Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

A little primer on international law and Singapore

International law is a system of law whose subjects are states. Therefore, it governs the rights and obligations which states have vis-a-vis one another.  (Here, “international” doesn’t mean all over the world; it means between (nation-)states. Hence, we would call the Singapore-Malaysia water agreements “international treaties” even though they are only between two countries.) 



The two most common sources of international law are customary international law and treaties. A state is only bound by an international treaty which it has signed and ratified. Rules of customary international law are formed when nearly all states act in a certain way because they believe that they are bound by law to do so. Examples include the rule that visiting heads of state are immune from criminal prosecution. (Some rules of international law are both rules of customary international law and rules found in treaties. For example, the prohibition against torture is both a rule of customary international law and a rule set out in the Convention Against Torture.


Even as each state is a subject of international law, each state also has its system(s) of what is termed domestic law or municipal law. Hence, we would speak of the domestic law of Singapore, the domestic law of the UK, etc.

A rule of international law does not necessarily automatically become a rule which the state must follow in domestic law. Therefore, it is in principle possible for a state authority to do something that it is entitled to do under that state’s domestic law, even if doing it would put the state in breach of its international-law obligations.

A (somewhat simplified) example: Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) are prohibited from instituting a blanket policy banning all prisoners from voting. The UK is a party to the ECHR. However, under UK domestic law, for a long time, there was a blanket ban prohibiting (most) prisoners from voting. This put the UK in breach of the ECHR. However, that did not mean that prisoners had the right to vote. The UK was in breach of its international-law obligations, but the prisoners’ rights and obligations were governed by UK domestic law, under which the UK, through its legislature, was entitled to ban prisoners from voting. After all, there is no rule of UK domestic law saying that rules under the ECHR automatically become rules of UK domestic law. (As to whether the UK is still in breach of its ECHR obligations, see https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2019/01/30/elizabeth-adams-prisoners-voting-rights-case-closed/) 

It is true that international law often exists for the sake of individuals – consider, for example, human rights treaties. But, nonetheless, international law is primarily about how states relate to each other. For example, suppose Singapore were to breach its obligation under CEDAW to “repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women” (CEDAW, Article 2(g)). It is not an individual woman who would have the right to take action in response. Rather, the consequences take place at the level of states – for example, public criticism by the CEDAW Committee (Article 17). In other words, Singapore has obligations to take certain steps to eliminate discrimination against women, but those obligations are owed to other states – not to individuals.

Sometimes individuals do have access to remedies under international law, but this is generally only when a treaty says so. For example, if someone claims to be the victim of a violation of CEDAW by the Philippines, they can send a complaint (known as a “communication”) to the CEDAW Committee; the Committee can then form “views” and “recommendations”, which it can then send to the Philippines, which in turn must submit a “response”. All this – which is essentially a way for individuals to complain of a violation of CEDAW – is only possible because the Philippines has agreed to it, by signing and ratifying the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.


Some of you have asked about how international law is enforced. Sometimes, states agree to enforcement mechanisms – such as the Philippines’ signing the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, or Singapore and Malaysia agreeing to refer the Pedra Branca dispute to the International Court of Justice. But these are up to state consent; even the International Court of Justice only has the jurisdiction to hear cases which parties have agreed to refer to it (see Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ).

Rather, a key means of enforcement is diplomacy. A state which violates international law can expect to be criticised on the world stage – for example, at UN General Assembly meetings. It can also expect that other states will approach it with greater suspicion – if you were a state, would you really want to enter into a free trade agreement with another state that has a track record of ignoring its international agreements?

In some cases, a violation of international law by one state can cause other states to impose sanctions unilaterally, as when Singapore imposed sanctions on Russia following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as Singapore took the view that “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine contravenes the UN Charter and is a clear and gross violation of international law”. There could also be sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, which UN member states are obliged by the UN Charter to obey.

There is a body of literature about why states enter into treaties. It could be a matter of maintaining a certain image on the global stage, and/or sending a certain signal domestically. As for Singapore’s approach to international treaties, see my draft paper on international law (click “Content” above), paragraphs 27-45.


Singapore’s law on treaties is as follows:

When Singapore enters into an international treaty, that does not mean that it becomes part of the domestic law of Singapore. This is known as the “dualist” approach to international law, which is adopted by most (if not all) common-law systems, including the UK.

  • Take, for example, the Genocide Convention, Article III of which says that genocide “shall be punishable”. But that is not the reason why genocide is a crime in Singapore. Rather, the reason why genocide is a crime in Singapore is sections 130D-130E of the Penal Code.
  • Or consider UN Security Council resolution 2397 (2017), which is binding on Singapore because Singapore has agreed to the United Nations Charter (Article 25 states: “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”) That Security Council resolution requires that UN member states shall, among other things, “prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK… all crude oil”. That does not itself make it unlawful for someone in Singapore to export crude oil to the DPRK. What makes it unlawful is the United Nations (Sanctions – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) Regulations 2010, made under s 2 of the United Nations Act.

The courts will strive to interpret domestic legislation and the Constitution in a manner that better gives effect to Singapore’s international law obligations. Take, for example, the customary international law rule that torture is prohibited. (The word “torture” has a certain technical meaning in international law: for examples, see Yong Vui Kong v PP [2015] 2 SLR 1129 (CA) [84].) Hence, prison authorities have the discretion as to what imprisoned people eat (see generally the Prisons Act 1933), but the courts would probably say that it would be unlawful for them to exercise this discretion in a way that amounts to torture – for example, by giving prisoners “rotten food and insufficient drinking water” (Miroslav Kvocka, cited in Yong Vui Kong (2015) [84(d)]).

But there are limits to interpretation; the courts’ remit is only to interpret legislation, not to rewrite it. If, for example, legislation explicitly stated that imprisoned people get only 1 litre of drinking water a day and are to be given only rotten food, then doing so would be lawful (and in fact mandatory).1 Singapore would be in breach of its international law obligation not to torture people – but that would be a matter for international fora, not the Singapore courts.

If not embodied in a statute, rules of customary international law and treaty law can, at most, be accepted by the courts as rules of common law. Other countries’ courts have said something similar. For example, the High Court of Australia has held that though “[t]he common law does not necessarily conform with international law, … international law is a legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, especially when international law declares the existence of universal human rights”: [Optional] Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 at [42].

But common law can be overridden by legislation. Hence, for example, even if the death penalty violated customary international law, that would at most mean that the common law of Singapore prohibits international law; but that common law rule, in turn, would be overridden by legislation explicitly providing for the death penalty, such as the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973. (See Yong Vui Kong (2010).)

Rules of international law do not themselves have the status of constitutional rules. Therefore, the courts will not strike down a domestic statute merely because it (allegedly) contravenes international law.


  1. If subsidiary legislation said that, it would be at least arguable that such subsidiary legislation violated the Prisons Act 1933, in that any intention by Parliament to give the Minister the power to make such subsidiary legislation would have to be shown by clear and explicit words. As for the law in Singapore now, see r 110 of the Prisons Regulations. ↩︎

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