- The separation of powers is not just about ensuring that powers are not concentrated in the same hands. If that were all there is to it, then why not simply distribute power randomly among people? (See Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers’, ch 11 in David Dyzenhaus and Malcolm Thorburn (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (OUP, 2016) <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/ak_separation_of_powers_philfounds_book.pdf> at 229-230. Kavanagh argues: “Not only do we want to ensure that the right decisions are made by the institutions which govern us, we also care about whether the right decisions have been made by the right body.” What matters, she says, is that functions are allocated to the institutions that are best equipped to perform them.
- One could draw a distinction between a separation of powers and a separation of power-holders. The mere fact that Ministers are also MPs doesn’t mean that there is no separation between the legislative and executive powers. The Ministers do know which of the two hats they are wearing at any given point. There is, of course, a conversation to be had about whether the two should be doing the same job — but that is a conversation about the separation of power-holders, not the separation of powers. If you’re interested in more detail, see Jeremy Waldron, ‘Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?’ (2013) 54 British Columbia Law Review 433.
- In Westminster systems, one tends (whether rightly or wrongly) to see the separation between the legislature and the executive as being less important than the separation between the judiciary on the one hand and everyone else on the other.
- One may question how useful a label like “the executive” is. Not every institution within “the executive” performs the same function. There are executive bodies which check each other; there are situations where a person dissatisfied by the decision of one executive officer may appeal to another; and there are executive bodies which perform completely different functions from one another. It may well be that the main reason for labelling them all “the executive” is simply the broad idea — which relates to the previous point I made — that executive action generally is subject to control by the courts through judicial review. (More on that in the seminar next week.)
- The Legislature is not the only law-maker. Courts make law too — if you have forgotten this, think back to what you learned during the Business Law course about the Offer and Acceptance Act and the Duties of Care Act (hint: they don’t exist). But that doesn’t mean that courts legislate. It is not that “to legislate” simply means “to make law”. Rather, it is clearer to say that legislating is one kind of law-making, which is different from the kind of law-making that courts do. For an analysis of the differences between the types of laws and law-making processes, see John Gardner, ‘Some Types of Law’, ch 3 in Law as a Leap of Faith (OUP, 2012) <https://johngardnerathome.info/pdfs/typesoflaw.pdf>; and Paul Yowell, ‘Legislation, Common Law and the Virtue of Clarity’, ch 6 in Richard Ekins (ed), Modern Challenges to the Rule of Law (LexisNexis, 2011) especially at 123-128.
- For further reading on the Auditor-General of Singapore, see Preston Wong, ‘Watchman, Watchdog, Warden and What More? The Constitutional Role and Autochthony of the Singapore Auditor-General’ (2016) 28 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 552 <https://journalsonline.academypublishing.org.sg/Journals/Singapore-Academy-of-Law-Journal/e-Archive/ctl/eFirstSALPDFJournalView/mid/495/ArticleId/1161/Citation/JournalsOnlinePDF>.
- For an example of an argument that we should consider that there is a fourth branches of the state and not just three, see Mark Tushnet, The New Fourth Branch: Institutions for Protecting Constitutional Democracy (CUP, 2021), or simply listen to the 15th Kwa Geok Choo Distinguished Visitors Lecture that he delivered at NUS in 2018: https://nus.edu.sg/thought-leadership/the-future-of-the-separation-of-powers. Note that Tushnet’s conception of the ‘fourth branch’ of the state is by no means the only one.
- Consider how the separation of powers advances the rule of law. If a law-maker were also in charge of applying the law, there may be the danger that what he applies may be the law that he thought he was making rather than the law that he actually made. Worse, there may be the danger that he deliberately applies something other than the law he made. All this would run contrary to the rule-of-law values of certainty and predictability. Indeed, it would run contrary to the enterprise of law itself. Quaere: why, then, do we tolerate the existence of case law as a source of law?
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