Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Executive decision-makers (e.g. the HDB) and judicial power

A student asked about the HDB’s power to decide to compulsorily a flat, which was discussed in Per Ah Seng Robin v HDB. The question was: “why the HDB is not considered to be exercising judicial power despite being the one to investigate and decide, even on appeal, with regards to the merits of the appellant’s case.” My response was as follows:

This is one of those questions that people seem to know the answer to, but the explanation is not very clear. 

This question is important for the following reason. If the HDB is exercising judicial power, but it does not fall within the definition of a “subordinate court” as that phrase is used in Article 93, then its existence and/or its actions must be unconstitutional.  

Any lawyer, if asked what the HDB is, would say that it is an executive body that exercises executive power. But why? The answer is not that it is not called a “court”: as the case law has shown, when the courts look at separation of powers, they look at substance and not form. And when we look at substance, Faizal would seem to suggest that HDB does exercise judicial power because it decides controversies between the state and private persons.  But even Faizal did not intend this to be an exhaustive definition, as we see from the fact that the ultimate ratio of Faizal was based, not on applying this definition, but rather on a historical analysis (of whether the sentencing power is a judicial power). As for the HDB, an appeal to history will probably not help us, given how new the HDB is. 

So we have to dig deeper into principle. The UK case law will not help us, because the UK courts will rarely, if ever, have to answer the question ‘is this body exercising judicial power or not’? That is why Faizal referred to Australian cases: the issue arises in Australia because Australia has a written Constitution providing that the judicial power of the Commonwealth of Australia shall only be vested in some types of body but not others.

An Australian case that elaborates on the definitions provided in the cases cited in Faizal is Precision Data Holdings v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167 (HCA). At 188-190 (emphasis added): 

  • “The acknowledged difficulty, if not impossibility, of framing a definition of judicial power that is at once exclusive and exhaustive arises from the circumstance that many positive features which are essential to the exercise of the power are not by themselves conclusive of it. Thus, although the finding of facts and the making of value judgments, even the formation of an opinion as to the legal rights and obligations of parties, are common ingredients in the exercise of judicial power, they may also be elements in the exercise of administrative and legislative power…”
  • “if the ultimate decision may be determined not merely by the application of legal principles to ascertained facts but by considerations of policy also, then the determination does not proceed from an exercise of judicial power… That is not to suggest that considerations of policy do not play a role, sometimes a decisive role, in the shaping of legal principles.”
  • “Furthermore, if the object of the adjudication is not to resolve a dispute about the existing rights and obligations of the parties by determining what those rights and obligations are but to determine what legal rights and obligations should be created, then the function stands outside the realm of judicial power.”

None of this is wholly satisfactory. For example, one may argue that judicial declarations of remedial constructive trusts fall within the third point.  As the first point admits, none of the various factors is conclusive.

For more information, try the following books (available in our Library):

  • Dan Meagher, Amelia Simpson, James Stellios, and Fiona Wheeler, Hanks, Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary (10th ed, 2016) at 879-900 (KU1750.H36 2016). 
  • Peter Harris, Frances Gordon, and Graeme Hill, Constitutional Law in Australia (3rd ed, 2012) at 505-523 (KU1750.H36 2012).

Applying the decision in Wills, the answer to your question would appear to be that the HDB’s power to decide whether or not to compulsorily acquire a flat is not judicial power, because: (a) this decision is one that would create rights/obligations rather than adjudicating on whether rights/obligations already exist; (b) this decision is a policy-laden one, as opposed to one that consists of the application of legal rules.

What about the HDB’s power to make a finding of fact as to whether the owner of a flat has “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” a flat? The answer is that this is not per se a power that HDB has. What the HDB has the power to do is to acquire the flat. The question of whether the owner has “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” is merely a condition which must be satisfied for the HDB to have power to acquire the flat. If the owner has not “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” the flat (and none of the other requirements in s 56(1) are made out), then the HDB has no power to acquire the flat (and, in fact, not even any power to decide whether or not to acquire the flat). So this question of fact is not itself part of HDB’s power; rather, it is the legal limit to the HDB’s power. To use language which we will be seeing in our next topic, whether the owner has “assign[ed], underle[t] or part[ed] with the possession of” the flat is a precedent fact requirement, which must be objectively established before the HDB even has power to act. It is for the court to determine whether such a requirement has been made out, because this requirement is a legal limit to the HDB’s power, and it is for the court to determine whether legal limits have been transgressed.

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *