Whenever we judge anything, we should judge it not only according to what it is, but also according to how well it achieves what it purports to achieve. For example, it would be unfair to say that the ‘Shared Values’ fail to provide prescriptive guidance to state authorities if they were not meant to do so in the first place.
If I may share a note I wrote to a previous class about the ‘Shared Values’ and the purported ‘jun zi’ model:
I agree with [a student who argued that the Shared Values White Paper is of limited prescriptive utility, and is more descriptive]. The article which [another student] cited [namely, Thio Li-ann, ‘Constitutional “Soft” Law and the Management of Religious Liberty and Order’ [2004] SJLS 414] cites another article by Benedict Sheehy (2004) HKLJ 67, which argues that the decisions in Colin Chan and Ong Ah Chuan make sense in the light of the Shared Values (notwithstanding that Ong Ah Chuan predates the Shared Values White Paper) — for example, he refers to the first of the Shared Values, and then explains Colin Chan as a case in which “[t]he individual’s interest in eternal life does not override the state’s or community’s interest in self-defence” (76). However, Sheehy does not (and cannot) say that the courts relied on the Shared Values.
Sheehy suggests that the judiciary was “not always so strongly pro-communitarian” (79) until the Constitution and ISA were amended to reverse Chng Suan Tze and appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in 1993 (80). I have a number of points in response.
First, correlation is not causation. It is not clear how Sheehy moves from his statement that the Shared Values are a statement of “values and principles by which the Government of Singapore intends to run the country” (81, emphasis added) to the conclusion that the courts are to be understood as having deliberately decided on the basis of the Shared Values.
Second, it would appear that Sheehy’s thesis has proven no longer to be accurate: his characterisation of constitutional interpretation in Singapore as “pro-communitarian” (79) and failing to “adher[e]” to the “Westminster modelled Constitution… in the strict ‘Rule of Law’ sense” (81), even if once accurate, must now be reconsidered in the light of more recent case law. (Sheehy’s paper was published in 2004.)
Third, I wonder whether Sheehy and others are making more of the White Paper than the White Paper itself did. To elaborate:
- The White Paper’s professed aim is to present “a set of Shared Values which Singaporeans… can subscribe to and live by” (at [1]) which are nonetheless “ideals” (at [54]) which are, further, not “prescribe[d] and fr[ozen] for all time” (at [53]), and which are meant as an “influence” on “future generations of Singaporeans” rather than an attempt to “completely determine” their “values” (at [57]).
- The passage in the White Paper about junzi is a passing remark that was merely meant to illustrate the point that “[m]any Confucian ideals are relevant to Singapore” ([41]), and does not necessarily relate directly to any particular proposed “shared value”.
- The White Paper purported to be a discussion of values that ought to shape society, and not a discussion of how the government should act. Even the discussion of “[p]olitical values” at [47]-[51] purported to discuss the importance of “[p]olitical values” and “political culture” to “all Singaporeans” (as opposed to, say, the government only), and, more importantly, ultimately concluded that “[t]he Shared Values focus on the relationship between the individual and society… Extending them to cover the relationship between the voter and the government will bring in an altogether different set of issues, and risk diffusing their primary focus… It is better for the political culture not to be included in the Shared Values, but to be inculcated separately among the population.” ([50]-[51]; emphasis added)
That is not to say that the Shared Values White Paper is useless. I agree with [the first student’s] account of possible uses to which the White Paper could be put. I would, however, add the caveat that, for the Shared Values (or anything) to be more than merely someone’s opinion, it would need to have a degree of legitimacy among people — otherwise, the courts would have no business imposing them on people. Thio makes this point in ‘Soft constitutional law in nonliberal Asian constitutional democracies’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 766, albeit in the context of another document (the Declaration on Religious Harmony). At 769, she observes that “the function and effect of [soft constitutional law], created and interpreted primarily by nonjudicial actors, raise[s] questions of legitimacy…”; for example (at 796): “The legitimacy of a document is more likely to be bolstered where it is a product of consultation, not diktat…”
Finally, if you do not know what a White Paper is, please go and find out, and please do not think that a White Paper necessarily contains unshakeable truth.
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