Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The World Development Movement case

A student asked why commentators say that the court in the World Development Movement (known as the “Pergau Dam case”) had mis-applied s 1(1) of the Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980. After all, the student asked, surely s 1(1) suggests that grants must be made for the sake of the “welfare” of the people of another country, and the auditors had found that the proposed dam project would raise electricity costs for the people.

I noted that s 1(1) does not say that the only permissible purpose of a grant is to promote the “welfare” of people.

My reply:

I see the force in your view. The argument I see to the contrary was put by Timothy Endicott, in Administrative Law (5th ed, OUP, 2021) at p 297 as follows: 

“The Overseas Development and Co-operation Act 1980 s 1(1) gave the Secretary of State power to make grants ‘for the purpose of promoting the development or maintaining the economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or the welfare of its people’ (Pergau Dam, 390). He was certainly maintaining the economy of Malaysia by giving the government £400 million from the overseas development fund. It is not implausible to argue that the Act authorized the action.” 

(Note that Endicott ultimately disagreed with this view.)

I am prepared to agree with you, and with Endicott’s point that the legislation had a “development purpose”. But I do note the counter-argument at 402C that, ultimately, the money was going toward providing electricity.

What I don’t like is that the court did not explain this. What I don’t like is that the court said: “if Parliament had intended to confer a power to disburse money for unsound development purposes, it could have been expected to say so expressly.” Why? We are not told. We are not pointed to Parliamentary debates showing that the Legislature intended that the power in s 1(1) be used only for the purpose of economically viable projects, and not for projects that were not economically viable but were diplomatically fruitful. (I don’t see how the sources referred to at 402A-B can be of use in statutory interpretation: they are not evidence of the legislative intention at the time the Act was passed.) What I was looking for, and I did not find, was an explanation — or at least a statement — of why your interpretation of s 1(1), and not the alternative, is correct. 

Is it that I’m missing something? Perhaps the word “development”, like the word “wash-house”, has a certain meaning in English law that I’m not picking up on. But even then, I find it difficult to see how the distinction between “sound” and “unsound development purposes” (402A) has any basis in s 1(1). 

For what it’s worth, all this may not have made a difference. On the account of Ivan Hare, ‘Judicial Review and the Pergau Dam’ (1995) 54 Cambridge Law Journal 227, 228, the UK Government eventually did fund the Pergau Dam — just under a different law.

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *