The problem in Wham’s case was that he had applied for judicial review of the wrong thing. He had attempted to argue that the Public Order Act is unconstitutional insofar as it requires one to have a permit for certain types of assembly. The court said that it was not. In other words, the permit system per se was not unconstitutional. If anything is unconstitutional, it might be, not the system, but rather the application of that system in a given case. In other words, even though the permit system is constitutionally valid, a person may seek to argue that a particular decision by the police not to grant a permit is unconstitutional (or unlawful for some other reason).
But Wham couldn’t argue that, because the police had not taken a decision not to grant a permit, because Wham had never applied for a permit in the first place.
What he should have done was to apply for a permit. If his application was rejected, he could then do 3 things:
- Apply for judicial review of the Public Order Act, saying that it is unconstitutional
- Apply for judicial review of the police’s decision not to grant a permit, saying that that decision was unconstitutional/illegal/irrational/procedurally improper (/in breach of substantive legitimate expectations?)
- Apply for judicial review of the Public Prosecutor’s decision to prosecute him, saying that that decision was a breach of his constitutional rights / in bad faith / for an extraneous purpose (see Gary Chan’s article for details about the grounds on which an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be judicially reviewed)
But because he had not applied for a permit, option (2) was out. And he had not tried option (3).
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