The UK Supreme Court held that a proposed (in the court’s words) “policy that certain people claiming asylum in the United Kingdom should not have their claims considered here, but should instead be sent to Rwanda in order to claim asylum there” was unlawful: R (AAA (Syria) and others) v SSHD [2023] UKSC 42, [1]. Someone asked what precisely the role of the court is. I think we will be in a better position to understand once we have learned about the law on questions of precedent fact.
The law is that, in the UK, public bodies must not “act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right” (Human Rights Act 1998, s 6(1); here, “Convention” refers to the European Convention on Human Rights). The ECHR requires that the UK (in the Supreme Court’s words) “not… remove persons to other states where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be at real risk of” “torture or… inhuman or degrading treatment” (at [23]). Also, the UK’s legislation states that immigration policies cannot be “contrary to the Convention” (referring to the Refugee Convention), and the Refugee Convention says: “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (reproduced at [20] and [27])
This being so, “The test to be applied by the court in relation to the issue of refoulement is… whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the removal of asylum seekers to Rwanda would expose them to a real risk of ill treatment, as a consequence of refoulement to another country.” (at [38]) It is not merely whether the Minister reasonably thinks that there is no such risk; the question is whether there is such a risk (at [39]).
The government sought to rely on assurance given by the Rwandan government. The court acknowledged that it should “attach weight to the government’s view as to the value of assurances given by another country, particularly where its view reflects the advice of officials with relevant experience and expertise” (at [52]). However, the government’s fact-finding process was flawed (at [54]). Moreover, “the government is not necessarily the only or the most reliable source of evidence about matters which may affect the risk of refoulement” ([55]). There could be other sources of evidence, which the court would have to weigh up ([57]).
Moreover, “even if the court is not institutionally as well equipped as the government to carry out an evaluation of a diplomatic assurance, the position is different ‘where the assessment of future conduct engages practical considerations which arise from past conduct’” ([58]). In other words, the government does not have “special institutional expertise” on the track record of how the asylum system has worked in Rwanda; that is simply a matter of historical fact which the court is no less well-placed to consider.
The court’s conclusion was that, indeed, “there were substantial grounds for believing that asylum seekers would face a real risk of ill-treatment by reason of refoulement in the event that they were removed to Rwanda” ([73], [104]-[105]).
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