrability imposes another set of boundaries.) 

        In TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533 (High Court of Australia) [28]-[30], French CJ and Gageler J articulated two further reasons why arbitral tribunals do not exercise judicial power. First, judicial power is “conferred and exercised by law and coercively”, whereas the power of an arbitral tribunal arises from the “agreement of the parties”. Second, an arbitral award is “not binding of its own force”, but rather only becomes binding only because the law says it is. And, if I may add, that law imposes legal limits on the types of arbitral awards which are capable of being binding and the circumstances in which they are.

        Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ added another point at [76]ff: Arbitral tribunals do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts to hear a dispute. Rather, the making of an arbitral award “both extinguishes the original cause of action and imposes new obligations on the parties in substitution for the rights and liabilities which were the subject of the dispute referred to arbitration. The former rights of the parties are discharged by an accord and satisfaction. The accord is the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration; the satisfaction is the making of an award in fulfilment of the agreement to arbitrate”. This being so, the role of the courts in the exercise of their judicial power is to determine whether the arbitral award is to be enforced.

        For more views from Singapore, see Menon CJ’s speech, ‘Judicial Attitudes towards Arbitration and Mediation in Singapore’ (25 October 2013) (archive).

        * Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 (High Court of Australia) 35-36 (Brennan J), making a similar point about the nature of judicial review, viz., that (at least according to one view) it does not exist in order to correct “injustice”, but instead simply to enforce legal limits to executive power: “The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error.” (emphasis added)

        ** Note that “public policy” in this context does not mean matters of a political rather than legal nature. In arbitration, “public policy” has a specific technical meaning, for which see e.g. BVU v BVX [2019] SGHC 69, [44]: “The upholding of an award conflicts with public policy only if it would ‘shock the conscience’, be ‘clearly injurious to the public good’, be ‘wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public’, or when the award ‘violates the forum’s most basic notion of morality and justice’.”


        A follow-up question for a student: “If arbitral proceedings are not exercises of judicial power because they are ‘supervised’, does this mean that the Subordinate Courts do not exercise judicial power? (In relation to the point on AJU v AJT)”

        My response:

        You are right that, if X is subject to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, that does not necessarily mean that X is not exercising judicial power. The Court of Appeal in AJU v AJT seems to have used the terminology loosely; its point appears to be not that the arbitral tribunal does not exercise judicial power, but rather that the High Court does not cease to exercise judicial power.

      30. Executive decision-makers (e.g. the HDB) and judicial power

        A student asked about the HDB’s power to decide to compulsorily a flat, which was discussed in Per Ah Seng Robin v HDB. The question was: “why the HDB is not considered to be exercising judicial power despite being the one to investigate and decide, even on appeal, with regards to the merits of the appellant’s case.” My response was as follows:

        This is one of those questions that people seem to know the answer to, but the explanation is not very clear. 

        This question is important for the following reason. If the HDB is exercising judicial power, but it does not fall within the definition of a “subordinate court” as that phrase is used in Article 93, then its existence and/or its actions must be unconstitutional.  

        Any lawyer, if asked what the HDB is, would say that it is an executive body that exercises executive power. But why? The answer is not that it is not called a “court”: as the case law has shown, when the courts look at separation of powers, they look at substance and not form. And when we look at substance, Faizal would seem to suggest that HDB does exercise judicial power because it decides controversies between the state and private persons.  But even Faizal did not intend this to be an exhaustive definition, as we see from the fact that the ultimate ratio of Faizal was based, not on applying this definition, but rather on a historical analysis (of whether the sentencing power is a judicial power). As for the HDB, an appeal to history will probably not help us, given how new the HDB is. 

        So we have to dig deeper into principle. The UK case law will not help us, because the UK courts will rarely, if ever, have to answer the question ‘is this body exercising judicial power or not’? That is why Faizal referred to Australian cases: the issue arises in Australia because Australia has a written Constitution providing that the judicial power of the Commonwealth of Australia shall only be vested in some types of body but not others.

        An Australian case that elaborates on the definitions provided in the cases cited in Faizal is Precision Data Holdings v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167 (HCA). At 188-190 (emphasis added): 

        • “The acknowledged difficulty, if not impossibility, of framing a definition of judicial power that is at once exclusive and exhaustive arises from the circumstance that many positive features which are essential to the exercise of the power are not by themselves conclusive of it. Thus, although the finding of facts and the making of value judgments, even the formation of an opinion as to the legal rights and obligations of parties, are common ingredients in the exercise of judicial power, they may also be elements in the exercise of administrative and legislative power…”
        • “if the ultimate decision may be determined not merely by the application of legal principles to ascertained facts but by considerations of policy also, then the determination does not proceed from an exercise of judicial power… That is not to suggest that considerations of policy do not play a role, sometimes a decisive role, in the shaping of legal principles.”
        • “Furthermore, if the object of the adjudication is not to resolve a dispute about the existing rights and obligations of the parties by determining what those rights and obligations are but to determine what legal rights and obligations should be created, then the function stands outside the realm of judicial power.”

        None of this is wholly satisfactory. For example, one may argue that judicial declarations of remedial constructive trusts fall within the third point.  As the first point admits, none of the various factors is conclusive.

        For more information, try the following books (available in our Library):

        • Dan Meagher, Amelia Simpson, James Stellios, and Fiona Wheeler, Hanks, Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (10th ed, 2016) at 879-900 (KU1750.H36 2016). 
        • Peter Harris, Frances Gordon, and Graeme Hill, Constitutional Law in Australia (3rd ed, 2012) at 505-523 (KU1750.H36 2012).

        Applying the decision in Wills, the answer to your question would appear to be that the HDB’s power to decide whether or not to compulsorily acquire a flat is not judicial power, because: (a) this decision is one that would create rights/obligations rather than adjudicating on whether rights/obligations already exist; (b) this decision is a policy-laden one, as opposed to one that consists of the application of legal rules.

        What about the HDB’s power to make a finding of fact as to whether the owner of a flat has “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” a flat? The answer is that this is not per se a power that HDB has. What the HDB has the power to do is to acquire the flat. The question of whether the owner has “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” is merely a condition which must be satisfied for the HDB to have power to acquire the flat. If the owner has not “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” the flat (and none of the other requirements in s 56(1) are made out), then the HDB has no power to acquire the flat (and, in fact, not even any power to decide whether or not to acquire the flat). So this question of fact is not itself part of HDB’s power; rather, it is the legal limit to the HDB’s power. To use language which we will be seeing in our next topic, whether the owner has “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” the flat is a precedent fact requirement, which must be objectively established before the HDB even has power to act. It is for the court to determine whether such a requirement has been made out, because this requirement is a legal limit to the HDB’s power, and it is for the court to determine whether legal limits have been transgressed.

      31. Apparent bias and the “fair-minded and informed observer” discussed in BOI v BOJ

        We have discussed the idea of justice having to be seen to be done. That explains why there is a body of law on apparent bias. It exists not so much to guard against the possibility of bias, as to guard against the possibility of the perception of bias.

        The logical question is: justice has to be seen to be done in whose eyes? Whose perception? The answer, we are told by BOI v BOJ, is: the perception of a notional “fair-minded and informed observer”. This led us into a discussion about whether the court’s definition of a “fair-minded and informed observer” is realistic – a discussion engaged in by Lionel Leo and Chen Siyuan, ‘Reasonable Suspicion or Real Likelihood: A Question of Semantics?’ [2008] SJLS 446, 450-451. There is, however, one matter we did not directly confront: when we say “realistic”, we mean a realistic representation of what? Of the public? Or of the sort of people who would actually have been observers?

        The difference is that some decision-making procedures are not open to the public. Some older cases which say that the ‘observer’ is to be an approximation of a member of the public are cases involving alleged bias shown by things done in/visible in public, such as a press conference (Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 (UKHL)) and a gift of flowers by a juror to a murder victim’s mother (Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 (HCA)). But others do not. BOI v BOJ itself must have involved a hearing in chambers (because rule 81(2) of the Family Justice Rules provides that “[a]n application for ancillary relief must be heard and determined in Chambers”), yet it talks about “public confidence” (emphasis added), the perspective of “reasonably well-informed members of the public” (emphasis added), etc. (Strictly speaking, it is possible for the parties themselves to attend such a hearing; but I understand that this is rare. And, anyway, the only person other than a lawyer who could have attended and perceived bias would be the ex-wife herself, but the Court of Appeal explicitly said at [119] that the “reasonable observer is not to be confused with the person who has brought the complaint”.)

        One possibility I can think of is that the law should demand that decision-making procedures be fair from the point of view of someone who represents the public, even if the public is not allowed to see the procedure. The rationale would be that the focus is not actually on public perception, but rather on objective fairness. In other words, the point is not to make decision-making procedures appear fair, but rather to make them actually fair; and the law is merely choosing to define ‘fair’ as ‘what a reasonable member of the public would, if he saw it, describe as fair’. But this reading of the case law is heretical; it certainly flies in the face of the case law’s stressing that it is concerned with perception.

        Another possibility is that the courts use the language of the perception of “the public”, but in substance they decide cases based on the perception of the particular people who are able to observe the hearing. This was what I suggested in class. That would explain why the ‘observer’ in BOI v BOJ is as knowledgeable as a lawyer: the only people who were there to observe the allegedly biased acts were lawyers.  But I must stress that the courts have never explicitly said this. They have never said that, if only a limited class of persons could have observed the proceedings, then the notional ‘observer’ is defined by reference to that limited class of persons. On the one hand, the Court of Appeal in BOI v BOJ said that the notional “observer” is one who has “witness[ed] the proceedings” ([103(e)]). But on the other hand, the “observer” in BOI v BOJ was explicitly said to be “not a lawyer” ([99]), although, in the case itself, odds are that the only observers were lawyers; and even if the parties themselves were present, the only one whose perception might matter is the ex-wife herself, but the Court of Appeal explicitly said at [119] that the “reasonable observer is not to be confused with the person who has brought the complaint”.

        The upshot is that it would appear to me to be an arguable question whether, in applying the test in BOI v BOJ, it is open to a party to argue that the characteristics of the notional ‘observer’ ought to be similar to those of the people who actually observed, or could have actually observed, the hearing, and not those of the public generally. I think it is arguable that this should be the case. But this is only my opinion; the courts have never explicitly said so. To the contrary, the test in BOI v BOJ – which, as some of you argued, seems to make the notional ‘observer’ much more clever, patient, and knowledgeable than the average person, and indeed more like a judge! – is stated in terms that purport to apply to all cases.

        On another note, for a summary of the law on ‘descending into the arena’, I would refer you to BOI v BOJ at [111]-[113]. This adds detail to the distinction we alluded to in class between the decision-maker’s asking questions for the sake of clarification and asking questions as though he/she were one of the parties.

      32. The ‘merits’ of an executive decision

        A student asked about Chee Siok Chin v MHA, which at [97] reproduces the following quotation from Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437 (UKHL) 446 (Lord Diplock):

        [The] lawfulness of the arrest and detention based on that suspicion [does] not depend upon the judge’s own view as to whether the arrest was reasonable or not, but upon whether [the police officer’s] action in arresting … was an exercise of discretion that was ultra vires under Wednesbury principles because he took into consideration an irrelevant matter.

        I responded:

        This relates to the ‘cheeky’ question I asked [in class] about the rules of football. The orthodox view is that the referee can call out a player for violating the rules of football, but not for using bad tactics. But what if there were a rule of football saying ‘players may not use bad tactics’?

        Similarly, the orthodox view is that judicial review is about ensuring that executive decisions are made within the bounds of the law, without looking at the substance of the decision and whether it is reasonable. But what if I told you that there is a law saying that executive decisions must have a certain type of substance — namely, they must not be unreasonable? Indeed, there is such a law, which we will study in topic 5: “irrationality”) is that executive decisions cannot be unreasonable.

        Now, this doesn’t mean that judges have a great deal of power to strike down and executive decisions that they don’t like. This is because the threshold for what is “unreasonable” is very high — something like ‘no reasonable decision-maker could have reached this decision’. So, in Chee Siok Chin, all the court had to ask was: could a reasonable police officer, given the evidence in front of him, make a decision to arrest; or was the decision to arrest substantively extremely unreasonable? The answer was the former.

        But, crucially, the court did ask this question. It did not stop at asking whether the police officer had acted within the legal limits set out in s 40, not taken into account irrelevant considerations, not acted for improper purposes, etc.

        To put it another way (spoiler alert): It is not true that, in judicial review, the courts do not examine the merits of the decision in question. Indeed, in Chee Siok Chin, the court’s reasoning was that the substance of the police officer’s decision was justified given the evidence. The court didn’t just consider the inputs to the police officer’s reasoning process, and the process itself; it said that the output was acceptable. However, this isn’t a bad thing, because, in theory, only in extreme cases can the court strike down an executive decision on substantive grounds: where the decision is extremely unreasonable, such that even the court — with its relative lack of expertise, etc. — can comfortably say that it is. To put it another way, only when the tactics are clearly terrible, such that even the referee who isn’t an expert in tactics can see it, can the referee call out the players for breaking the rule that says you can’t use bad tactics.

        I wrote something expanding on this view some time ago — see https://www-cambridge-org.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/core/journals/asian-journal-of-comparative-law/article/unmeritorious-legalitymerits-distinction-in-singapore-administrative-law/4FD23EBA73F6AAA6439CDE857756442D especially under the headings “Incompatibility with Substantive Review” (including the quotations from other writers there) and “The way forward”.

      33. Notes on the E case

        Here’s a message I sent to a past student about E:

        “… if I understand correctly, you are saying that ‘the truth’ is a mandatory relevant consideration, and so the idea of error of fact is simply an instance of the idea that a decision-maker must take into account mandatory relevant considerations. That is true insofar as we say that the relevant consideration is ‘the need to know the truth’.

        But the problem is that, often, the error of fact doesn’t consist merely of a failure to take into account ‘the truth’ in the abstract, but rather a failure to take into account a particular piece of evidence / to pursue a particular line of inquiry. As the court in E said at [62], often the statute will say nothing — neither explicitly nor implicitly — about that particular piece of evidence / line of inquiry.

        The assumption in E is that “[f]ailure to take account of a material consideration is only a ground for setting aside a decision, if the statute expressly or impliedly requires it to be taken into account” (at [62]). We know that statutes lay down general rules/principles, and are not addressed to individual cases. Hence, when the court in E used the word “consideration”, it must have used that word to refer to a variable or a factor phrased in general terms — say, ‘the potential conflict between the decision and the law of trademarks’ (Jessie Tan) or ‘the degree of public outcry about the offences in question’ (Venables) or ‘the identity of the person who is complaining to the Law Society’ (CBB — High Court held that it was irrelevant). So far, so good.

        By contrast, in certain other cases, the courts use the language of irrelevant considerations to describe what is in substance an error of fact. They do this by using the word “consideration” to refer to a particular piece of evidence — as in Maripan Ponnusamy (“err in failing to take into account Dr Teh’s evidence”: at [34]), Venables and possibly Fong Thin Choo (at [56]-[57]). What are we to make of such cases? The court in E would probably describe them as involving errors of fact. The reason why these cases have used the language of relevant considerations is that they used the word ‘consideration’ to mean something broader than, as E suggests, a factor which is “expressly or impliedly” mentioned in the statute.

        Of course, this latter set of cases can be rationalised as cases involving irrelevant considerations too. We can say that the alleged error in Maripan Ponnusamy was a failure to ‘take into account all relevant medical expert evidence’. We can say that the problem in Venables was that “public protests about the level of a tariff to be fixed in a particular case are legally irrelevant” (526G). We can say that the problem in Fong Thin Choo was that that the Director-General had failed to take into consideration ‘all relevant documents or testimonies of witnesses’.

        If we can, in this manner, say that cases involving errors of fact are just cases about irrelevant/mandatory relevant considerations, then what does E add? I can think of at least two answers.

        First, E is intellectually honest. It addresses the problem that the conventional notion of relevant/irrelevant considerations doesn’t tell us anything about the level of generality with which a consideration should be framed. Indeed, in E, the court wasn’t creating concepts out of thin air; what it was doing was trying to come up with a framework that satisfactorily explains many other past English cases which in substance involved review for error of fact but which struggled to explain the boundaries of this ground of review. By contrast, if we just stop at reading Fong Thin Choo, we are left wondering precisely how far the court can go.

        Second, E paves the way for saying that a decision can be quashed on grounds relating to evidence that emerged after the decision was made. By contrast, it is conceptually problematic to say that a decision-maker who did not take into account such new evidence had omitted to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration.”

        Off-topic:

      34. Former judges appearing as counsel

        Section 26(2) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 states that, if you have “held office as a Supreme Court Judge for a period of 3 years or more”, you don’t have a “right of audience in any court of justice in Singapore”.

        Note that this doesn’t apply to Judicial Commissioners: see s 26(10).

      35. Contempt of court and “fair criticism”

        On what counts as fair criticism, and therefore not contempt of court, see the extracts cited by the Court of Appeal in Shadrake Alan v AG [2011] 3 SLR 778 (CA) at [61]-[67], [81], and [86].

      36. Legal limits to the power to prosecute

        So far, the case law discloses at least five situations in which an exercise of the power to prosecute would be unlawful or lead to adverse consequences for the Public Prosecutor:

        1. The power to prosecute must not be used for an “extraneous purpose”: Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [132].
        2. The power to prosecute must not be exercised in breach of constitutional rights. There have, so far, been few cases in which this has been alleged, and all of those involve the constitutional right to equality before the law (see Article 12(1) of the Constitution) – in other words, that people in the same situation should be treated in the same manner. The difficulty with this is that people who commit criminal offences are rarely equally situated:
          1. Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General at [51]-[53] and [71]. 
          2. Xu Yuan Chen v Attorney-General [2022] SGCA 59 (on the reading list for a later topic). In this case, Julie O’Connor wrote a letter online, and Xu Yuan Chen (also known as Terry Xu) republished it. Xu, but not O’Connor, was prosecuted for contempt of court. Xu argued that the Attorney-General’s act of proceeding against him but not O’Connor violated Article 12(1) of the Constitution.
        3. If the prosecution acts in a manner that renders it “impossible to give the accused a fair trial” (for example, through very long delay, or generally “where the particular circumstances are such that to try the accused would offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety”), then the court may order that criminal proceedings be “stayed” (i.e. paused) permanently. [Optional] See Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen [2020] SGHC 186 at [41], [45]-[46], [92] for more details.
        4. If the accused person is acquitted, and the prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”, then the Public Prosecutor may be ordered to pay compensation to the accused person. The definition of “frivolous or vexatious” is this: “The court will ask, based on the evidence the Prosecution had at the relevant time, whether an objective reasonable Deputy Public Prosecutor (“DPP”) would have considered that there was sufficient evidence to render the case fit to be tried before the court… The classic case of such a frivolous prosecution is when the decision to commence and/or continue prosecution is based on such insufficient evidence that the prosecution is objectively factually unsustainable… I am also of the view that a frivolous prosecution may also include a prosecution which is legally unsustainable where, even if the Prosecution succeeds in proving all the facts asserted, the elements of the charge will still not be satisfied.” ([Optional] Parti Liyani v Public Prosecutor [2021] 5 SLR 860 at [116]-[117], emphasis removed).
          1. The Public Prosecutor also has a duty to “asses[s] the sufficiency of the admissible evidence”. It may be that “cross-examination at trial reveals severe weaknesses in the testimony of the witnesses or new evidence is discovered that destroys the very crux of the Prosecution’s case”, in which case, it may be “frivolous or vexatious” to insist on continuing the prosecution: see [Optional] Parti Liyani at [118].
          2. For a summary of Parti Liyani, see [Optional] Benjamin Joshua Ong, ‘Compensation for Frivolous or Vexatious Prosecution’, Law Gazette (October 2021) <https://lawgazette.com.sg/feature/compensation-for-frivolous-or-vexatious-prosecution/>. 
        5. If the Public Prosecutor makes a statement (or engages in conduct) that creates “legitimate expectations” on the part of certain people, then the Public Prosecutor may not act in a way that frustrates these expectations. We see this in the Tan Seng Kee case.

        Can the Public Prosecutor bring as many charges as possible against an accused person, and then just ‘see what sticks’? 

        It is arguable that the act of bringing some of those charges would be an abuse of process, and hence unlawful: see Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [132]. Also, it is quite possible that prosecuting on some of those charges would be “frivolous and vexatious”, and so the accused person, if acquitted of those charges, is entitled to compensation: see s 359(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Parti Liyani.  Moreover – as you might learn in Part B – the Prosecution cannot seek to “ru[n] a case which is internally inconsistent”: PP v Aishamudin bin Jamaludin [2020] SGCA 70 at [56]ff; see also PP v Wee Teong Boo [2020] SGCA 56 at [113], which states that doing so may amount to an “abuse of process”.

      37. The law on gambling

        Gambling per se was never unlawful. What was unlawful (under the now-repealed Common Gaming Houses Act 1961) was “gaming” in a “common gaming house”, which meant “any place kept or used for gaming to which the public or any class of the public has or may have access, and any place kept for habitual gaming, whether the public or any class of the public has or may have access thereto or not, and any place kept or used for the purpose of a public lottery whether the public has access thereto or not”. “Gaming”, in turn, meant “the playing of any game of chance or of mixed chance and skill for money or money’s worth”. “Gaming” in public was also an offence.

        (There were statutory exemptions for licensed casinos and gambling organised by the Tote Board.)

        It was similarly unlawful under the Betting Act 1960 to bet in a “common betting house”.

        One might think that it was not clear what “habitual” meant. If a group of friends met every week to play mahjong for money, wouldn’t that be “habitual gaming”? Then again, according to R v Fong Chong Cheng [1930] SSLR 139, “a place does not become a common gaming house merely because gaming habitually occurs in it. A private residence is not a common gaming house because the owner makes a practice of inviting his friends to it to gamble.” Rather, the law criminalised the “use of premises either for public gambling, or for the special purpose of a gambling saloon” (ibid), as well as the use of “the facade of a personal dwelling” to mask the fact that a place is “primarily kept for gaming” (PP v Yap Ah Yoon [1993] 1 SLR(R) 506).

        That said, it may well be that the point of both Acts was never to target people gambling in private. This article gives us a hint about the sort of thing that the law aimed to target. I haven’t read about the matter in detail, but I was once curious and Googled various games on the list of games declared by the Minister to be “games of chance or mixed games of chance and skill”. It seems to me that point of that list was to make it harder for accused persons to argue that those games were somehow games of skill, and hence not “gaming”: for evidence, go to LawNet and search for “chap ji kee” OR “chap ji ki”.

        The Gambling Control Act 2022 affirms that “social gambling” is not unlawful. For the reasons set out in the cases referred to above, I would not say that the Act legalised social gambling; indeed, the MHA’s position has been that such gambling was never illegal. If anything, the Act tightened the rules by restricting online social gambling, etc. (I cannot presently purport to provide a comprehensive overview of the Act.) I would like to highlight that something can be “social gambling” even if you’re gambling for money.

      38. Is prejudgment a form of apparent bias?

        The case law now says yes: BOI v BOJ [2018] SGCA 61 at [107]-[110]. I don’t really see a contradiction between this and statements in other cases saying that prejudgment is simply a complete failure to exercise discretion. If you ask me, the various cases are speaking at cross-purposes. My view is that prejudgment is arguably not itself biased decision-making, but rather the failure to take into consideration what the parties have to say – which we might well call a failure to take into account relevant considerations. But the point made by BOI is that it is not only actual prejudgment, but also apparent prejudgment, that can render a decision unlawful. In other words, the standard of proof for prejudgment is the same as that for apparent bias, and that’s why the court said that prejudgment can itself amount to “apparent bias”. Either way, the question is what the “fair-minded, informed and reasonable observer” would think: see [109].

      39. Judges offering to recuse themselves

        I know of at least two cases in which the courts wrote to parties to ask whether they would object to a particular judge hearing the case, on the ground of possible apparent bias. These are:

        • Panchalai a/p Supermaniam and another v PP [2022] SGCA 37: see [3], [8], and [17]-[18]. (I respectfully disapprove of the use of the Latin word “coram” as a noun.)
        • Tan Cheng Bock v AG: see this Facebook post (archive). (Some of the comments left by others on that Facebook post are, at least arguably, in contempt of court; I consider them totally baseless, and do not endorse them.)

      40. Written and oral advocacy

        I mentioned a case emphasising the importance of written advocacy, and not only oral advocacy. That case is Re Lord Goldsmith Peter Henry PC QC [2013] SGHC 181. Specifically, I was referring to the following statement from paragraph 29: “the appellate process in the Singapore Court of Appeal has evolved to be more writing-centred than that in many other common law court systems. The written medium occupies a central role in the appellate process here. The usual portrayal in the media of oral arguments having a pivotal role in the appellate process, while alluring and ripe with drama, does not accurately reflect the reality of legal practice here.”

        If you’re considering a career in litigation, perhaps read paragraphs 22 to 38.

        On a related note: You may have read about a recent case where the court did not grant leave for two KCs to argue a case involving drug trafficking. Some have alleged that the accused persons were unable to find local lawyers, and that local lawyers fear acting in such cases. I would ask you not to rely on this sound-bite, which is not true: see Kassimatis, Theodoros KC v AG [2024] SGHC 24 at [69]-[74], especially [71]. Also note that the KCs remain free to help with preparing written submissions (see [77]).

      41. Collective ministerial responsibility

        There isn’t much that has been written about collective ministerial responsibility in Singapore; there is much more in UK constitutional law textbooks, if you’re interested. As to the content of the principle, see this guide produced by the House of Commons Library, section II.A.

        I would like to stress that, while the Singapore Constitution says that Cabinet is collectively responsible to Parliament, it does not prescribe any legal consequence for breach. That is by design. The principle of collective responsibility was inherited from the UK, where the principle is not a legal rule, but rather a non-legal convention. The consequences for breach – in both the UK and Singapore – are political, not legal. I can think of three possible consequences for a breach of the principle of collective responsibility:

        1. The electorate might, in response, vote the government out.
        2. Parliament might, in response, pass a motion that it has no confidence in the government. That might prompt the government to resign. The President will then have to appoint a new Prime Minister (Constitution, Art 25), or, if “there is no Member of Parliament likely to command the confidence of a majority of the Members thereof”, dissolve Parliament (Art 65(2)), in which case an election must be called (Art 66).
        3. Even without a Parliamentary motion of no confidence, the President may independently form the view that the Prime Minister has “ceased to command the confidence of a majority of the Members of Parliament” (Art 26(1)(b)). The President can then declare the office of PM vacant, in which case he will have to appoint a new PM (Art 25); or, “if the Prime Minister so requests, the President may dissolve Parliament instead of making such a declaration” (Art 26(1)(b)) – in which case, an election must be called (Art 66).

        For more on the President’s power to dismiss the Prime Minister, see Seow Zhixiang, ‘Upholding Responsible Government: Legal and Political Controls on the Prorogation Power in Singapore’ [2020] SJLS 665, section VI.

      42. The role of the victim in criminal proceedings

        The victim of a crime has no standing to challenge the sentence imposed by the court, nor to challenge the PP’s decision not to appeal against the sentence: Huang Meizhe v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR(R) 1149 at [28]. I respectfully suggest that the reasoning in that case is not as clearly stated as in R v Nunn [1996] 2 Cr App R (S) 136 (EWCA) at 140 and R (Bulger) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 3 All ER 449 (EWHC) at [19]-[23] (which cited Nunn). According to Nunn at 140:

        “We mean no disrespect to the mother and sister of the deceased, but the opinions of the victim, or the surviving members of the family, about the appropriate level of sentence do not provide any sound basis for reassessing a sentence. If the victim feels utterly merciful towards the criminal, and some do, the crime has still been committed and must be punished as it deserves. If the victim is obsessed with vengeance, which can in reality only be assuaged by a very long sentence, as also happens, the punishment cannot be made longer by the court than would otherwise be appropriate. Otherwise cases with identical feature would be dealt with in widely differing ways leading to improper and unfair disparity, and even in this particular case, as the short judgment has already indicated, the views of the members of the family of the deceased are not absolutely identical.

        If carried to its logical conclusion the process would end up by imposing unfair pressures on the victims of crime or the survivors of a crime resulting in death, to play a part in the sentencing process which many of them would find painful and distasteful. […]”

        Bulger at [21] adds:

        “If the family of a victim could challenge the sentencing process, why not the family of the defendant? Should the Official Solicitor be permitted to represent the interests of children adversely affected by the imprisonment of their mother? Should organisations representing victims or offenders be permitted to intervene? In my judgment, the answer in all these cases is that the Crown and the defendant are the only proper parties to criminal proceedings. A proper discharge of judicial functions in relation to sentencing requires that the judge take into account (as Lord Woolf CJ said he did in this case) the impact of the offence and the sentence on the public generally, and on individuals, including the victim and the victim’s family and the defendant and the defendant’s family. The nature of that impact is properly channelled through prosecution or defence.”

        What, then, is the role of the victim in sentencing? See s 228 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010, which provides that the prosecution may, in its sentencing submissions, refer to a “victim impact statement” – which means “any statement relating to any harm suffered by any person as a direct result of an offence, which includes physical bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm”. So if you are the victim of a crime and you wish to communicate your views about how the crime has affected you, get in touch with the prosecutor and ask to make a victim impact statement.

      43. The effect of Article 22Q of the Constitution

        I respectfully disagree that the President was previously disentitled from being involved in foreign or international organisations in his private capacity, until the Constitution was amended to retroactively allow him to do so. There was never any rule saying that he couldn’t. While Article 21 of the Constitution says that the President “shall, in the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or any other written law, act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet”, that only applies to what he does “under this Constitution or any other written law” – not in his free time.

        One might argue that there is a constitutional convention (not a legal rule, but still a norm) that the President cannot publicly speak in a private capacity. Some time ago, someone contacted me and presented this view, citing the various annexes to this speech. I respectfully disagreed for the following reasons:

        ‘Let us grant that the convention in the UK was inherited by Singapore, and that it was not removed by the former Article 18(2) (which serves roughly a similar function to today’s Article 19A) and Article 21. (One might argue expressio unius, etc.) Even then, I can see an argument that the convention has not survived the transition to an elected Presidency. Baldwin’s letter rightly states that the basis of the convention in the UK was that “the King himself can do no wrong”; that is why “the King’s Ministers must take responsibility for every public act of the King”. If we read “can do no wrong” as meaning “cannot be held accountable”, then this basis has fallen away in 1991, as the President is now accountable in the sense of being liable to be removed by the electorate.

        Putting that aside, there is the question of the precise content of the convention. I would suggest that it is not necessarily the case that merely taking up an office an organisation, without more, would violate the convention (assuming it exists in Singapore). But in any event, what the convention would require is – again, to quote Baldwin’s letter – that the President not “make a public statement on any matter of public interest except on the advice of his Ministers”. Here, one could take the phrase “matter of public interest” to refer to the sort of domestic matter with which the executive government would be concerned (as opposed to the sort of thing covered in the Queen’s Christmas speech, which I understand is not written in accordance with advice from the UK Government). An example of a “matter of public interest” would be King Edward VIII’s proposed marriage, which, I note, would have been an unlawful act. By contrast, if the President were to (say) join the International Society for Putting Things on Top of Other Things, and make a speech about the importance of making use of space in all three dimensions efficiently, one could argue that there is no violation of the convention, any more than there would be if the President were to post a photograph of his breakfast on Instagram.

        Of course, as I mean to show by using such a ludicrous hypothetical, it is a matter of degree; and membership or participation in an international or foreign organisation could in principle touch on a matter of domestic public concern, but it need not be. One might ask: would it really violate the convention for the President to take up an office in an international society for the study of environmental issues and make broad statements such as ‘we must all work together to save the planet’? It would not be as though the President would be purporting to act in breach of the law of Singapore, or to clash openly with the Government’s position.

        One might go further yet and suggest that the convention does not now exist in Singapore, on the basis of at least two data points. First, there is the following statement by Mr Shanmugam: “Our Constitution, including provisions such as Articles 21(1) and 24(2), was based on English principles and conventions. It follows that these same principles apply to our Presidency, which in turn is created and empowered by the Constitution.” If this means that the convention is embodied in those provisions, then Art 21(1) must have cut down the scope of the convention, to the effect that the President only has to act on advice “in the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or any other written law”. Second, there is President Halimah Yacob’s post on Facebook that shared her view on caning for offenders aged above 50 – which was different from the Government’s view which Minister Shanmugam stated in Parliament. As far as I can recall, there was no official response to the President’s post on constitutional grounds.

        Finally, I note that if the convention exists and bars the President from membership in any foreign organisation without Government approval, then one might reach the conclusion that President Tharman has been acting unlawfully from his inauguration until the present. Of course, that is not necessarily the case – the Government may well have advised him that it has approved of his memberships – but it is a conclusion that I would be extremely reluctant to reach.

        All that having been said, I would welcome the Bill (save for the clause purporting to backdate it). For one thing, s 76 of FICA does not apply to the President (except if the competent authority designates the President as a “Part 4 politically significant person” – but that would apply only to the individual President of the day, not to the office generally); it would be good for the Government to have at least notice of, and control over, what organisations the President can join – simply for the sake of consistency. More generally, the Bill could be seen as relating to an unwritten constitutional function of the President, namely, representing Singapore before the world. I did note the comment on my LinkedIn post about the precise meaning of “in the national interest”, and I also note that the precise meaning of “office” might be open to question; I suppose we will have to await further developments on these issues if any.’

        If I am right, then it is not the case that the President was unable to play a role – even in a “private” capacity – in an international organisation until the Constitution was amended. This being so, I do not think that the question of retroactivity even arises.

        What, then, did the constitutional amendment really do? To my mind, it limited the President’s ability to hold office in a foreign/international organisation, even in a “private” capacity, in that now the Cabinet can tell him to relinquish that office or  not to “sa[y] or d[o] anything in the performance of the functions of [such an] office”.

      44. Can the Housing and Development Board sell a flat to a single aged under 35?

        The HDB’s legal power to lease flats comes from section 26(3) of the Housing and Development Act 1959. (The definition of “building” in s 2(1) includes a “flat”.) The power to sell a flat comes from s 49; as for resale flats, see s 55(1). You will see that none of these provisions states who can rent/buy a flat. What, then, is the legal basis for the HDB’s various “eligibility conditions”, or the rule that the HDB will only rent or sell (or consent to the resale of) a flat to a person with an “HDB Flat Eligibility (HFE) letter”?

        The answer is that when an executive body has a broad power, it is entitled to formulate policies stating how it will exercise that power. However, such a policy is not law, and therefore cannot be rigid (as law is); the authority must be prepared to hear those who claim to be in exceptional circumstances and make exceptions. The HDB itself says that it will consider exceptions; see also this exchange in Parliament.

      45. Article 12 of the Constitution and private bodies

        The general argument I can think of (which, for the avoidance of doubt, the courts haven’t explicitly articulated) is that constitutional rights generally bind, not only state authorities, but also private bodies such as employers. Evidence for this is Nappalli, which was a case that involved the Art 15 right, but it did not involve an application for judicial review – it was, instead, a claim for wrongful dismissal. So, arguably, the respondent was being sued qua employer rather than qua state authority – and if a constitutional right was relevant to this, it must follow that constitutional rights are relevant to employers generally.

        Then there is Art 12(3)(b), which purports to be an exception to Art 12(1)-(2) relating to employment. It follows (the argument goes) that, prima facie, something in Art 12(1)-(2) creates a right against an employer. This could well include Art 12(1), not just Art 12(2).

        That said, Art 12(2) would, on its face, appear to prohibit discrimination against citizens, on certain grounds, “in the administration of any law relating to… the establishing or carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or employment”. I do wonder (tentatively) whether this could include the common law of contract.

      46. The Presidential Council for Minority Rights and Article 12 of the Constitution

        If the PCMR issues an adverse report on a Bill, but Parliament passes it anyway, would it nonetheless be unconstitutional for violating Art 12?

        Not necessarily. The test applied by the PCMR is different from the test applied by the courts under Art 12.

        The PCMR’s job is to identify “differentiating measures”. Art 68 says a “differentiating measure” is “any measure which is, or is likely in its practical application to be, disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community and not equally disadvantageous to persons of other such communities, either directly by prejudicing persons of that community or indirectly by giving advantage to persons of another community”. At the risk of over-simplifying: once there’s unequal treatment, there’s a differentiating measure.

        But that is not the test under Art 12. The Art 12 tests for legislation and executive action, broadly speaking, don’t forbid unequal treatment – they allow it under some circumstances if (broadly speaking) it is justified. By contrast, the test applied by the PCMR doesn’t account for the possibility that there is differential treatment but it is justified.

        That being so, the fact that Parliament has okayed the Bill despite the adverse report is irrelevant.

        If the PCMR doesn’t issue an adverse report on a Bill, will the courts presume that it doesn’t violate Art 12?

        No. The PCMR doesn’t have the authoritative word on the interpretation/application of the Constitution – so an Act on which the PCMR hasn’t issued an adverse report can’t be presumed constitutionally valid: see Ravi s/o Madasamy v AG [2017] 5 SLR 489 at [87]. Indeed, the court said at [88] that it agreed with the PCMR, meaning that the court carried out an independent assessment; the court did not stop at saying that it presumed that the PCMR was right, and explicitly said that it’s not bound by what the PCMR says (and, for good measure, that – as I said above – the PCMR’s test is different from the Art 12 test). At most the court might defer to the PCMR’s views, but – as always – the decision to defer is a considered decision, not a mere presumption.

      47. Welcome.

        I’ve been teaching constitutional and administrative law at the Yong Pung How School of Law at Singapore Management University (SMU) for several years. I’ve also taught other subjects from time to time.

        Over the years, my students have asked me quite a few thought-provoking questions. My answers have been lying around in several places, including my email archives as well as per-class discussion fora. I haven’t really had a system to organise them, which has been inefficient for everybody. (There have been occasions on which I typed out a lengthy answer to someone’s question, only to realise that I’ve answered the same question at length before!)

        So I’ve decided to consolidate these, as well as other notes I’ve prepared for students, on this website, and organise everything using tags. Of course, I won’t reveal which student(s) asked which question(s). People other than students may or may not find this website useful.

        While I do my best to ensure that my assertions of fact are accurate and that the opinions I express are based on accurate substrata of fact, I would be grateful to have any mistakes pointed out to me.

        Nothing on this website is legal advice; you should not rely on it as such. If you need legal help, you should contact a practising lawyer.

        In the unlikely event that you were wondering: notwithstanding section 134 of Singapore’s Copyright Act 2021, I own the copyright to everything posted on this website, as a result of various provisions of SMU’s policies which take effect as terms of my employment contract.

        Finally, my apologies for the fact that this website is rough around the edges — I thought that it’d be better to get something up and running first and sort out the details later.