In previous years, I sent students this message on or around 14 February:
Today, the 14th of February, is the anniversary of the date on which Ronald Dworkin, philosopher of law, passed away in 2013. I cannot pretend to recall off the top of my head everything he said, let alone readily to understand it/its implications. Nonetheless, if I may, I would like to share a couple ideas of his (or ideas which I understand to be ideas of his).
First, there is the idea that law consists not only of rules, but also of principles. Dworkin articulated this idea in ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 University of Chicago Law Review 14. By his definitions, rules (such as “A will is invalid unless signed by three witnesses”) apply in an “all-or-nothing” manner (at 25), whereas principles (such as “no man may profit from his own wrong”: at 25) can be assigned a different amounts of weight in each particular case, and may pull in different directions (for examples, see 25-26). Moreover, principles can masquerade as rules: for example, there may be a ‘rule’ saying that “every contract in restraint of trade shall be void”, but the definition of “restraint of trade” contains the word “unreasonable”, which is a matter of principles and not rules (at 28). Dworkin says that we must not forget that principles, too, are part of the law.
Whatever is the significance of this point for his theory on a grander scale, what I immediately drew from it is that we cannot expect law to be a simple process of applying rules to facts to come up with a conclusion, as though all we need to do to succeed is to know what the rules are. To the contrary, working with principles — including arguing about what principles are/aren’t relevant in a particular case, and what weight to assign to each principle — is part and parcel of a lawyer’s work.
Second, there is the idea of law as interpretation (‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 179) and the metaphor of the chain novel. Dworkin is talking about ‘interpretation’, not of a word or phrase, but rather of the entire body of law generally. He says this: “an interpretation of a piece of literature attempts to show which way or reading (or speaking or directing or acting) the text reveals it as the best work of art” (at 183). He goes on to describe a process in which a group of writers writes a novel chapter-by-chapter, each writer writing a chapter that builds on all of the previous chapters (at 192-193); in this process, each writer must interpret the previous chapters in order to write the next so as to participate in the enterprise of writing one novel. Dworkin then goes on to say that this is what judging consists of (at 193):
“The similarity is most evident when judges consider and decide common-law cases; that is, when no statute figures centrally in the legal issue, and the argument turns on which rules or principles of law ‘underlie’ the related decisions of other judges in the past. Each judge is then like a novelist in the chain. He or she must read through what other judges in the past have written not simply to discover what these judges have said, or their state of mind when they said it, but to reach an opinion about what these judges have collectively done, in the way that each of our novelists formed an opinion about the collective novel so far written. Any judge forced to decide a lawsuit will find, if he looks in the appropriate books, records of many arguably similar cases decided over decades or even centuries past by many other judges of different styles and judicial and political philosophies, in periods of different orthodoxies of procedure and judicial convention. Each judge must regard himself, in deciding the new case before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of which these innumerable decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his job to continue that history into the future through what he does on the day.”
Sometimes, a lawyer’s job is to aid a judge in this process. At other times, it is to predict what a judge will say (and this applies no less to lawyers doing transactional work than to litigation lawyers). Either way, we will have to do more than recall what past cases have said (after all, judges have LawNet too); we will have to put forth arguments explaining which features of the existing body of law are relevant (or irrelevant), what sense to make of them, and, more generally, what way forward will cast the law in its “best possible light” (a phrase Dworkin used in his book Law’s Empire). (Come to think of it, was all this not what the Court of Appeal of England and Wales was explicitly trying to do in E?) If you are interested, read ‘Law as Interpretation’ for an account of the kind of issues that arise when one seeks to interpret the law in the manner just described.
The 14th of February is also, according to some accounts, Valentine’s Day. Putting aside the dubious origins of the modern connotations of this ‘event’, I suppose it is worth remembering a couple of things. First, we must not confuse lust with love, and lust for the law with love for the law: to love is to grapple persistently with another’s flaws and weaknesses. Second, no matter how much we love the law the law cannot love us back; so is love for the law true love? Even as we pursue the law, let us not neglect our human loved ones, including ourselves.
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