Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

The freedom of expression as a guard against the risk of abuse of state power

In response to a student’s question, I set out the following remarks:

I agree that preventing the abuse of state power can be a justification for the freedom of speech.

The more challenging question is where we are to go from there. First, we could say that, if the rationale for the freedom of speech is the prevention of the abuse of state power, then protecting the freedom of speech is only justified to the extent to that the speech in question is capable of countering the abuse of state power. Second, we could say that the speaker should not have to prove that the speech is capable of countering the abuse of state power, because, so long as the state is called upon to answer that question, the state may abuse its power in answering that very question.

This reminds me of the debate in New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964) <https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/39> over whether false speech engages the freedom of expression. The US Supreme Court did not say that there should be a constitutional right to engage in false speech. Yet, it said that the freedom of expression is violated by rules targeted at false speech. Hence, according to the US Supreme Court, the rule that the defendant (not the plaintiff) bears the burden of proving the truth of a statement that is defamatory of a political figure is unconstitutional, because (at 279; internal citations omitted):

“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions — and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount — leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’ Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred… Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone.’… The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.”

Hence (at 279-280):

“The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”

So US defamation law tolerates false speech, not because false speech is worthy of protection, but rather because rules that preventing false speech may end up discouraging non-false speech.

While the Singapore courts have not explicitly said so, it may be that a similar idea drove the Court of Appeal in TOC/SDP to say that, while speech that has been “judicially determined to be indeed a false statement of fact” (at [62]; emphasis in original) does not fall within the ambit of Art 14(1)(a), speech that might be false does.

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *