Some time ago, I mentioned instances where the Singapore courts have adopted procedures that no piece of legislation (such as the Supreme Court of Judicature Act or the Rules of Court) says they can take, in the name of preventing a “miscarriage of justice”. Please allow me to illustrate this using two examples.
The first is Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] 2 SLR 192. The background is as follows: Yong had been convicted of drug trafficking; he appealed; he then withdrew the appeal, as the court put it at [17], “on the ground that he had become a Buddhist and was at peace with himself”. Yong then changed lawyers. The new lawyer argued that the withdrawal of the appeal was a “nullity” as it had been, among other things, been “based on a misapprehension that… in order to maintain an appeal against conviction on points of law, it was necessary to lie” (at [18(a)(i)]).
But there was no statute referring to the idea that a decision to withdraw an appeal could be a “nullity”. To the contrary, r 18(2) of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Rules stated clearly that, once an appeal was withdrawn, it “shall be deemed to have been dismissed”; and the Prosecution argued that, the appeal having been deemed to have been dismissed, the court had no more role in the matter.
Yet, the court held that Yong’s decision to withdraw his appeal was motivated by a mistake, and hence a “nullity”. Hence, his appeal was still before the court, and the court could proceed to hear arguments and rule on it. This, said the court, would prevent the ocurt from “circumscrib[ing] its own jurisdiction to render itself incapable of correcting a miscarriage of justice” (at [16]).
This, to my mind, is an example of a procedural innovation by the courts in the interests of preventing a “miscarriage of justice”. The courts, in effect, created the idea that a withdrawal of an appeal could be a “nullity”, with the effect that the case was still before the court. There was no clash with r 18(2) of the Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Rules, because the purported withdrawal was a “nullity” and so no withdrawal had actually taken place.
Note that, at this stage, the court had not ruled on the merits of Yong’s appeal. So when it spoke of preventing a “miscarriage of justice”, this referred to a procedural injustice in the sense of a situation that would prevent Yong from running potentially meritorious arguments; the court did not yet rule on whether those arguments were in fact meritorious.
Another innovation is the idea that the court has the power to re-open a concluded criminal appeal: Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 (at [2]: “the court should, in exceptional cases, be able to review its previous decisions where it is necessary to correct a miscarriage of injustice”). Please see my other forum post titled “Finality in judicial decision-making” for more details.
Leave a Reply