Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Of judicial activism and (allegedly) deficient political processes

Some time ago in class, I made a remark that the Indian courts tend to read rights provisions in a more expansive manner (that is, in favour of the person and against the state) than Singapore courts do. I would now like to expand on that. Before doing so, however, it may be useful to have a look at the rights provisions in the Indian Constitution, and observe that they are different from Singapore’s. India’s Constitution <https://legislative.gov.in/sites/default/files/COI.pdf> recognises more constitutional rights than Singapore’s, and the rights provisions are themselves worded differently. For example, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution provides that legislation can impose on the “freedom of speech and expression” only “reasonable” restrictions in the interests of various matters; by contrast, Article 14 of Singapore’s Constitution does not contain the word “reasonable”.

Now, consider Article 21 of India’s Constitution, which states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.” This is nearly identical to Singapore’s Article 9(1); the only difference is that the Indian provision says “according to procedure established by law”, not just “according to law”. In Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 3 SLR 489, the Court of Appeal had to consider the argument that the mandatory death penalty violates Article 9(1) of Singapore’s Constitution. As we have seen, according to the Singapore courts, “in accordance with law” means in accordance with laws that observe certain “fundamental rules of natural justice”. By contrast, in India, “in accordance with law” means in accordance with laws that are “fair, just and reasonable” (see Yong Vui Kong at [80] citing Mithu v State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC 473 at [34]). According to the Supreme Court of India in Mithu, the mandatory death penalty violates their Article 21.

Why the difference? The Singapore court in Yong Vui Kong at [83] said: “The decision in Mithu is entirely understandable, having regard to the economic, social and political conditions prevailing in India and the pro-active approach of the Indian Supreme Court in matters relating to the social and economic conditions of the people of India.” What precisely does this mean? How can the “economic, social and political conditions” in a country influence what the law means? 

It may be that the Singapore court was, somewhat euphemistically, referring to a phenomenon, actual or perceived, of inaction on the part of the Indian legislature and/or executive which have caused the court to take on a more active role than it otherwise would. There is at least one case in which the Supreme Court of India has reeferred to such a phenomenon. The case of Vishaka v State of Rajasthan AIR 1997 SC 3011 <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1031794> concerned a social worker who had allegedly been brutally raped. The Supreme Court said (emphasis added): 

“… The incident reveals the hazards to which a working woman may be exposed and the depravity to which sexual harassment can degenerate; and the urgency for safeguards by an alternative mechanism in the absence of legislative measures. In the absence of legislative measures, the need is to find an effective alternative mechanism to fulfil this felt and urgent social need.

Each such incident results in violation of the fundamental rights of ‘Gender Equality’ and the ‘Right of Life and Liberty’. It is clear violation of the rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of Constitution. One of the logical consequences of such an incident is also the violation of the victim’s fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) ‘to practice any profession or to carry out any occupation, trade or business’. Such violations, therefore, attract the remedy under Article 32 for the enforcement of these fundamental rights of women. […] The fundamental right to carry on any occupation, trade or profession depends on the availability of a ‘safe’ working environment. Right to life means life with dignity. The primary responsibility fro [sic] ensuring such safety and dignity through suitable legislation, and the creation of a mechanism for its enforcement, is of the legislature and the executive. When, however, instances of sexual harassment resulting in violation of fundamental rights of women workers under Articles 14, 19 and 21 are brought before us for redress under Article 32, an effective redressal requires that some guidelines should be laid down for the protection of these rights to fill the legislative vacuum.”

The court, noting the “absence of enacted law to provide fro [sic] the effective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality and guarantee against sexual harassment and abuse”, laid down several very detailed “guidelines and norms” which would stand “until a legislation [sic] is enacted for the purpose”. In Singapore, as in several other jurisdictions, a court which made such rules would be considered to have grossly overstepped its boundaries by (in effect) legislating. But in Indian law, the courts consider that “it is the duty of the executive to fill the vacuum by executive orders because its field is coterminous with that of the legislature, and where there is inaction even by the executive, for whatever reason, the judiciary must step in, in exercise of its constitutional obligations under the aforesaid provisions to provide a solution till such time as the legislature acts to perform its role by enacting proper legislation to cover the field” (Vineet Narain v Union of India AIR 1998 SC 889 <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1203995/>, discussing Vishaka).

Some pejoratively call this “judicial activism”. Others call this “judicial activism”, but not pejoratively. 

The Vishaka case, and the gloss in Vineet Narain, are evidence for the hypothesis that the courts take on a more active role in lawmaking, sometimes interpreting the Constitution more expansively in order to justify doing so (by saying that the Constitution requires them to), when they perceive that the political branches of the state are not adequately performing their function.

Another piece of evidence for this hypothesis is what is sometimes known as the most famous footnote in [US] constitutional law, namely, footnote 4 of United States v Carolene Products 304 US 144 (1938). The main text of Stone J’s judgment, at [11], speaks of a presumption that legislation is constitutionally valid. But footnote 4 suggests that “legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” might stand to be “subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny”. Again, the court sees itself taking on a more active role when it needs to make up for deficiencies in political processes.

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