Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The ‘merits’ of an executive decision

A student asked about Chee Siok Chin v MHA, which at [97] reproduces the following quotation from Holgate-Mohammed v Duke [1984] AC 437 (UKHL) 446 (Lord Diplock):

[The] lawfulness of the arrest and detention based on that suspicion [does] not depend upon the judge’s own view as to whether the arrest was reasonable or not, but upon whether [the police officer’s] action in arresting … was an exercise of discretion that was ultra vires under Wednesbury principles because he took into consideration an irrelevant matter.

I responded:

This relates to the ‘cheeky’ question I asked [in class] about the rules of football. The orthodox view is that the referee can call out a player for violating the rules of football, but not for using bad tactics. But what if there were a rule of football saying ‘players may not use bad tactics’?

Similarly, the orthodox view is that judicial review is about ensuring that executive decisions are made within the bounds of the law, without looking at the substance of the decision and whether it is reasonable. But what if I told you that there is a law saying that executive decisions must have a certain type of substance — namely, they must not be unreasonable? Indeed, there is such a law, which we will study in topic 5: “irrationality”) is that executive decisions cannot be unreasonable.

Now, this doesn’t mean that judges have a great deal of power to strike down and executive decisions that they don’t like. This is because the threshold for what is “unreasonable” is very high — something like ‘no reasonable decision-maker could have reached this decision’. So, in Chee Siok Chin, all the court had to ask was: could a reasonable police officer, given the evidence in front of him, make a decision to arrest; or was the decision to arrest substantively extremely unreasonable? The answer was the former.

But, crucially, the court did ask this question. It did not stop at asking whether the police officer had acted within the legal limits set out in s 40, not taken into account irrelevant considerations, not acted for improper purposes, etc.

To put it another way (spoiler alert): It is not true that, in judicial review, the courts do not examine the merits of the decision in question. Indeed, in Chee Siok Chin, the court’s reasoning was that the substance of the police officer’s decision was justified given the evidence. The court didn’t just consider the inputs to the police officer’s reasoning process, and the process itself; it said that the output was acceptable. However, this isn’t a bad thing, because, in theory, only in extreme cases can the court strike down an executive decision on substantive grounds: where the decision is extremely unreasonable, such that even the court — with its relative lack of expertise, etc. — can comfortably say that it is. To put it another way, only when the tactics are clearly terrible, such that even the referee who isn’t an expert in tactics can see it, can the referee call out the players for breaking the rule that says you can’t use bad tactics.

I wrote something expanding on this view some time ago — see https://www-cambridge-org.libproxy.smu.edu.sg/core/journals/asian-journal-of-comparative-law/article/unmeritorious-legalitymerits-distinction-in-singapore-administrative-law/4FD23EBA73F6AAA6439CDE857756442D especially under the headings “Incompatibility with Substantive Review” (including the quotations from other writers there) and “The way forward”.

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