- Speaking for myself, my understanding of the problem of defining the ‘rule of law’ is as follows: We would start with a core meaning in mind, namely, the idea that all relations, whether between private persons inter se, between state authorities inter se, or between private persons and state authorities, are governed by law and not by something else. The question is then: what is required to give effect to this core meaning? For example, it would be necessary for law to be clear and accessible, for nobody could conform to the law if it were not possible to know what the law is in the first place.
- When asking what the rule of law requires, I think it may be useful to distinguish between what it requires of laws and what it requires of society. Nicholas Barber thinks that the rule of law requires that people have a certain educational legal and access to socio-economic resources. We might call this a ‘thick’ definition of the rule of law, but we should not lose sight of the fact that it is a different kind of definition from saying that (for example) the rule of law requires the people be able to vote. The latter can be said to be a ‘substantive’ definition of the rule of law, in that it demands that laws have a certain substance. Barber’s point is that a definition of the rule of law, even if not ‘substantive’ in this sense, can still demand more than merely that laws take a certain form.
- Why do we care whether a ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ definition of the rule of law ought to apply? I think it would be useful to begin by asking why we seek a definition of the rule of law at all. If we seek to use it as a metric to judge legal systems relative to each other in order to identify some legal systems for praise and others for criticism, then we should seek a definition of the rule of law that serves that purpose well, namely, one that:
- is relatively uncontroversial in terms of what it enshrines as ideals, so that its proponents cannot be accused of attempting to smuggle in some non-universally-accepted ideology;
- measures variables which, at the least, can be said to be comparable across systems (for example, ‘clarity’ should be one of the variables only if it is possible to say with certainty, for any two legal systems, which has better ‘clarity’).
- I do not agree that the distinction between thick and thin conceptions of the rule of law overlaps with the distinction between legal positivism and Radbruchian natural-law theory (according to which — to simplify somewhat — an ‘unjust’/’evil’ law is not a law). The latter distinction is a distinction between what criteria there are to tell whether something is law or not. The former distinction is a way of judging a legal system and/or a legal norm in that system. Moreover, the demands made of the law by a ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law are not necessarily coterminous with the moral criteria which a ‘natural law theorist’ would say that something must meet for it to count as law.
- Consider the following example of a ‘rule’: “Love all humans.” A natural-law theorist may say that that meets the requisite moral standard so it counts as ‘law’. Yet, that ‘rule’ would probably not comply with any conceivable definition of the ‘rule of law’, because it is so hopelessly unclear as to be totally incapable of guiding human conduct.
- In other words, none of the following statements is incoherent:
- X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria, but it is not compliant with a ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law.
- X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria, but it is not compliant with a ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law.
- X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria and is morally just, but it is not compliant with a ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law.
- X is a valid law because it meets the requisite formal criteria and is morally just, but it is not compliant with a ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law.
- I disagree that ‘thin’ conceptions of the rule of law focus on quantitative indicators while ‘thick’ conceptions of the rule of law focus on qualitative ones. The same challenges arise with quantifying, say, ‘stability’ and ‘promoting the freedom of expression’. Of course, quantification is not impossible. We can say that country A has a more stable legal system than country B, even if we can’t assign a number to each. (In other words, we can rank countries’ compliance with some indicator on an ordinal scale, even if we can’t do so on an interval or ratio scale.)
- In general, how can we quantify something like the clarity of laws? We could:
- Ask people to rate the clarity of laws on a scale of, say, 1 to 10. This can be a useful way to measure changes over time provided it is the same people being polled every time. By way of comparison, consider how, if you seek medical treatment for pain, you may be asked to rate the pain on a scale of 1 to 10: because (the theory goes) you will have the same scale in mind each time, your rating will be an accurate way to measure whether the pain has worsened or improved over time.
- Use something objectively measurable as a proxy — for example, we could use the average length of words or sentences in laws as a proxy for clarity.
- I’d say that the following requirements are in increasing order of ‘thickness’:
- Laws must be passed in accordance with a certain procedure
- Laws must be passed in accordance with a certain procedure that is democratic in nature
- Laws must have content that advances the freedom of expression
Someone asked whether the rule of law can act as a “yardstick to judge societies and legal systems” given that every legal system (or, more precisely, the officials within each legal system) might have a different idea of what the rule of law should mean. Will this create unfairness? What if there are disagreements between officials in the same legal system? My response:
When anything is being evaluated, the evaluator must apply consistent standards. If the evaluator applies the same standards consistently, there can be no unfairness in the sense of inconsistent treatment. The evaluator must also apply standards that are fit for purpose – for example, it must be possible to say with certainty which of two things measures up better according to those standards; the standards must be a useful , etc. those make use of the evaluator’s findings agree that the evaluator has applied standards that are fit to form a basis for evaluation. That is a different question from the question of whether everyone who is being evaluated agrees with the standards which they should aspire to.
Indeed, it is precisely because everyone has different goals and priorities that it is worth attempting to create a single yardstick by which to judge them all. People may protest at being judged by that yardstick because they say it is not a suitable one for the task of judging them. The yardstick may or may not, in fact, be a suitable one for the task of judging them. But there is no unfairness in the sense of inconsistency, provided that the judger is applying the same yardstick to all of them.
Now, suppose officials within a legal system — say, different judges — have different views on the rule of law. You asked whether the difference in views as to what the rule of law requires of the law may lead to different outcomes in terms of what the case law requires. The answer is yes. If judge A and judge B start with the idea that the rule of law is important, but judge A thinks that the rule of law requires X while judge B thinks that the rule of law requires Y, then it may be that judge A may develop the common law down path 1 while judge B takes the common law down path 2. (This is not necessarily the outcome. It may be, for example, that both X and Y would imply that the law should follow path 1.)
That would simply be an instance of the general phenomenon that decision-makers faced with the same question can make different decisions because they have different background ideas in mind. That is not necessarily a bad thing: people, in general, value diversity in thought, and seek to embrace it by having decision-making organs consist of multiple people. One might think that this phenomenon may be minimised through rigid legislation that leaves little room for the courts to develop the common law in tandem. But, putting aside the problems that rigidity brings, that would simply mean that the aforementioned phenomenon will take place to an even greater extent in the Legislature.
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