Article 78(8)
All Bills require Presidential assent: see Article 58.
It’s strange that Article 78(8) is part of Article 78 at all, given that it doesn’t have anything to do with the PCMR. What Article 78(8) says is that a Money Bill can only be presented to the President for assent if the Speaker of Parliament issues a certificate saying that it is a Money Bill. This raises an interesting question, the answer to which the Constitution does not make clear: can the President refuse assent if the Bill is in fact a Money Bill but the Speaker has failed to issue the certificate?
How the PCMR works
The rest of Article 78 explains how the PCMR works:
- Articles 78(1)-(4) state how, after Parliament passes a Bill, it must send the Bill to the PCMR, which is then to send its report to Parliament.
- Article 78(5) states what happens if the PCMR does not render a report.
- Article 78(6) states that a Bill can only be presented to the President for assent after the PCMR has rendered a favourable report; failed to render a report within the required time frame; or rendered an adverse report which is then overruled by 2/3 of the total number of MPs (except NMPs).
Presidential assent — not a substitute for scrutiny by the PCMR
What about Article 78(7), which sets out three exceptions to the PCMR procedure? Before going into more detail about those exceptions, I would like to point out that it is not enough to say that it’s OK for the PCMR not to scrutinise these types of Bills because the President is sufficient as a layer of scrutiny. That assumes that the President has the legal power to withhold assent. (After all, despite the President’s “moral authority”, it is law that governs the President’s powers.) Is she?
The starting point is that the President is generally not free to withhold assent. We see this from:
- The fact that the President’s function in assenting to Bills is modelled after the Queen’s function. The Queen gives Royal Assent as a matter of course: she is not obliged to by law, but as a matter of constitutional convention she does.
- The fact that provisions like Article 22E, 22H, 144(2), and 148A exist. They state when the President may withhold assent to certain bills. If the President were generally free to withhold assent on any bill, then these provisions would be otiose.
Now, about the three exceptions:
Exceptions to the PCMR procedure
Money Bills
In the case of certain Money Bills, however, the President is entitled to withhold her assent in certain limited circumstances (subject to the caveats I mention right at the end of this post):
- The President may, “acting in his discretion, withhold his assent to any Supply Bill, Supplementary Supply Bill or Final Supply Bill for any financial year if… [they] are likely to lead to a drawing on the reserves which were not accumulated by the Government during its current term of office”: Article 148A.
- The President may also “withhold his assent to any Bill passed by Parliament providing, directly or indirectly, for the borrowing of money, the giving of any guarantee or the raising of any loan by the Government if, in the opinion of the President, the Bill is likely to draw on the reserves of the Government which were not accumulated by the Government during its current term of office”: Article 144(2).
So the President is not free to withhold assent to Money Bills generally. Why, then, are such Bills exempt from scrutiny by the PCMR? Parliament did not say why when amending the Constitution to create the Presidential Council (as the PCMR was once known), Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, vol 29, col 63 (12 June 1969). But I believe the answer becomes evident when we consider what Money Bills normally do. See the definition in Article 68: if I may paraphrase it, a Money Bill authorises the state to raise funds or spend money. Merely raising funds or authorising the spending of money, without more, cannot possibly contain any differentiating measure. If anything, it is the specific things done with the money that is open to question.
This is not to say that the exception for Money Bills is beyond criticism. Imagine a Bill that provides that people of race X shall pay income tax at a higher rate than that of other races. Wouldn’t this be a Money Bill, since it would deal with the “imposition… of taxation”? Why should such a Bill be beyond the remit of the PCMR? (That’s not to say that the Bill will go unchecked, since a court would most certainly rule that it is void for contravening Article 12.)
Bills relating to “the defence or the security of Singapore” or “public safety, peace or good order in Singapore”
Why are these exempt from scrutiny by the PCMR? Please see the explanation by the Minister for Law at Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report, vol 30, col 195-197 (2 September 1970):
“Recently the Presidential Council considered the Enlistment Bill (Bill No. 17/70). I understand that among other arguments against some of the provisions, there was one that Ministerial discretion was so wide as to be possible of discrimination. In this case, a majority of the Council upheld an interpretation of the legislation which did not cause the Bill to be referred back to the House.
But it brought home to the Government the realisation that it could have been extremely difficult to explain, either to the Presidential Council, or in this House, sensitive issues as to why exemption or deferment of call-up for any person or group of persons would not be in the national interests. On matters of defence or security, there are times when a Minister cannot give his reasons. For example, a person aged 18, otherwise fit and eligible, might have to be left out of the armed forces because he is known to have pro-Communist or other extremist tendencies, or that he comes from such a family.”
For the Presidential Council’s report on the Enlistment Bill, see https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/government_records/docs/c59e0463-b8fe-11e7-81c8-0050568939ad/Pres.Co.14of1970.pdf
By the way, if you type presidential council enlistment bill into the search box on the website of the National Archives, you will see that the Prime Minister does not necessarily issue the certificate exempting bills about National Service from the PCMR’s scrutiny as a matter of course.
Urgent Bills
These are not exempt from scrutiny by the PCMR. The PCMR still has to examine them and issue a report — just that the report is issued after the President gives her assent: see Article 79. The report is then to be presented to Parliament.
The President’s powers, and when they can be overruled
For completeness, three more points about the President’s powers:
- Except in situations where the Constitution states otherwise, the President is bound to act, not in her own discretion, but rather in accordance with Cabinet’s/a Minister’s advice: see Article 21(1). (But that doesn’t come into play here, because Cabinet/a Minister has no role to play in the legislative process.)
- In general, the President must consult the Council of Presidential Advisers before exercising her discretion: Articles 37IA-37IB.
- On the powers of Parliament to overrule the President’s veto, see Article 37IF.
For a summary of these matters, see https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/speech-dpm-teo-chee-hean-2nd-reading-constitutional-republic-singapore-amendment-bill (click on “03 – CPA.pdf”).
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