Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

How ‘thick’ can a definition of the rule of law be before becoming so contested (/contestable) as to fail to be useful as a definition?

In theory, it ought to be possible to derive from the core of the rule of law a series of necessary conditions for its protection, which, in theory, if they are necessary implications of the core, ought to be uncontentious as the core itself. 

Perhaps a useful answer to the question of when the rule of law necessarily becomes too contested to be a useful concept lies in the distinction Barber draws in his article (on the reading list) between “legalistic conceptions of the rule of law” which “focus on questions of legal procedure, structure, and the formulation of laws”, and “non-legalist conceptions” which “include social and political rights at their core” (475). Barber argues that even legalistic conceptions of the rule of law might contain some substantive elements, e.g. a sufficient “level of material well-being” for people to be able to assert their legal rights (483).

That said, ‘thin’ conceptions of the rule of law are not necessarily more vague than ‘thicker’ ones. It may well be as difficult to measure, say, the clarity of legislation as it is to define the boundaries of the freedom of legislation.

Another point: The rule of law is, as you point out, a standard by which states (and their constituent parts) are judged; but it is more than that: it plays a role in the shaping of legal doctrines. We see this at work in Tan Seet Eng and Chng Suan Tze, where the rule of law was said to demand that certain rules of administrative law be the way they are. (To similar effect, see the statement of Dixon J in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth of Australia (1951) 83 CLR 1 that the “rule of law” is an “assumption” of the Australian Constitution, and leads to the principle that (to put it somewhat simplistically), if the legislature has power to legislate only regarding topic X, and somebody challenges legislation on the ground that it has nothing to do with topic X then it is for the court and not for the legislature to decide whether it really has anything to do with topic X.) So it might be that, even if a given conception of the rule of law is too vague/hard to measure to serve as a reliable yardstick by which the state (/any organ thereof) may be judged, it could still serve as a useful ideal to which the state (/any organ thereof) could aspire.

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