Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Was GCHQ wrong to say that irrationality is a separate category from illegality, when Wednesbury itself said that the various grounds mentioned in Wednesbury all “overlap” and “run into each other”?

I agree that it is arguable that GCHQ was wrong in inferring from Wednesbury that there is such a ground of review as irrationality. So would Prof Timothy Endicott, who says, in Administrative Law, 2nded (OUP, 2011) at 348-349, about the GCHQ taxonomy of ‘illegality’, ‘irrationality’, and ‘procedural impropriety’:

This seemingly neat list is very popular, but it is incoherent. ‘Procedural impropriety’ makes sense—that means lack of due process. Lord Diplock meant ‘irrationality’ as a label for Wednesbury unreasonableness (410) – necessarybut it is a misleading label: see p 232. And if ‘illegality’ means unlawfulness, it covers all of the grounds of review.

Lord Diplock tried to explain (410): ‘By “illegality” as a ground for judicial review I mean that the decision- maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision- making power and must give effect to it.’ But all the grounds of judicial review are part of the ‘law that regulates’ a decision-making power […]

There is no particular reason to use ‘illegality’ as a label for bad faith and irrelevant considerations if we don’t use it as a label for procedural impropriety and irrationality (whatever may be meant by that) as well. And classifying relevance as a matter of ‘illegality’ would be dangerously misleading. It would suggest that the standard for identifying the considerations on which a decision should be based is one of correctness (like the standard for determinations of law). But that is a mistake that generates excessive legalism in administrative decision making: judges ought to defer to public authorities, to some extent, on the question of what considerations are relevant to the public authority’s decision

(see p 276).

It is impossible – and unnecessary to encapsulate the grounds of review in three big words.

[footnotes omitted]

For more scepticism of the GCHQ taxonomy, see Swati Jhaveri, ‘Revisiting Taxonomies and Truisms in Administrative Law in Singapore’ [2019] SJLS 351, which will be on our reading list for the topic on theories of administrative law.

That said, the courts have had occasion to apply irrationality (by whatever name called) as a ground of review, which suggests that the courts do see some value in it. Otherwise, the decision in Lines International (and perhaps Chee Siok Chin) would not have been so detailed; Bugdaycay would have been decided differently; etc. More generally, for all its problems, irrationality (as defined in GCHQ) was what paved the way for substantive review to take place, which has in turn had an influence on, among other things, the law on substantive legitimate expectations. Of course, one could retort that what I have just said is merely that I see the value in substantive review (by whatever name called), and that the courts do engage in substantive review under other names (such as what Chan J did in Fong Thin Choo). Seen in that light, the main contribution of GCHQ is to try to create doctrinal neatness where none existed before, even if GCHQ ultimately failed at this task.

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