In class, I said something about the value in people’s being able to ascertain the content of the law with a sense of certainty, and to have disputes resolved with finality. I meant to mention the following quotation by Robert H Jackson, a US Supreme Court judge: “We [i.e. the court] are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”
Jackson’s famous words may be found in his judgment in Brown v Allen 344 US 443 (1953). We need not concern ourselves with the facts of that case. What matters is this passage:
Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is no doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.
Do you find this disturbing? If so, ask yourself: If the Supreme Court of Newgarth [in Lon L Fuller, ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explorers‘ (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 616] was unable to deliver a clear majority ruling (and only reached the conclusion it did because of the rule that, if there was no majority, then the lower court’s decision would stand), then why would an even higher court lead to a clearer decision? If not, ask yourself: Why have appeals — or, for that matter, any check and balance — at all?
The Kho Jabing saga
For a Singapore case about the issue of finality, consider the case of Kho Jabing. Kho had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Then the Penal Code was amended to allow for a sentence of life imprisonment and caning instead of death in certain cases of murder; and to provide for a procedure by which those who had been sentenced to death but not yet executed could apply to the court for a review of their sentences. Kho made such an application. The High Court ruled that he should be sentenced to life imprisonment and caning. The Prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeal, which ruled (by a 3-2 majority) that he should be sentenced to death. (In the Court of Appeal, all the judges agreed that, when the court has a choice between a sentence of death and a sentence of life imprisonment and caning for murder, “the death penalty would be the appropriate sentence when the offender has acted in a way which exhibits viciousness or a blatant disregard for human life”: see [2015] 2 SLR 112 at para [45]. What the judges differed on was whether there was sufficient evidence before the court to show that Kho had indeed acted in such a manner.)
Next, Kho asked the Court of Appeal to re-open the appeal (see [2016] 3 SLR 135). The Court of Appeal agreed that it had the power to re-open a previously concluded case. But this power, said the Court, is to be exercised sparingly. The Court laid down stringent criteria for when this power would be exercised, and found that those criteria had not been made out. Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s earlier decision would stand. Note that, while the Court of Appeal’s initial decision to sentence Kho to death was by a majority of 3 judges to 2, the Court of Appeal’s next decision not to re-open its earlier decision was a unanimous decision of the same 5 judges. So was the Court of Appeal’s next decision (reported at [2016] 3 SLR 1259), in which Kho made a second application to the Court of Appeal asking it to re-open its decision.
As of 2 January 2021, the power of an appellate court to re-open a previously concluded case is governed by sections 394F to 394K of the Criminal Procedure Code. Focus on section 394J, which specifies when the case may be re-opened (or, to use the language of the Criminal Procedure Code, when a “review application” is to be allowed.) The criteria are more or less the same as those laid down by the court in Kho Jabing. They are very stringent indeed. For example, one must be able to produce new material which had not been, and could not have been, canvassed in court before which is “capable of showing almost conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice”; and it is not a “miscarriage of justice” merely because “there is a real possibility that the earlier decision is wrong” (rather, the decision must have been “demonstrably wrong” or “tainted by fraud or a breach of the rules of [procedural fairness], such that the integrity of the judicial process is compromised”.)
For statements from the Court of Appeal about the importance of finality, see the following passages from [2016] 3 SLR 135 (Kho’s first application to re-open the case):
1 In our recent decision in The Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT International Ltd [2015] 5 SLR 1104 (“TT International”) at [185] and [215], we explained that the principle of finality is an integral part of justice. Judicial decisions, if they are to mean anything at all, must confer certainty and stability. People must be able to order their affairs according to the settled conviction that the last word of the court is the last word, and that the last full stop in a written judgment is not liable to be turned into an open-ended and uncertain ellipsis. As Harlan J said in Mackey v United States 401 US 667 (1971) at 690–691:
… It is, I believe, a matter of fundamental import that there be a visible end to the litigable aspect of the criminal process. Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain view. … If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to the questions litigants present or else it never provides an answer at all. Surely it is an unpleasant task to strip a man of his freedom and subject him to institutional restraints. But this does not mean that in so doing, we should always be halting or tentative. No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing [that] a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.
2 However, the cost of error in the criminal process is measured not in monetary terms, but in terms of the liberty and, sometimes, even the life of an individual. For this reason, where criminal cases are concerned, the principle of finality cannot be applied in as unyielding a manner as in the civil context, and it seems that the court should, in exceptional cases, be able to review its previous decisions where it is necessary to correct a miscarriage of injustice. The question would then be this: when do these conditions obtain? In the present criminal motion (“the Present Application”), we confront this very issue.
[…]
8 Applications to reopen concluded criminal appeals have burgeoned. In 2015, 11 criminal motions of this nature were filed by accused persons in the Court of Appeal alone: six seeking leave to appeal against the outcome of Magistrate’s Appeals and five seeking to move this court to re-examine its own decisions in concluded criminal appeals arising from decisions made by the High Court at first instance. Of these 11 criminal motions, eight were dismissed summarily for being wholly without merit (oftentimes without the respondent in the application concerned being called on to respond); one was withdrawn; one has yet to be heard; while the last (the Present Application, which was also the last criminal motion of this nature filed in this court in 2015), we reserved to consider more carefully. This figure does not include the innumerable criminal motions filed in the High Court, some of which, we have no doubt, also sought to have the High Court reopen its previous decisions in concluded Magistrate’s Appeals, there being no avenue for a further appeal against a decision made by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate criminal jurisdiction.
9 We do not think the present state of affairs conduces to justice. As Jackson J candidly remarked in Brown v Allen 344 US 443 (1953) at 537, “[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones”. We are still paradigmatically a one-appeal jurisdiction. The filing of unmeritorious applications to reopen concluded criminal appeals takes up valuable resources which can and should go towards the disposal of cases which are coming up on appeal for the first time. For this reason, we propose to lay down some guidelines to explain when, and in what circumstances, this court should reopen a concluded criminal appeal. First, we will examine the way in which this issue has developed in our jurisprudence. Second, we will consider the position in other jurisdictions in search of guiding principles which may be used to develop a coherent system in Singapore. Finally, we will gather up the threads of our analysis and distil certain guidelines for application in future cases.
And from [2016] 3 SLR 1259 (Kho’s second application to re-open the case):
[…]
3 When the applicant first applied to set aside the sentence of death on 4 November last year, he made the exact same argument. However, he withdrew his argument on 20 November 2015 when he amended his notice of motion. He did not give any reasons for doing so, but it is plainly his prerogative to amend his motion as he sees fit in order that he might put forward the best case he possibly can. We then considered his application on the basis of his amended motion and we dismissed it. It is an abuse of the process of the court for a person to file an application containing a particular argument, withdraw the argument sometime before the hearing, and then – after his first application is dismissed – file a fresh application premised on the argument which had been withdrawn. If this were allowed, applicants would prolong matters ad infinitum by drip-feeding their arguments one by one through the filing of multiple applications. We cannot allow this. No court would ever allow this. The English courts set their face against this in the 1800s in a case called Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100; 67 ER 313 and we have affirmed that principle many times before this. For this reason, we would dismiss this motion.
[…]
9 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this application. In conclusion, we only wish to say this. The applicant was arrested in 2008. Eight years and an innumerable number of legal applications later, he still stands before this court. When we delivered judgment on 5 April 2016, we stressed the importance of finality (see Kho Jabing at [50]). We said that there comes a point, after the appeals have been heard and the applications for reviews have been decided, when the legal process must recede into the background and give way to the search for repose. We think that time has come.
By the way, the reason why Holmes had first come to my mind is his description of law as “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact” — which would mean that, if the law says A on paper but the courts do B, then the law is, for all intents and purposes, B and not A. If you’re interested, read about the ‘legal realism’ movement.
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