We have discussed the idea of justice having to be seen to be done. That explains why there is a body of law on apparent bias. It exists not so much to guard against the possibility of bias, as to guard against the possibility of the perception of bias.
The logical question is: justice has to be seen to be done in whose eyes? Whose perception? The answer, we are told by BOI v BOJ, is: the perception of a notional “fair-minded and informed observer”. This led us into a discussion about whether the court’s definition of a “fair-minded and informed observer” is realistic – a discussion engaged in by Lionel Leo and Chen Siyuan, ‘Reasonable Suspicion or Real Likelihood: A Question of Semantics?’ [2008] SJLS 446, 450-451. There is, however, one matter we did not directly confront: when we say “realistic”, we mean a realistic representation of what? Of the public? Or of the sort of people who would actually have been observers?
The difference is that some decision-making procedures are not open to the public. Some older cases which say that the ‘observer’ is to be an approximation of a member of the public are cases involving alleged bias shown by things done in/visible in public, such as a press conference (Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 (UKHL)) and a gift of flowers by a juror to a murder victim’s mother (Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 (HCA)). But others do not. BOI v BOJ itself must have involved a hearing in chambers (because rule 81(2) of the Family Justice Rules provides that “[a]n application for ancillary relief must be heard and determined in Chambers”), yet it talks about “public confidence” (emphasis added), the perspective of “reasonably well-informed members of the public” (emphasis added), etc. (Strictly speaking, it is possible for the parties themselves to attend such a hearing; but I understand that this is rare. And, anyway, the only person other than a lawyer who could have attended and perceived bias would be the ex-wife herself, but the Court of Appeal explicitly said at [119] that the “reasonable observer is not to be confused with the person who has brought the complaint”.)
One possibility I can think of is that the law should demand that decision-making procedures be fair from the point of view of someone who represents the public, even if the public is not allowed to see the procedure. The rationale would be that the focus is not actually on public perception, but rather on objective fairness. In other words, the point is not to make decision-making procedures appear fair, but rather to make them actually fair; and the law is merely choosing to define ‘fair’ as ‘what a reasonable member of the public would, if he saw it, describe as fair’. But this reading of the case law is heretical; it certainly flies in the face of the case law’s stressing that it is concerned with perception.
Another possibility is that the courts use the language of the perception of “the public”, but in substance they decide cases based on the perception of the particular people who are able to observe the hearing. This was what I suggested in class. That would explain why the ‘observer’ in BOI v BOJ is as knowledgeable as a lawyer: the only people who were there to observe the allegedly biased acts were lawyers. But I must stress that the courts have never explicitly said this. They have never said that, if only a limited class of persons could have observed the proceedings, then the notional ‘observer’ is defined by reference to that limited class of persons. On the one hand, the Court of Appeal in BOI v BOJ said that the notional “observer” is one who has “witness[ed] the proceedings” ([103(e)]). But on the other hand, the “observer” in BOI v BOJ was explicitly said to be “not a lawyer” ([99]), although, in the case itself, odds are that the only observers were lawyers; and even if the parties themselves were present, the only one whose perception might matter is the ex-wife herself, but the Court of Appeal explicitly said at [119] that the “reasonable observer is not to be confused with the person who has brought the complaint”.
The upshot is that it would appear to me to be an arguable question whether, in applying the test in BOI v BOJ, it is open to a party to argue that the characteristics of the notional ‘observer’ ought to be similar to those of the people who actually observed, or could have actually observed, the hearing, and not those of the public generally. I think it is arguable that this should be the case. But this is only my opinion; the courts have never explicitly said so. To the contrary, the test in BOI v BOJ – which, as some of you argued, seems to make the notional ‘observer’ much more clever, patient, and knowledgeable than the average person, and indeed more like a judge! – is stated in terms that purport to apply to all cases.
On another note, for a summary of the law on ‘descending into the arena’, I would refer you to BOI v BOJ at [111]-[113]. This adds detail to the distinction we alluded to in class between the decision-maker’s asking questions for the sake of clarification and asking questions as though he/she were one of the parties.
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