Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Interpreting the Constitution of Singapore

A student asked whether the Singapore courts, in interpreting the Constitution, apply a method of “originalism” rather than a “more creative” method. 

I propose to respond in a manner that shies away from using terms like “originalism”, “textualism”, etc., given that these words can have various shades of meaning. Nor would I seek to draw direct comparisons with Justice Antonin Scalia’s method of interpretation, not only because I am not 100% familiar with his method, but also because he (like many others) has been said not to apply one method consistently anyway. 

The starting point is that any interpretation of a text must have at least some link with the text. After all, it is an interpretation of the text. From there, several issues arise.

First, the distinction between interpretation and addition. In general, while a word or phrase may be capable of a range of meanings, some of which may be described as “strained”, the Singapore courts will not, in the name of “interpretation”, ascribe to the text a meaning which it cannot possibly bear; that would amount in substance to addition and/or rewriting, not interpretation.

Second, the distinction between giving effect to what the law-maker meant and what the law-maker wrote. This is easy: the Singapore courts’ task is to give effect to the intent of the law-maker as expressed in the text, not to give effect to the what the law-maker intended in his mind (/heart). After all, the latter would require a power of mind-reading. Moreover, the latter could yield an ‘interpretation’ which has no link at all with the text, which runs contrary to the principle that the court is interpreting the text.

Third, the question of whether the courts are to consider the meaning that words had at the time the Constitution was written, or the meaning that those words have now. I suspect, Marcus, that this is the crux of what you were asking about. To answer this question, we would need an example of a case before the Singapore court involving a word whose meaning had changed over time; as far as I know, there is no such case. 

Fourth, the distinction between the meaning of a word and its application. It is possible that the meaning of, say, “speech” or “expression” has never changed over time, yet different types of speech/expression have arisen. As the High Court of Australia put it in Re Wakim; Ex part McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 at [44]:

“many words and phrases of the Constitution are expressed at such a level of generality that the most sensible conclusion to be drawn from their use in a Constitution is that the makers of the Constitution intended that they should apply to whatever facts and circumstances succeeding generations thought they covered.”

Take, for example, the right to freedom of religion in Article 15 of the Constitution. I suspect that the Singapore courts might hold that the definition of the word “religion” has not changed over time, (e.g. it refers, and has always referred, to a belief system about the supernatural, etc.), but that that word would cover anything that falls within that definition even if it came into existence after the Constitution came into force (Pastafarianism?)

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to section 9A(1) of the Interpretation Act, which provides:

“In the interpretation of a provision of a written law, an interpretation that would promote the purpose or object underlying the written law (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the written law or not) shall be preferred to an interpretation that would not promote that purpose or object.”

So, if (and only if) the text is capable of bearing more than one meaning, the court will choose the one that would best promote the object of the provision in question. For more details, see Tan Cheng Bock v AG [2017] SGCA 50 at para [54].

For further reading on originalism, consider:

  • Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation’ (2002) 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence 255
  • Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 677

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