Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Notes on the E case

Here’s a message I sent to a past student about E:

“… if I understand correctly, you are saying that ‘the truth’ is a mandatory relevant consideration, and so the idea of error of fact is simply an instance of the idea that a decision-maker must take into account mandatory relevant considerations. That is true insofar as we say that the relevant consideration is ‘the need to know the truth’.

But the problem is that, often, the error of fact doesn’t consist merely of a failure to take into account ‘the truth’ in the abstract, but rather a failure to take into account a particular piece of evidence / to pursue a particular line of inquiry. As the court in E said at [62], often the statute will say nothing — neither explicitly nor implicitly — about that particular piece of evidence / line of inquiry.

The assumption in E is that “[f]ailure to take account of a material consideration is only a ground for setting aside a decision, if the statute expressly or impliedly requires it to be taken into account” (at [62]). We know that statutes lay down general rules/principles, and are not addressed to individual cases. Hence, when the court in E used the word “consideration”, it must have used that word to refer to a variable or a factor phrased in general terms — say, ‘the potential conflict between the decision and the law of trademarks’ (Jessie Tan) or ‘the degree of public outcry about the offences in question’ (Venables) or ‘the identity of the person who is complaining to the Law Society’ (CBB — High Court held that it was irrelevant). So far, so good.

By contrast, in certain other cases, the courts use the language of irrelevant considerations to describe what is in substance an error of fact. They do this by using the word “consideration” to refer to a particular piece of evidence — as in Maripan Ponnusamy (“err in failing to take into account Dr Teh’s evidence”: at [34]), Venables and possibly Fong Thin Choo (at [56]-[57]). What are we to make of such cases? The court in E would probably describe them as involving errors of fact. The reason why these cases have used the language of relevant considerations is that they used the word ‘consideration’ to mean something broader than, as E suggests, a factor which is “expressly or impliedly” mentioned in the statute.

Of course, this latter set of cases can be rationalised as cases involving irrelevant considerations too. We can say that the alleged error in Maripan Ponnusamy was a failure to ‘take into account all relevant medical expert evidence’. We can say that the problem in Venables was that “public protests about the level of a tariff to be fixed in a particular case are legally irrelevant” (526G). We can say that the problem in Fong Thin Choo was that that the Director-General had failed to take into consideration ‘all relevant documents or testimonies of witnesses’.

If we can, in this manner, say that cases involving errors of fact are just cases about irrelevant/mandatory relevant considerations, then what does E add? I can think of at least two answers.

First, E is intellectually honest. It addresses the problem that the conventional notion of relevant/irrelevant considerations doesn’t tell us anything about the level of generality with which a consideration should be framed. Indeed, in E, the court wasn’t creating concepts out of thin air; what it was doing was trying to come up with a framework that satisfactorily explains many other past English cases which in substance involved review for error of fact but which struggled to explain the boundaries of this ground of review. By contrast, if we just stop at reading Fong Thin Choo, we are left wondering precisely how far the court can go.

Second, E paves the way for saying that a decision can be quashed on grounds relating to evidence that emerged after the decision was made. By contrast, it is conceptually problematic to say that a decision-maker who did not take into account such new evidence had omitted to take into account a mandatory relevant consideration.”

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