Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The right to be told the gist of the case against you

I said that the law is not exactly that a fair hearing requires that you know the case against you; rather, it requires that you know the gist of the case against you. The case I had in mind was AF (No 3), which involved the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. That Act allowed a “control order” to be made against a suspected terrorist – not unlike a restriction imposed under s 8(1)(b) of our Internal Security Act 1960. The person could appeal against the control order to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). Some hearings before the SIAC would be open to the public. Others would be “closed hearings”, at which not even the controlee could attend. Instead, the controlee would be represented by a “special advocate”, who was a security-cleared lawyer who would be shown certain “closed” security-sensitive details of the case against the controlee. The special advocate could then make submissions to SIAC. But the controllee themselves would not get to see the “closed” evidence. And the special advocate would not get to meet the controlee to take instructions about the “closed” materials.

Would this be a fair hearing? One could argue that, given national security constraints, yes: the ‘special advocate’ system was a way to balance the need for a fair hearing against the needs for national security. But the House of Lords, by a majority, said that this wasn’t always good enough. The controlee need not be shown every piece of evidence against them, but “the controlee must be given sufficient information about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions in relation to those allegations” (Lord Hope at [59]). That’s what I meant when I said that the person affected has to be given at least the “gist” of the case against him. (See [85]. English lawyers use the word “gisting” to mean telling someone the gist of the case against them.)

Otherwise, Article 6(1) of the ECHR would be violated. And, Lord Scott said, the same conclusion would have been reached under the common law rules of procedural fairness (at [96]).

How is all this relevant in Singapore? Suppose someone is detained under the ISA. That person has the right to be “informed of the grounds of his detention” and “the allegations of fact on which the order is based”, but this “does not require any authority to disclose facts the disclosure of which would, in its opinion, be against the national interest”: Constitution, Art 151; ISA, s 9. Or suppose someone is detained under the CLTPA; that person has the right to be told the “grounds for the making of the detention order” (Criminal Law (Advisory Committee) Rules, Schedule, Form 2, read with r 6), but the Minister need not “disclose facts which he considers it to be against the public interest to disclose” (CLTPA, s 41). One could argue that, despite the “national interest”/“public interest” provisos, it would be unlawful to disclose the grounds of detention in such scanty detail that the applicant doesn’t even know the gist of why they have been detained. And I think the English case law might be useful for making such an argument.

For more, see this case note by Aileen Kavanagh.

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