The classic explanation as to why there are requirements to obtain leave (or, even if the two stages are ‘rolled up’, there are threshold requirements) is to “prevent a wasteful use of judicial time and to protect public bodies from harassment”: Linda Lai [2001] 1 SLR(R) 133 (CA) at [23]. It appears that, in saying things like this, the courts have conflated two things: (a) the rationale for the threshold requirements; (b) the rationale for having a separate leave hearing during which these threshold requirements, and nothing else, are to be argued about.
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which the law can create a mechanism for a case to be summarily thrown out without having to go into all the details of the case. First, the law can require the plaintiff/applicant to show that certain threshold requirements are passed, failing which the application proper will not be allowed to proceed. Second, the law can allow the plaintiff/applicant to make the application proper first, but allow the defendant/respondent to apply to have the application struck out. The latter applies in civil proceedings generally, but the former applies in judicial review proceedings. In theory, the practical difference is as follows: in the former mechanism, an application for leave is to be made ex parte, i.e. the applicant asks the court for leave without the respondent having to be present – so the respondent need not trouble itself to appear in court at the leave stage. But in practice, the respondent often (always?) appears at the leave stage anyway: Wong and Hong (2016) 28 SAcLJ 527 at [11]. This practical reality suggests that there need not be a separate leave stage.
This, in turn, explains why the threshold to show a “prima facie case of reasonable suspicion” is in practice higher than what is claimed in Linda Lai. (Consider cases like Jeyaretnam and Vijaya Kumar, where the substance of the application was decided in full at the leave stage.) If all the parties will turn up in court for both hearings anyway, why have two hearings on two separate days? But I would disagree that raising the threshold for a “prima facie case of reasonable suspicion” says anything about the ‘green-light’ theory etc. This is because the threshold is being raised no higher than the threshold that the applicant would have to meet at the substantive stage anyway. It is, in effect, just a matter of administrative convenience: the arguments that would be heard and evaluated during the second hearing are now dealt with during the first hearing instead.
That leaves us with the ‘susceptible to judicial review’ and ‘sufficient interest in the matter’ requirements. (For short, I will refer to the latter as the ‘standing’ requirement.)
The ‘susceptible to judicial review’ requirement is not merely procedural; it is substantive. However, it makes sense for it to be dealt with as a threshold issue because it is logically prior to other substantive issues. If the subject-matter of the application is not susceptible to judicial review, then, by definition, all arguments about the grounds of review are irrelevant. By way of analogy, consider a suit in which the plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract. The defendant is entitled to apply to the court to strike the suit out on the ground that it is factually unsustainable, in that no contract existed at the first place. The effect of this is that the existence of a contract is a threshold requirement, and, if the plaintiff can be shown not to have met it, then the court (and defendant) need not trouble themselves with arguing about how to calculate the sum of damages etc. This has nothing to do with any particular theory of contract law; it is simply a matter of saving time. Similarly, the ‘susceptible to judicial review’ requirement is simply a matter of saving time – a matter of administrative convenience.
As for the standing requirement, the reasons why it is relatively difficult to have standing are as set out in Vellama and Jeyaretnam. As I understand it, the cases make multiple points: that the aim is to prevent time being wasted by frivolous applications; that the aim is to prevent time being wasted by applications that are not based on the best possible arguments/evidence; that the aim is to prevent multiple applications; and that the aim is to prevent time being wasted by applications whose substance ought to be dealt with in the political arena. Jeyaretnam explicitly linked the last of these points to the ‘green light’ theory. But I would hesitate to agree that that is correct. If the point is that the application is bound to fail because of the law of deference etc. – in other words, if the applicant is bound to fail for reasons of its substance – then I think the application ought to have been thrown out on that ground (viz. that there is no reasonable suspicion), and not on the ground that the applicant had no standing.
I would add that, in Singapore, there has been no application for judicial review that would have succeeded on the merits but failed because the applicant had no standing.
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