Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Legal limits to the power to prosecute

So far, the case law discloses at least five situations in which an exercise of the power to prosecute would be unlawful or lead to adverse consequences for the Public Prosecutor:

  1. The power to prosecute must not be used for an “extraneous purpose”: Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [132].
  2. The power to prosecute must not be exercised in breach of constitutional rights. There have, so far, been few cases in which this has been alleged, and all of those involve the constitutional right to equality before the law (see Article 12(1) of the Constitution) – in other words, that people in the same situation should be treated in the same manner. The difficulty with this is that people who commit criminal offences are rarely equally situated:
    1. Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General at [51]-[53] and [71]. 
    2. Xu Yuan Chen v Attorney-General [2022] SGCA 59 (on the reading list for a later topic). In this case, Julie O’Connor wrote a letter online, and Xu Yuan Chen (also known as Terry Xu) republished it. Xu, but not O’Connor, was prosecuted for contempt of court. Xu argued that the Attorney-General’s act of proceeding against him but not O’Connor violated Article 12(1) of the Constitution.
  3. If the prosecution acts in a manner that renders it “impossible to give the accused a fair trial” (for example, through very long delay, or generally “where the particular circumstances are such that to try the accused would offend the court’s sense of justice and propriety”), then the court may order that criminal proceedings be “stayed” (i.e. paused) permanently. [Optional] See Public Prosecutor v Soh Chee Wen [2020] SGHC 186 at [41], [45]-[46], [92] for more details.
  4. If the accused person is acquitted, and the prosecution was “frivolous or vexatious”, then the Public Prosecutor may be ordered to pay compensation to the accused person. The definition of “frivolous or vexatious” is this: “The court will ask, based on the evidence the Prosecution had at the relevant time, whether an objective reasonable Deputy Public Prosecutor (“DPP”) would have considered that there was sufficient evidence to render the case fit to be tried before the court… The classic case of such a frivolous prosecution is when the decision to commence and/or continue prosecution is based on such insufficient evidence that the prosecution is objectively factually unsustainable… I am also of the view that a frivolous prosecution may also include a prosecution which is legally unsustainable where, even if the Prosecution succeeds in proving all the facts asserted, the elements of the charge will still not be satisfied.” ([Optional] Parti Liyani v Public Prosecutor [2021] 5 SLR 860 at [116]-[117], emphasis removed).
    1. The Public Prosecutor also has a duty to “asses[s] the sufficiency of the admissible evidence”. It may be that “cross-examination at trial reveals severe weaknesses in the testimony of the witnesses or new evidence is discovered that destroys the very crux of the Prosecution’s case”, in which case, it may be “frivolous or vexatious” to insist on continuing the prosecution: see [Optional] Parti Liyani at [118].
    2. For a summary of Parti Liyani, see [Optional] Benjamin Joshua Ong, ‘Compensation for Frivolous or Vexatious Prosecution’, Law Gazette (October 2021) <https://lawgazette.com.sg/feature/compensation-for-frivolous-or-vexatious-prosecution/>. 
  5. If the Public Prosecutor makes a statement (or engages in conduct) that creates “legitimate expectations” on the part of certain people, then the Public Prosecutor may not act in a way that frustrates these expectations. We see this in the Tan Seng Kee case.

Can the Public Prosecutor bring as many charges as possible against an accused person, and then just ‘see what sticks’? 

It is arguable that the act of bringing some of those charges would be an abuse of process, and hence unlawful: see Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR(R) 239 at [132]. Also, it is quite possible that prosecuting on some of those charges would be “frivolous and vexatious”, and so the accused person, if acquitted of those charges, is entitled to compensation: see s 359(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code and Parti Liyani.  Moreover – as you might learn in Part B – the Prosecution cannot seek to “ru[n] a case which is internally inconsistent”: PP v Aishamudin bin Jamaludin [2020] SGCA 70 at [56]ff; see also PP v Wee Teong Boo [2020] SGCA 56 at [113], which states that doing so may amount to an “abuse of process”.

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