Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The effect of Article 22Q of the Constitution

I respectfully disagree that the President was previously disentitled from being involved in foreign or international organisations in his private capacity, until the Constitution was amended to retroactively allow him to do so. There was never any rule saying that he couldn’t. While Article 21 of the Constitution says that the President “shall, in the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or any other written law, act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet”, that only applies to what he does “under this Constitution or any other written law” – not in his free time.

One might argue that there is a constitutional convention (not a legal rule, but still a norm) that the President cannot publicly speak in a private capacity. Some time ago, someone contacted me and presented this view, citing the various annexes to this speech. I respectfully disagreed for the following reasons:

‘Let us grant that the convention in the UK was inherited by Singapore, and that it was not removed by the former Article 18(2) (which serves roughly a similar function to today’s Article 19A) and Article 21. (One might argue expressio unius, etc.) Even then, I can see an argument that the convention has not survived the transition to an elected Presidency. Baldwin’s letter rightly states that the basis of the convention in the UK was that “the King himself can do no wrong”; that is why “the King’s Ministers must take responsibility for every public act of the King”. If we read “can do no wrong” as meaning “cannot be held accountable”, then this basis has fallen away in 1991, as the President is now accountable in the sense of being liable to be removed by the electorate.

Putting that aside, there is the question of the precise content of the convention. I would suggest that it is not necessarily the case that merely taking up an office an organisation, without more, would violate the convention (assuming it exists in Singapore). But in any event, what the convention would require is – again, to quote Baldwin’s letter – that the President not “make a public statement on any matter of public interest except on the advice of his Ministers”. Here, one could take the phrase “matter of public interest” to refer to the sort of domestic matter with which the executive government would be concerned (as opposed to the sort of thing covered in the Queen’s Christmas speech, which I understand is not written in accordance with advice from the UK Government). An example of a “matter of public interest” would be King Edward VIII’s proposed marriage, which, I note, would have been an unlawful act. By contrast, if the President were to (say) join the International Society for Putting Things on Top of Other Things, and make a speech about the importance of making use of space in all three dimensions efficiently, one could argue that there is no violation of the convention, any more than there would be if the President were to post a photograph of his breakfast on Instagram.

Of course, as I mean to show by using such a ludicrous hypothetical, it is a matter of degree; and membership or participation in an international or foreign organisation could in principle touch on a matter of domestic public concern, but it need not be. One might ask: would it really violate the convention for the President to take up an office in an international society for the study of environmental issues and make broad statements such as ‘we must all work together to save the planet’? It would not be as though the President would be purporting to act in breach of the law of Singapore, or to clash openly with the Government’s position.

One might go further yet and suggest that the convention does not now exist in Singapore, on the basis of at least two data points. First, there is the following statement by Mr Shanmugam: “Our Constitution, including provisions such as Articles 21(1) and 24(2), was based on English principles and conventions. It follows that these same principles apply to our Presidency, which in turn is created and empowered by the Constitution.” If this means that the convention is embodied in those provisions, then Art 21(1) must have cut down the scope of the convention, to the effect that the President only has to act on advice “in the exercise of his functions under this Constitution or any other written law”. Second, there is President Halimah Yacob’s post on Facebook that shared her view on caning for offenders aged above 50 – which was different from the Government’s view which Minister Shanmugam stated in Parliament. As far as I can recall, there was no official response to the President’s post on constitutional grounds.

Finally, I note that if the convention exists and bars the President from membership in any foreign organisation without Government approval, then one might reach the conclusion that President Tharman has been acting unlawfully from his inauguration until the present. Of course, that is not necessarily the case – the Government may well have advised him that it has approved of his memberships – but it is a conclusion that I would be extremely reluctant to reach.

All that having been said, I would welcome the Bill (save for the clause purporting to backdate it). For one thing, s 76 of FICA does not apply to the President (except if the competent authority designates the President as a “Part 4 politically significant person” – but that would apply only to the individual President of the day, not to the office generally); it would be good for the Government to have at least notice of, and control over, what organisations the President can join – simply for the sake of consistency. More generally, the Bill could be seen as relating to an unwritten constitutional function of the President, namely, representing Singapore before the world. I did note the comment on my LinkedIn post about the precise meaning of “in the national interest”, and I also note that the precise meaning of “office” might be open to question; I suppose we will have to await further developments on these issues if any.’

If I am right, then it is not the case that the President was unable to play a role – even in a “private” capacity – in an international organisation until the Constitution was amended. This being so, I do not think that the question of retroactivity even arises.

What, then, did the constitutional amendment really do? To my mind, it limited the President’s ability to hold office in a foreign/international organisation, even in a “private” capacity, in that now the Cabinet can tell him to relinquish that office or  not to “sa[y] or d[o] anything in the performance of the functions of [such an] office”.

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