Benjamin Ong's notes

Notes about Singapore public law, etc. for my students (and possibly others)

Is sentencing an exercise in populism? (No)

Some time ago, we discussed the case of Venables, in which one of the issues before the House of Lords was whether the public’s opinions could be a consideration which the Minister tasked with determining the duration of a sentence of detention was entitled to take into account. Some of you noted that the local case of Kho Jabing appears to have addressed a similar issue.

In response, I would like to share with you a passage from Singapore Medical Council v Lim Lian Arn [2019] 5 SLR 739 (HC). In this case, a doctor had pleaded guilty to a charge of professional misconduct; the Disciplinary Tribunal sentenced him to a fine of $100,000. As the court observed at [2]: “There followed a major outcry from the medical profession, many of whom thought the penalty was unreasonably high. Those protesting appeared to be concerned that the decision would set an unacceptable benchmark for other cases…” The Ministry of Health then asked the Singapore Medical Council to appeal to the High Court (see the MOH’s press statement here: https://www.moh.gov.sg/news-highlights/details/moh-statement-on-smc-dt-inquiry-for-dr-lim-lian-arn). 

The High Court ultimately set aside the conviction. The reasons for its doing so are interesting, but will not be my focus here. Rather, I would like to focus on the court’s response to the fact that there was, in the court’s words, an “‘outcry’ from the medical profession after the [Disciplinary Tribunal’s] decision was handed down”, which was a “protest at the perceived harshness of the penalties and warnings of the spectre of defensive medicine” (at [51]). In response, the court had this to say (at [52]):

“… fidelity to the rule of law demands that courts remain independent and not succumb to external pressures: see also Chan Sek Keong, ‘Securing and Maintaining the Independence of the Court in Judicial Proceedings’ (2010) 22 SAcLJ 229 at para 36. Decisions are made within the confines of the case at hand and not under the sway of public opinion. Hence, we bluntly told [counsel for the Singapore Medical Council] that the ‘outcry’ from the medical profession is irrelevant to us because our concern is solely with the merits of the present case.”

 What, then, of the case of PP v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA), which some of you raised in/after class? In that case, the Court of Appeal held that, when a court has the discretion to sentence an offender to death, the court is to do so in the event that (at [44]):

“… the actions of the offender would outrage the feelings of the community.  Undoubtedly, capital punishment is an expression of society’s indignation towards particularly offensive conduct, and the fact that the death penalty continues to be part of our sentencing regime is an expression of society’s belief that certain actions are so grievous an affront to humanity and so abhorrent that the death penalty may, in the face of such circumstances, be the appropriate, if not the only, adequate sentence. It would therefore, in our judgment, be correct to consider the strong feelings of the community in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty.”

At first glance, this flies in the face of the idea articulated in Lim Lian Arn that the courts are not to decide cases “under the sway of public opinion”. How can we reconcile the two cases? The easy answer is that public opinion is relevant to the passing of one kind of sentence (death) but not to another (a fine) or to conviction. But even that would not accurately reflect what the Court of Appeal said in Kho Jabing. The real answer is this: As the Court of Appeal later said in Kho Jabing v PP [2016] 3 SLR 135 (CA) at [89], the “outrage the feelings of the community” test

“does not entail that the court is to sentence by public opinion, with the sentence of death being imposed for the offence of murder whenever a preponderance of the members of the public express sufficient distaste for the accused’s actions. We completely abjure such a suggestion. That is not the way this court or, for that matter, any court elsewhere would administer justice. The test that this court adopted in CA (Re-sentencing) sets out, instead, a reasoned normative standard which future courts are to apply when deciding whether to impose the death penalty for the offence of murder…”

and was, in fact, an objective test that took into account factors such as the offender’s “motive and intention”, etc. (See [2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA) at [45]-[50] for a discussion of the factors to be taken into account.)

In other words, it appears that, despite the reference to the “feelings of the community”, the true test is not whether the public was in fact outraged, but, rather, whether, in the court’s view, the offender’s acts were objectively outrageous. While the Court of Appeal did refer to “society’s belief that certain actions are so grievous an affront to humanity and so abhorrent that the death penalty may, in the face of such circumstances” ([2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA) at [44]), the court did not for one moment seek to formulate a hypothetical ‘reasonable member of the public’ and ask what that person thought. Instead, public opinion was relevant only to the extent that it was the inspiration for what was ultimately an objective test which the court formulated.

I suspect that this approach explains what is going on in cases of apparent bias. In class, I suggested that the “fair-minded observer” is a hypothetical figure that does not exist in practice. But is this a problem? According to the House of Lords in R v Gough [1993] AC 646 at 670, the answer is no: “I think it unnecessary, in formulating the appropriate test, to require that the court should look at the matter through the eyes of a reasonable man, because the court in cases such as these personifies the reasonable man”. This line of thinking has been subject to criticism in various jurisdictions, and ultimately our Court of Appeal rejected it in BOI v BOJ (see, e.g., [91]). Nonetheless, I would like to suggest that one key element of that line of thinking remains: namely, that it is not the court’s function to decide cases based purely on what the public would think. Rather, the point of the BOI v BOJ test, and tests like it, is to remind the court simply that the mind of the public is not like the mind of the court — in other words, to temper the court’s tendency to focus on substance to the exclusion of appearance. 


I would like to add the following about the “outrage the feelings of the community” test in Kho Jabing: I am fortified in my statement that that test is an objective one that, in substance, amounts to asking whether the offender’s acts were outrageous by the following cases:

  • In PP v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 (CA) [45] itself, the Court of Appeal said that the court should “consider the strong feelings of the community in deciding whether or not to impose the death penalty” (at [44]). However, it went on to define “outrage the feelings of the community” as follows: “In determining whether the actions of the offender would outrage the feelings of the community, we find that the death penalty would be the appropriate sentence when the offender has acted in a way which exhibits viciousness or a blatant disregard for human life. Viewed in this light, it is the manner in which the offender acted which takes centre stage. For example, in the case of a violent act leading to death, the savagery of the attack would be indicative of the offender’s regard for human life. The number of stabs or blows, the area of the injury, the duration of the attack and the force used would all be pertinent factors to be considered.” (at [45]) These are all objective factors which make no reference to the actual feelings of “the community”. While the court stated that “capital punishment is an expression of society’s indignation towards particularly offensive conduct” (at [44]), the only role that “society” or “the community” played in the court’s reasoning was this: the court recognised that “society”, through the Legislature, had decided to enact laws providing for the death penalty. That is all.
  • Similarly, in the following cases, the court had to apply the “outrage the feelings of the community” test, but made reference only to objective factors relating to how the offence had been carried out, and not to any actual or inferred feelings of any members of the community: PP v Daryati [2021] SGHC 135, [68]; PP v Toh Sia Guan [2020] SGHC 92, [122]ff; PP v Khoo Kwee Hock Leslie [2019] SGHC 215, [163]ff; Chan Lie Sian v PP [2019] 2 SLR 439 (CA) [84]ff; PP v Chia Kee Chen [2018] 2 SLR 249 (CA) [110], [113], [1135]ff; Micheal Anak Garing v PP [2017] 1 SLR 748 (CA) [54]ff; Panya Martmontree v PP [1995] 2 SLR(R) 806 (CA) [66].
  • In Sia Ah Kew v PP [1974-1976] SLR(R) 54 (CCA) [7] — a case involving kidnapping, which appears to be the first case in Singapore to use the phrase “outrage the feelings of the community” — the Court of Criminal Appeal (which has since been absorbed into the single Court of Appeal that we have today) held that the trial judges, in deciding to impose the death penalty instead of life imprisonment, had laboured under the mistaken impression that kidnapping was “on the increase in Singapore”. This, and other reasons, led the Court of Criminal Appeal to set aside the death sentences and replace them with sentences of imprisonment and caning. This is interesting, because it suggests that a possible reason to impose a more severe sentence is that the crime in question is “on the increase in Singapore”. This does not have to do with the feelings of the community, but it does suggest that, in sentencing, the court is entitled to take into account the needs of the community (in that, if a crime is rampant, then a stiffer sentence is needed to provide the requisite degree of general deterrence).
  • The same can be said of PP v Wang Wenfeng [2014] 2 SLR 636 (HC), another case involving kidnapping. In that case, the High Court had to apply the “outrage the feelings of the community” test in Sia Ah Kew. Again, in deciding to impose imprisonment and caning instead of the death penalty, the High Court said: “For the court to justify imposition of capital punishment on the ground of deterrence, the Prosecution must produce much more evidence to show the inadequacy of life imprisonment (plus caning) as against the death sentence. The only evidence of this produced by the Prosecution was a single incident of murder of a taxi driver in the past five years, which was this present case. There have been a number of cases of serious hurt against taxi drivers, but there is no upward trend nor are the numbers high – the range of such offences vary from two a year to seven a year in the last five years.” (at [31]) 
  • At the most, we have the following remark in para 4 the oral remarks of Tay Yong Kwang JC (as he then was) in PP v Zhou Jian Guang [2000] SGHC 68 (reproduced at [14] of the written judgment): “This offence has certainly not been rampant for the past decade – in fact it was practically non-existent – but I am confident that our society does not feel nostalgic about it.” Read in context, however, this is merely a (somewhat poetic) statement that, though the offences in the case did not warrant the death penalty, they were still serious ones. 

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