Article 14 of the Constitution says that citizens of Singapore have certain constitutional rights. The effect of those constitutional rights is to restrict the state’s powers to restrict the ability of citizens to express themselves, assemble, and associate. Therefore, because non-citizens do not have those constitutional rights, the state is freer, not less free, to restrict non-citizens’ ability to express themselves, assemble, and associate.
I say “freer”, and not “totally free”, for the following reason. While non-citizens do not enjoy rights under Article 14 of the Constitution, it does not follow that non-citizens have no right at all to express themselves (etc.). They still enjoy a limited right to express themselves (etc.) in two senses.
First, non-citizens enjoy the residual liberty to speak, which is a specific instance of the general proposition that whatever is not expressly forbidden by law is permitted. Hence, non-citizens have a liberty to speak in the sense that they are free to speak save to the extent that the law prevents them from doing so. (There is, in a similar sense, a liberty to engage in cannibalism. While there is no constitutional right to cannibalism, we are free to engage in cannibalism because there is no law forbidding it. If such a law is passed, then our liberty to engage in cannibalism will be correspondingly restricted, and we have no ground to say that that law would be invalid; but, so long as such a law does not exist, eat away.)
Second, there are certain rights recognised at common law, with the effect that a statute, if capable of being interpreted in more than one way, will be interpreted in the way that better gives effect to those rights. The freedom of speech is one such right. A case in point is PP v Yue Mun Yew Gary [2013] 1 SLR 39, which involved section 267C of the Penal Code. Section 267C states that it is an offence to, among other things, make a communication “containing any incitement to violence or counselling disobedience to the law or to any lawful order of a public servant or likely to lead to any breach of the peace”. The High Court could have read this literally, which would make the offence a “strict liability” offence (i.e. one where the offender need not have any particular state of mind in order to be convicted). Or the High Court could have held that there is an implied mental element (“mens rea“), namely, that a person must have had an intention to incite violence (etc.) to be convicted under s 267C. The High Court chose the latter. Why? Because of the
“need to give sufficient weight to the value of free expression. A free and open discourse is indispensable to the proper functioning of any democracy, and provisions like s 267C may potentially have an adverse chilling effect on this vital civic conversation. That is not what s 267C was meant to achieve. Hence in my judgment s 267C cannot be a strict liability offence.” (at [38)
Neither of these is the same as the constitutional right enjoyed by citizens under Article 14. The difference is perhaps best summed up by the Court of Appeal’s approach to the Reynolds privilege in Review Publishing. The Court of Appeal said that, if anything would provide the Singapore courts to adopt the concept of Reynolds privilege from English law into Singapore law, it would have to be a constitutional right. Hence, if the defendant had been a Singapore citizen, then the Court of Appeal would, prompted by Article 14, have considered adopting Reynolds privilege into Singapore law. By contrast, because the defendant was not a Singapore citizen (and did not consist of Singapore citizens), it did not enjoy the constitutional rights in Article 14, and so the Court of Appeal did not consider adopting Reynolds privilege at all. So Article 14 is not “merely symbolic”; whether or not someone enjoys the rights in Article 14 can make a real difference to the outcome of a court case.
Leave a Reply