Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The constitutionality of sentences for enhanced public protection (SEPPs)

I have just read what was said in Parliament about the Criminal Procedure (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill – in particular, about sentences for enhanced public protection (SEPPs) – so that I can better answer your questions.

Having done so, I stand by my view that SEPPs are probably not unconstitutional if we see them as a form of life imprisonment imposed by the court followed by executive discretion to release the convicted person early.

As for whether SEPPs are a good thing: I have learned that a useful case study is “imprisonment for public protection” in the UK, which was introduced in 2005 and abolished in 2012.

I would also like to point out that one can apply for judicial review of a decision not to release someone who is serving an SEPP after the minimum period. There isn’t even a purported ouster clause.

I also found out about the English case of James, Wells, and Lee. I gathered the following points from the judgment of the High Court of England and Wales ([2008] 1 All ER 138):

  1. There is no presumption in favour of not releasing someone serving an IPP sentence after the minimum period has lapsed: [47]-[48].
  2. The purpose of the minimum period is “retribution and deterrence”, while the purpose of continued detention after that is prevention: [44]. Therefore, what is relevant to the Minister’s deciding whether to release someone is a something to be assessed, not at the time of the sentence, but rather from the time the minimum period expires, “on a continuing basis, by periodic assessment”: [46]-[47].
  3. Indeed, it is a mandatory relevant consideration for the Minister whether there is “up-to-date… information” that justifies continued detention. This means that the Minister must have a “current and effective assessment of the danger he does or does not pose”: [47].
  4. The legislation providing for IPP sentences was on the basis of a “settled understanding” that the UK Government would put in place “procedures… to ensure that initiatives, in particular courses in the prison, would be available to maximise the opportunity for lifers to demonstrate they were no longer a danger to the public by the time their tariff expired or as soon as possible thereafter, so as to allow the lifer’s release once that was shown”: [26].  (I make no comment yet about whether a similar “understanding” can be said to exist in Singapore.)

The Court of Appeal agreed with these propositions: [2008] 1 WLR 1977. So did the House of Lords ([2010] 1 AC 553), which remarked that the “Secretary of State failed deplorably” in not performing his duty to “provide the systems and resources that prisoners serving [IPP] sentences needed to demonstrate to the Parole Board… that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that they should remain in detention”: [3]. The European Court of Human Rights held that this gave rise to a violation of certain prisoners’ rights under Art 5 of the ECHR (see [209] onwards).

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