I believe the argument the person who asked this question was referring to is as follows. Suppose you and I have a contractual dispute (in other words, a “controversy”). Suppose that there is an arbitration agreement between us. The effect of the arbitration agreement is that it will be an arbitral tribunal, and not the court, which has the power to resolve the “controversy”. But Article 93 of the Constitution effectively provides that only courts have the power to resolve “controversies”. That must mean that the arbitration agreement, and all arbitration agreements, are unconstitutional.
Before evaluating this argument, a preliminary point about it must be made. An analysis based on a ‘right of trial by jury’, or, for that matter, some (common-law?) right of ‘access to court’, must be irrelevant. This is because Article 93 of the Constitution has nothing to do with rights; it is about powers. A right is something that exists to benefit the rights-holder. But Article 93 does not exist in order to benefit anybody; it exists simply to define and delimit the powers of certain institutions. If, in doing so, people happen to gain a benefit as a side result, “so be it”;* but that does not change the fact that Article 93 has nothing to do with rights.
Do arbitration agreements require an arbitral tribunal to exercise judicial power? I believe the answer is the same as the question of whether executive bodies who exercise statutory decision-making powers exercise judicial power. The answer, for the reasons referred to in a previous post as well as those I have set out in my note on Nagaenthran (‘The constitutionality of ouster clauses’), is no, both because of the limits of the powers of the tribunal as well as the role of the court as an independent reviewer.
In AJU v AJT [2011] 4 SLR 739 (CA) [62], the Court of Appeal said that “the court cannot abrogate its judicial power to the Tribunal to decide what the public policy of Singapore is”, and hence the Court of Appeal could set aside an arbitral award on the ground that it had the effect of enforcing a contract that was contrary to public policy.** This suggests that arbitration is not an exercise of judicial power because the court retains its supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings, which it may exercise through powers such as the power to set aside the award; and because the court retains the final say over the boundaries of what is permissible in a contract, as well as the final power to enforce those boundaries. (Besides public policy, the doctrine of arbitrability imposes another set of boundaries.)
In TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533 (High Court of Australia) [28]-[30], French CJ and Gageler J articulated two further reasons why arbitral tribunals do not exercise judicial power. First, judicial power is “conferred and exercised by law and coercively”, whereas the power of an arbitral tribunal arises from the “agreement of the parties”. Second, an arbitral award is “not binding of its own force”, but rather only becomes binding only because the law says it is. And, if I may add, that law imposes legal limits on the types of arbitral awards which are capable of being binding and the circumstances in which they are.
Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, and Bell JJ added another point at [76]ff: Arbitral tribunals do not oust the jurisdiction of the courts to hear a dispute. Rather, the making of an arbitral award “both extinguishes the original cause of action and imposes new obligations on the parties in substitution for the rights and liabilities which were the subject of the dispute referred to arbitration. The former rights of the parties are discharged by an accord and satisfaction. The accord is the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration; the satisfaction is the making of an award in fulfilment of the agreement to arbitrate”. This being so, the role of the courts in the exercise of their judicial power is to determine whether the arbitral award is to be enforced.
For more views from Singapore, see Menon CJ’s speech, ‘Judicial Attitudes towards Arbitration and Mediation in Singapore’ (25 October 2013) (archive).
* Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 (High Court of Australia) 35-36 (Brennan J), making a similar point about the nature of judicial review, viz., that (at least according to one view) it does not exist in order to correct “injustice”, but instead simply to enforce legal limits to executive power: “The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository’s power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error.” (emphasis added)
** Note that “public policy” in this context does not mean matters of a political rather than legal nature. In arbitration, “public policy” has a specific technical meaning, for which see e.g. BVU v BVX [2019] SGHC 69, [44]: “The upholding of an award conflicts with public policy only if it would ‘shock the conscience’, be ‘clearly injurious to the public good’, be ‘wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public’, or when the award ‘violates the forum’s most basic notion of morality and justice’.”
A follow-up question for a student: “If arbitral proceedings are not exercises of judicial power because they are ‘supervised’, does this mean that the Subordinate Courts do not exercise judicial power? (In relation to the point on AJU v AJT)”
My response:
You are right that, if X is subject to the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction, that does not necessarily mean that X is not exercising judicial power. The Court of Appeal in AJU v AJT seems to have used the terminology loosely; its point appears to be not that the arbitral tribunal does not exercise judicial power, but rather that the High Court does not cease to exercise judicial power.
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