Question: Are procedural impropriety; frustration of procedural legitimate expectations; and frustration of substantive legitimate expectations conceptually separate grounds of review?
I think it is clear that frustration of substantive legitimate expectations is certainly a separate ground of judicial review from the other two. First, the Court of Appeal in SGB Starkstrom has proceeded on the basis that the two types of legitimate expectation are to be treated separately. Second, as I have stated in a previous message, so did the High Court in Chiu Teng, albeit less clearly. Third, conceptually speaking, it is evident from the cases involving alleged frustration of alleged substantive legitimate expectations that such expectations or such frustration can take place in a manner that has nothing to do with the procedure adopted by the decision-maker.
As for the question of whether procedural impropriety and frustration of procedural legitimate expectations are separate: You are certainly right to note that they overlap in the sense that both are about decision-making procedures; as you noted, this is evident from the approach taken in various textbooks, as well as some jurisdictions’ case law (see, e.g., Chiu Teng at [87] and [91]). You are also right to consider that procedural legitimate expectations can be said to be a subset of rules of procedural fairness, in the sense that the former help to determine whether a hearing should be held, while the latter tell us both whether a hearing should be held as well as about how that hearing is to take place.
Nonetheless, I think a conceptual difference is as follows. Procedural legitimate expectations are grounded in some kind of expectation that the applicant had. The cases on procedural impropriety, on the other hand, tend to say that a hearing should have been held/it should have been held in a certain manner/bias should have been avoided/better reasons for the final decision have been given, for reasons of principle that one would think must apply regardless of what the applicant actually expected or did not expect.
It is true that sometimes there is an overlap, particularly when the reasons of principle why a hearing need not be held are the same as the reasons why it would have not have been legitimate for the applicant to expect that one be held. Nonetheless, I think the conceptual difference referred to above still stands.
For these reasons, I think it would be clearest to treat the three as separate grounds of review, although noting the interaction between procedural legitimate expectations and rules of procedural fairness as described above.
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