Some of you asked: Does section 3(1) of the Application of English Law Act (AELA) mean that Singaporean courts other than the Court of Appeal are bound by rules of English common law that were in place before 12 November 1993?
In my view, the answer must be no. No English decision is binding on any Singapore court. According to section 3(2), English common law before 12 November 1993 applies in Singapore only “so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants and subject to such modifications as those circumstances may require”. Section 3(2), read plainly, does not place a limit on which court may make such “modifications”. It does not say, for example, that only the Court of Appeal can make such “modifications”. Neither does it elevate any English case law to the precedential status of decisions of any particular court in Singapore, such as the Court of Appeal. Therefore, the effect of s 3 is that any court – not just the Court of Appeal, but other courts, including, say, a District Court or Magistrate’s Court – is not bound by any English decision.
There is no contradiction between this proposition and the High Court’s statement in CHS CPO GmbH v Vikas Goel [2005] 3 SLR(R) 202 at [87] that Singapore law should not “depar[t] from the received English law merely for its own sake”. That latter statement means merely that Singapore law should not discard a useful legal rule merely because it is English in origin. That does not mean that Singapore law is obliged to keep that rule. In this regard, see also the observation of the Court of Appeal in Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663 at [133] that “local courts must… recognise that the days of a uniform common law [across jurisdictions] are no longer a given. It is true that in the commercial context, there is more likelihood of (and desirability for) uniformity. However, even in the commercial setting, uniformity should not be taken too far.”
One might next attempt to argue that, though any Singaporean court may decline to follow a pre-12 November 1993 English decision, there are limited reasons for which it may validly do so. One might, for example, point to the statement in s 3(2) that a court may decline to follow a pre-12 November 1993 English decision for reasons relating to the “circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants”, and attempt to argue that only a difference of “local culture and mores” (to use a phrase from TQ v TR [2009] 2 SLR(R) 961 (CA) [52]) can justify treating a pre-12 November 1993 English case as non-binding.
In my view, this cannot be correct. The “circumstances of Singapore” includes not only socio-cultural circumstances, but also the fact that Singapore is a sovereign independent state with its own legal system. From the fact of Singapore’s independence, and the independence of Singapore’s legal system, it must follow that a Singapore judge is entitled to develop the common law, on the basis not only of social or cultural differences between Singapore and England, but also of his or her views as to “the cogency as well as logic of legal arguments and doctrines” as part of his or her “search for principle” (see Andrew Phang’s remarks in Andrew Phang, Goh Yihan, and Jerrold Soh, ‘The Development of Singapore Law: A Bicentennial Retrospective’ (2020) 32 SAcLJ 804, [136]).
I am fortified in these views by the words of Andrew B L Phang and Goh Yihan, Contract Law in Singapore, 2nd ed (Walters Kluwer, 2021) at [50] (emphasis added):
“the local courts are free to either accept or reject the common law [of England] and equity. This may be done on the basis that it was not part of the corpus of Singapore law in the first place or that even if it were so part of the law of Singapore, section 3(2) furnished the necessary flexibility in any event.”
If statements from case law were needed to illustrate this point, I would point to two decisions of our courts. The first is Tang Kin Hwa v Traditional Chinese Medicine Practitioners Board [2005] 4 SLR(R) 604. At [27]-[28], the High Court stated (emphasis added):
“English law… has now to be cultivated with an acute awareness of the soil in which it has been transplanted. It must also be closely scrutinised for appropriateness on a more general level – that of general persuasiveness in so far as logic and reasoning are concerned. This is the essence of the ideal of developing an autochthonous or indigenous legal system sensitive to the needs and mores of the society of which it is a part. […] It is therefore to be welcomed that English law is no longer accepted blindly. This is not to state that it has not served jurisdictions such as Singapore, even outstandingly well. But there ought to be departures where either local conditions and/or reason and logic dictate otherwise.”
The second is ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd [2017] 1 SLR 918. There, the Court of Appeal declined to follow the decision of the House of Lords in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, which formed part of the common law of England in place before 12 November 1993. The Court of Appeal described the rule laid down in the latter case as “no longer applicable to the circumstances of Singapore” (at [175]). In saying that, the Court of Appeal was referring to matters of legal principle (see [174] and the discussion leading up to it), and not to the culture of Singapore or the nature of Singaporean society.
But, appeals to authority aside, there is a broader point of principle at stake. To believe that differences of culture aloneare a valid basis for declining to follow pre-12 November 1993 English law would simply not do justice to Singapore’s independence as a legal system. (After all, even English colonial authorities recognised that English law, as applied in the Straits Settlements, had to be “adapted to the condition and wants of the inhabitants” such as differences in religious beliefs and customs: see Choa Choon Neoh v Spottiswoode (1869) 12 Ky 216, 221.) But if one stopped there, and held that there Singapore law is otherwise manacled to English law, that would be no less than an act of neo-colonialism – and, worse, self-imposed neo-colonialism – which I cannot imagine was the intention of the Legislature when it passed section 3 of the AELA. I cannot imagine that any Singaporean judge would be willing to knowingly reach a decision whose reasoning he or she believes to be unprincipled, merely because similar reasoning has been applied in ‘mother England’ of which Singapore is but “some corner of a foreign field” (Rupert Brooke, ‘The Soldier’ (1914)). As we have seen, Phang JC (as he then was), for one, certainly refused to do so in Tang Kin Hwa. If I may respectfully say so, his approach appears to have been informed, not by picking at the wording of s 3 of the AELA, but rather simply by a recognition that he was a judge in a Singaporean court who owed a duty to none other than the Republic of Singapore and its law
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