Is the PCMR similar to a second chamber / a council of state?
Kind of. It may play a similar function. But there are important differences between the PCMR and second chambers/councils of state in many other legal systems: (a) The PCMR debates in secret, not publicly. (b) There are only limited grounds on which the PCMR can object to a Bill/subsidiary legislation: see Article 77.
Note that a second chamber doesn’t necessarily have to have the power to override the first chamber, nor does it necessarily have to be elected: consider the UK’s House of Lords.
How can Parliament ‘fire’ the Cabinet?
Parliament could pass a vote of no confidence in the Government, which would signal to the President that the PM no longer commands the confidence of the majority of Parliament. In that case, under Art 26(1)(b) of the Constitution, the President must either declare the office of PM vacant or (if the PM requests) dissolve Parliament.
Parliament can also pass a resolution to dissolve itself: Art 65(3A)(d).
If Parliament is dissolved, then elections must be called. If Parliament isn’t dissolved, but the PM’s office is declared vacant, then the President must appoint a new PM in accordance with Art 25(1).
How many MPs does it take to pass a Bill?
You may say “simple majority for normal Bills; 2/3 majority for Bills that would amend the Constitution”. That is not precise enough.
Bills seeking to amend the Constitution / Bills passed despite an adverse report by the PCMR
“A Bill seeking to amend any provision in [the] Constitution shall not be passed by Parliament unless it has been supported on Second and Third Readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament(excluding nominated Members)“: Article 5(2) (emphasis added).
The President can only assent to a Bill on which the PCMR has issued an adverse report if “a motion for the presentation of the Bill to the President for assent has been passed by not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament (excluding nominated Members)“: Article 78(6) (emphasis added).
At present, there are 108 MPs, 9 of whom are NMPs. So the minimum number of MPs needed to pass a Bill seeking to amend the Constitution = ceil(2/3 * (108 – 9)) = 66.
Other Bills (sometimes known as ‘ordinary Bills’)
As for a question whether an ordinary Bill should be passed, see Article 57(1): “Subject to this Constitution, all questions proposed for decision in Parliament shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting; and if, upon any question before Parliament, the votes of the Members are equally divided, the motion shall be lost.”
Then see Article 56: “If objection is taken by any Member present that there are present (besides the Speaker or other Member presiding) fewer than one-quarter of the total number of Members and, after such interval as may be prescribed in the Standing Orders of Parliament, the Speaker or other Member presiding ascertains that the number of Members present is still less than one-quarter of the total number of Members, he shall thereupon adjourn Parliament.”
So, if we assume that some MP will object if Parliament has fewer than 1/4 of the total number of members present, then the minimum number of MPs needed to pass a Bill other than a Bill seeking to amend the Constitution = ceil(1/2 * 1/4 * 108) = 14.
But if the number of MPs who turn up is fewer than 1/4 of the total number of MPs and yet no MP objects — in the extreme case, if just one MP turns up and he doesn’t object — then it would appear to me that the minimum number of MPs needed would be 1. (Of course, this is a very unrealistic scenario. As long as there is one opposition MP, I suppose that in practice that MP would turn up to object.)
We must note two special cases.
First, NMPs cannot vote on Supply Bills, Supplementary Supply Bills, Final Supply Bills, and Money Bills: Article 39(2). So in the case of such Bills, for the purpose of Article 57(1), they don’t count as “present and voting”.
Second, as noted above, if the PCMR has issued an adverse report on any provision of the Bill, then the Bill can only be passed if “not less than two-thirds of the total number of Members of Parliament (excluding nominated Members)” vote in favour. That currently means at least 66 MPs.
Finally, you may be wondering: does an MP who chooses to abstain from a vote count as “present and voting”? I would think the answer is no; I would think that “voting” refers to having the right to vote, not necessarily exercising that right.
Whips, etc.
Because of the party whip system, a party that controls at least 2/3 of the non-NMP seats in Parliament can pass any Bill seeking to amend the Constitution, and a party that controls more than half of the non-NMP seats in Parliament can pass any other Bill. One may ask: does this mean that, once that party’s leadership has decided that it wants a Bill to be passed, it will be done? Couple that with the fact that Ministers tend to take the lead in setting the legislative agenda (the vast majority of Bills are Government Bills), and you may ask: can we say that, in reality, it is the Government that legislates?
Sometimes, we see Ministers using language loosely: ‘we will introduce laws’; ‘the Government will change the law’. This is, of course, terminologically inaccurate: the Legislature, no matter who dominates it, is the legislative body. But there is a more important problem with thinking that the Government legislates: even if the Government dominates the legislative agenda, debates and questions — including questions asked by members of the ruling party — are no less an important part of the legislative process.
Indeed, given section 9A of the Interpretation Act, such debates can come into play when it is time for a court to interpret the legislation. It is possible that some part of a Bill is unclear; an MP asks for a clarification; the Minister who introduced the Bill responds; and a court then draws on that response in interpreting the Bill.
In an extreme case, it is possible for an MP to defy his/her party’s Whip. That may be a career-ending move in practice, but it remains possible.
‘The PAP’
While nobody, including the PAP, is beyond criticism, it is useful to distinguish between criticisms of what the PAP does qua PAP and what the PAP can do qua ruling party. For instance, I wouldn’t say that ‘the PAP’ can use its party whip to get Parliament to pass any Bill that it likes. To the extent that it can (which is itself an imprecise thing to say: it is Parliament, not any party, that passes Bills), that’s not because it’s the PAP; it’s because it’s the party that occupies more than 50% of the non-NMP seats in Parliament.
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